Publications

Submission to SBI/SBSTA on REDD+ Institutions, March 25, 2013

 

Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries (SBSTA/SBI)

CAN International views on existing institutional arrangements or potential governance alternatives including a body, a board or a committee (matters referred to in paragraphs 34 and 35 of FCCC/CP/2012/L.14/Rev.1, including potential functions, modalities and procedures (FCCC/CP/2012/L.14/Rev.1, paragraph 36).

 

1.  Introduction

CAN welcomes this opportunity to contribute to the work of SBSTA and SBI by giving our views on the matters referred to in paragraphs 34 and 35 of FCCC/CP/2012/L.14/Rev.1, including potential functions, modalities and procedures.

CAN considers that REDD+ should be a key component of the new agreement being negotiated by the ADP.  REDD+ can contribute significantly to global emission reductions both in the longer term (ADP workstream 1) and in the shorter term (ADP workstream 2), as well as delivering both biodiversity and social benefits.  However, if REDD+ is to deliver significant emission reductions in the short term then much more effort is urgently needed, by both donor and host countries during phases one and two of REDD+.

We agree with paragraph 34 of the Doha decision on REDD+ finance (FCCC/CP/2012/L.14/Rev.1) that there is a need to improve coordination in the implementation of REDD+ activities (paragraph 70 of 1/CP16).  We are not, however, convinced that a new REDD+ institution would achieve this aim, certainly not at this stage.  We consider that it would be best to decide what needs to be done first and then decide upon how best to do it, via new or existing institutions.

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VIEWS ON POSSIBLE CHANGES TO THE MODALITIES AND PROCEDURES FOR THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM

 

At CMP8, Parties confirmed the decision to review the modalities and procedures of the CDM (CDM M&P) and invited admitted observer organizations to submit to the secretariat, by 25 March 2013, their views on possible changes to the modalities and procedures for the clean development mechanism. The above mentioned NGOs welcome the opportunity to submit their views.

Introduction

The CDM is at a cross-road. In 2012, the market collapsed and prices, currently below one Euro, may not recover any time soon. At current price ranges, it is all but impossible to implement CDM projects that are truly additional.  The reason for the price collapse is two-fold: first, low demand due to very weak emission reduction targets; and second, a significant over-supply of carbon credits due to lenient rules, in particular rules on additionality. Such lenient rules allow for business-as-usual projects to qualify for the CDM and hence have resulted in the issuance of millions of credits that do not represent any emission reductions. Both the lack of demand due to insufficient ambition and the over-supply have to be addressed urgently.

Despite the uncertain future of the CDM, CAN believes that it is important to address its flaws and improve its rules for the following reasons:

1)     Its rules have served and will continue to serve as a blueprint for other carbon market mechanisms. Because the CDM is used as a reference by many other emerging schemes, it is vitally important that its rules are well -designed and have integrity.

2)     Despite the imbalance between supply and demand, a significant number of credits are expected to be used by Parties that plan to join a second commitment period. If these credits come from projects with poor environmental integrity, the CDM will continue to undermine the already weak emissions reduction targets.

 

Climate Action Network's Response to Questions related to the “Paradigm Shift” Posed in the Co-Chairs’ information note on the informal discussion on the business model framework of the Green Climate Fund

 

On behalf of the more than 700 member organizations in the Climate Action Network International, we appreciate the opportunity to provide our comments on Co-Chairs’ information note on the informal discussion on the business model framework of the Green Climate Fund.

This submission will address the “initial guiding questions” posed by the Co-Chairs in relation to the Operational Objectives of the Fund: 

1. What does it mean, in practice, to promote a paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways? 

2. What results will the GCF be supporting to contribute to this paradigm shift? For example, for mitigation, are we only interested in tCO2e, or do we want tCO2e plus some measure of transformational change (for example, some demonstration of fit of activity with national strategy/innovation/fiscal effort)? 

The GCF should promote a “paradigm shift” by scaling-up resource flows for ambitious and effective climate related policies and actions in accordance with country-led strategies. It should incentivize synergies between the GCF’s strategic objectives and the achievement of overall national development strategies and the production of development co-benefits. To achieve these objectives, civil society and other stakeholders must be full partners, both at the international and national level, in determining the way in which the GCF will finance climate action. 

