As people celebrated Bob Dylan’s birthday yesterday, negotiations in Bonn were ‘tangled up in blue’. ECO would like to inspire negotiators in answering the questions posed by the APA Co-Chairs.

**Should the features and information on Nationally Determined Contributions be tailored to the type of NDCs or should they be tailored on some other basis? If so what? What lessons can be drawn in this respect from the INDCs already submitted?**

‘The times they are a-changin’

Yes, features of NDCs and supplementary information should be tailored but in a manner that facilitates comparability and provides further clarity in relation to what the countries intends to do nationally.

- Explain Fairness: the Lima guidance on information requirement should be enhanced. Parties ought to explain why they consider their contribution to be “fair and ambitious”. Parties should be clear and specific about which baseline, indicators, global mitigation pathways and/or temperature limits they used and how they utilised them to make their determination of fairness and ambition.
- Respect the preamble of the Paris Agreement: new guidance should call on Parties to clarify how they will protect human rights, the rights of indigenous peoples, gender equity, food security, ecosystem integrity and just transition when taking climate action.
- Common five year timeframes: convergence on a single common five year timeframe for future NDCs would enhance comparability of Parties’ actions and avoid future inconsistency of end dates.
- Conditional component feature of NDCs: many developing countries have formulated their current INDCs with a conditional component. This should be an official feature of NDC guidance and needs to specify the precise nature and scale of the support required to implement these conditional activities.
- Not everyone is the same: LDCs and SIDS should be supported in their application of the guidance on the features and information in NDCs and should be allowed to exercise discretion with regards to how they use this guidance when developing their NDCs.
- Nothing to hide: if countries are using market mechanisms (Article 6) to deliver their contribution that should be explicit within the NDC.

**Can the existing guidance on accounting under the Convention be taken into account, and if so how? How detailed or general should the guidance be and what should it address**

‘I want you’
What are some of the experiences and lessons learnt from existing MRV arrangements, and how could they provide a basis for an enhanced transparency framework on action and support?

'Things have changed'

- Learning from existing practices:
  - It is important to build on the existing MRV system, especially the ICA process of Facilitative Sharing of Views, as this could be a helpful platform to match conditional NAMAs to finance and technology needs. It could provide a strong basis for future linkage developing country NDCs with necessary finance, from the GCF or elsewhere.
  - Existing MRV arrangements, such as biennial reports, show a lot of inconsistencies because it is currently left to contributing countries, which tend to overestimate the climate relevance of bilateral finance. They allow countries to inflate the amount of actual support provided to developing countries by, for instance, counting loans at face value rather than only counting grants and grant-equivalent funding. They do not allow a proper assessment of the degree to which financial support is new and additional.
  - Bolster institutional capacity: countries will need to do more to support the UNFCCC Roster of Experts as there will likely be insufficient capacity for the scaling up required by the enhanced transparency system.

What constitutes flexibility for developing countries and how could it be applied through modalities, procedures and guidelines in a way that supports full and effective participation in the transparency framework?

'I shall be released'

- Little by little: there could be flexibility in terms of scope, economic sectors / gases covered, methodological tiers/granularity for estimating emissions and removals and reporting frequency though the IPCC guidance for estimating emissions and removals should be common.
- Progression: there should be a “best efforts” starting point, and those who have previously reported to a certain standard / frequency etc. should do at least that in the new system. Progression to better reporting and estimation over time is critical. It must however be recognised that it has taken many years for developed countries to build and improve their systems so developing countries will also need time to improve their systems.

What input is needed for conducting the global stocktake, by when and from whom? What mechanism/channels could be used to feed this input into the global stocktake?

'Blowin’ in the wind'

- The following inputs should feed into the stocktake:
  - The results from the Second Periodical Review (SPR) of the Convention, which has the Sixth Assessment Report of IPCC and its three Special Reports as main sources, is supposed to consider the adequacy of the long term goal and it should be the main scientific input to the global stocktake in 2023.
  - Assessment of support provided and received: Review of assessment and reports from the SCF, Financial Mechanism, Technology Mechanism, and annual reporting of capacity building activities, in addition to the technical expert review under Article 13 of the PA.
  - National reports under the Transparency Framework for Action and Support (mitigation and adaption).
  - Other inputs from relevant UNFCCC thematic bodies including lessons learned from the Technical Expert Meetings and technical examination.
  - A proper assessment of fulfilment of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement as well as 4.3 and 4.4 of the Convention, drawing on existing work for instance by the SCF.
  - Assessing Equity: Considering that the global stocktake is mandated to be conducted “in light of equity”, Parties will need to identify relevant sources of information and expertise to guide their taking stock of equity matters. In addition to relevant information contained in IPCC assessment reports, inputs from academia and broader civil society should be invited.

How will the global stocktake be conducted, keeping in mind the need for simplicity and relevance, ownership and inclusiveness?

'Forever young'

- Open and Participatory: The global stocktake should be conducted in an open, participatory manner that ensures voices from stakeholders other than parties are taken into consideration.
- Political Momentum: The global stocktake should be conducted at ministerial level to formulate an effective COP decision resulting from the work of the SPR. With the SPR and the associated Joint Contact Group of SBSTA and SBI the same process and body will interact with the 2018 facilitative dialogue and the global stocktake in 2023.
- Science at the heart: The IPCC should be a key participant in the stocktake. Among other functions, it should inform parties on predicted impacts. For example, if Parties’ aggregate mitigation efforts are projected to lead to 3°C of warming, the associated impacts must be clearly communicated and juxtaposed to scenarios with 2 and 1.5°C of warming. It is crucial to have this ready for 2018, based on IPCC AR5.

What is the relationship, if any, between the global stocktake and the facilitative dialogue to be conducted in 2018?

'Knockin’ on heaven’s doors'

- Trial: Parties should use the opportunity of the 2018 stocktake (the “facilitative dialogue” pursuant to para 20 1/CP.21) to trial the modalities for the 2023 stocktake as much as possible. This would mean that modalities for the 2023 stocktake would have to be near final by COP23 in 2017, or SB48 in 2018 the latest, in time for testing at the 2018 facilitative dialogue.
- Learning: there will be an opportunity to learn from the 2018 experience and to improve the modalities for the 2023 global stocktake thereafter in accordance with the lessons learned.
In the two decades that ECO has been calling for action on shipping and aviation emissions, the period between now and Marrakech might be the best opportunity ever for some good news on both fronts.

The need for action has become even clearer in the recent UNFCCC aggregate assessment of the impacts of the INDCs. The report finds that mitigation INDCs of 189 countries now cover 95.7% of global emissions. This leaves 4.3% of global emissions outside of such emissions goals. Most of these are from international aviation and maritime transport, which are not covered by either national emissions targets or sectoral emissions caps.

The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) has set its assembly in October as a deadline to finalise its Market Based Measure to implement the goal of "carbon neutral growth from 2020". This means they will offset emissions growth above 2020 levels in future years, by purchasing credits from outside the sector.

ECO urges the industry to demonstrate leadership and take a solid first step toward tackling the sector’s rapid growth in emissions. Despite facing headwinds, some progress was made in a high level meeting a couple of weeks ago in Montreal. This included making the offset criteria to be adopted mandatory and not just guidelines, and included a review and ratchet clause that explicitly provides for considering further ways that the aviation industry might contribute its fair share towards the long-term temperature goals in the Paris Agreement. On October 7, the global spotlight will be on ICAO to meet its commitment.

On international shipping, Parties have a perfect opportunity to kick-start a real discussion of the sector's fair contribution to the Paris climate objectives. Parties had, as they say “a range of views”, at the Marine Environmental Protection Committee of the International Maritime Organisation meeting. The MEPC decided to consider again the case for creating a working group to address these proposals at the next meeting in October.

There is no reason to delay this further. The IMO is expected to formally agree on a Co2 emissions reporting MRV system for ship emissions later this year. There is already sufficient information and data related to this sector to underpin these important discussions of targets and measures to address emissions. ICAO and IMO, it’s time to align your plans with globally agreed climate objectives.

A Climaterian Emergency

Hundreds of miles from Bonn, climate impacts are capturing the attention of the World Humanitarian Summit, another meeting in Istanbul of decision makers and stakeholders deciding the future of our people and planet. It is tasked with the mammoth challenge of reforming the humanitarian system so it is fit for purpose in our changing world — more interconnected, urban, politically tense and rife with numerous emergencies.

Climate and conflict are topping the bill there. ECO is pleased to see the world outside of the UNFCCC taking climate seriously. But it’s also a sad reality that climate impacts are now on par with conflict.

All is not lost, with communities, countries and stakeholders across the humanitarian spectrum putting forward actions to further build resilience. Multilateral agencies such as the FAO and World Food Programme (WFP) are working to increase the resilience of food security to climate change, for example. Or the array of organisations that now recognise climate action as a prerequisite to peace, or have committed to integrating climate risk into their programming.

Initiatives to build resilience also extend out to the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the Sustainable Development Goals and, of course, the Paris Agreement. It is clear that the UNFCCC is not the only place where climate is being addressed. In the coming months and years, the torch for climate action must be carried across the UN system and in countries and communities worldwide.

Ethics 101: Conflict of Interest

It has come to the attention of ECO that, during the SBI contact group on Arrangements for Intergovernmental Meetings yesterday, many Parties and their lawyers were unclear about the definition of a fairly basic legal concept: “conflict of interest”. ECO knows that many negotiators (and certainly their legal experts) are lawyers. Imagine our surprise when several delegations feigned ignorance of the concept. As a public service to them (and all of us), here are the legal basics:

A conflict of interest may arise when activities, relationships or situations place a public institution, and/or an individual that represents it, in a real, potential or perceived conflict between its duties or responsibilities to the public, and personal, institutional or other interests. These other interests include, but are not limited to, business, commercial or financial interests pertaining to the institution and/or the individual. A conflict of interest, therefore, could be financial in nature or could simply point to diverging interests that may undermine policy objectives or outcomes.

Because nearly every public, and many private, institutions (like law firms) have the potential for conflict of interest, it is the rule, not the exception, that they also have policies to manage them. Indeed, many Parties to the UNFCCC also belong to other intergovernmental institutions like the OECD, where they have endorsed Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service since 2003. These guidelines state in no uncertain terms that “when conflict-of-interest situations are not properly identified and managed, they can seriously endanger the integrity of organisations and result in corruption in the public sector and private sector alike.” Given the potential for conflicts of interest with, say, the fossil fuel industry, ECO hopes that these Parties will therefore not block progress on this matter in the UNFCCC.
4. Japan has one of last remaining major donors for coal financing worldwide. Between 2007 and 2015, Japan financed more coal projects compared to any other G7 country, totaling approximately $22 billion. And worse still, Japan is considering more financing for coal to the tune of almost $10 billion. Let’s not even get started on Japan’s continual claims around “efficient” coal. Just keep it in the ground, Japan!

5. Japan still plans to increase its coal use domestically. This will compromise the country’s 2030 NDC and Japan could face $60 billion in stranded assets.

Japan has a rich history of innovation and advanced technology. It’s no wonder that ECO is left perplexed by their obsession with an old fossil like coal. Japan, it’s time to lead the world, instead of being shamed as an outdated player.