Towards this end, the Board should adopt the following definition of “paradigm shift” as part of its strategic vision or business model for the GCF: 

A paradigm shift involves a strategic, long-term, and fundamental re-orientation towards low-emission, climate-friendly, climate-resilient, pro-poor, gender-equitable and country-driven development. Such a transformation must be undertaken on the basis of country-owned strategies, plans and programmes that are developed and implemented through participatory and inclusive processes and that are integrated into developing countries’ core development plans. 

This understanding of “paradigm shift” includes three essential elements: (1) ambition, (2) country-led planning, and (3) participatory and inclusive decision-making. 

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Climate Action Network International Submission to ADP Chairs on Workstream 1: Post-2020

(a) Application of Principles of Convention

 
Equity, including a dynamic approach to common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRRC), must be at the very heart of the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action Workstream 1 if it is to be able to deliver adequately for the climate. The internationally legally binding protocol now under negotiation must include common and accurate accounting, MRV, strong compliance and enforcement, all respecting the principles of equity, including CBDRRC. It must have fair targets and actions that are consistent with the strong likelihood of meeting a 2°C global carbon budget, and thus keeping 1.5°C budget within reach. It should build on, develop and improve the rules already agreed under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol.
 
The failure to consider equity principles for a global effort sharing agreement – an equitable approach to sharing the costs of mitigation and adaptation amongst countries – has been a stumbling block to agreeing sufficient ambition. Adaptation must be treated with the same importance as mitigation. Countries are concerned that they will be asked to do more than is their fair share, and conversely that other countries will ‘free ride’ off their efforts. A common understanding of fair shares can help overcome this trust barrier and lead to higher levels of ambition from all. Countries must urgently start their work to increase understanding of, and further agreement on, ways and options for the allocation of fair shares of the global effort.
 
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Climate Action Network International Submission to ADP Chairs on Workstream 2: Pre-­2020 Ambition

At successive UNFCCC meetings, Parties have acknowledged the existence of a multi-gigatonnes gap between the current level of ambition to mitigate emissions until 2020 (expressed in QELROs, pledges, targets and NAMAs) for the period until 2020 and what is required in that period to allow the world to stay below the critical 1.5/2°C threshold. According to the Climate Action Tracker, current pre-2020 ambition (expressed by countries in QELROs, pledges and NAMAs) puts the world onto a path of 2.7-4.2°C warming. There is a consensus within the scientific community that we are fast approaching a devastating tipping point. In this context it is alarming that governments have not taken any steps yet to close the gap but allow it to grow. According to UNEP, the estimated emissions gap in 2020 for a “likely” chance of being on track to stay below the 2°C target is 8 to 13 GtCO2e, while it was 6 to 11 GtCO2e in the 2011 report. Global emissions are currently 14 per cent above where they should be to have a likely chance to limit global warming to no more than 2°C.

 
Some Parties seem to hope to get away with misinterpreting “enhancing ambition” to mean to continue to mitigate after 2020, and to leave the current pre-2020 ambition gap untouched – at least as far as own action is concerned. This is a highly irresponsible assumption. Raising the ambition level of action before 2020 is a prerequisite to stay below the 1.5/2°C threshold.  
 
With sufficient political will, that is lacking for instance in the US, China, EU, Canada, Japan, Australia and Russia, emissions can be brought to a level by 2020 consistent with staying below the critical 1.5/2°C threshold. UNEP's “Bridging the Emissions Gap 2012” report asserts that this is possible and economically feasible, using existing, mature technologies. In fact it should be common knowledge by now that if nothing more is done to increase the current unconditional pledges, costs would be much higher to reach deeper reductions in later years and/or the adaptation needs would be far greater.

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Climate Action Network International Submission to the 5th Meeting of the Technology Executive Committee: Optimizing the Technology Executive Committee/ Climate Technology Centre and Network Relationship

 

The text of the draft Doha decision, Agreed outcome pursuant to the Bali Action Plan, asks COP 19 to “initiate the elaboration and consideration of the relationship of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network, in order to ensure coherence and synergy within the Technology Mechanism…”Climate Action Network (CAN) is very pleased for the opportunity to offer this submission which focuses on supporting that goal, under items 2 and 3 of the TEC’s rolling work plan, by describing an efficient cooperative vision for the relationship and by providing additional detail, by example, of where, in our view, the relationship might benefit from further elaboration.
 
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Climate Action Network International Submission to the 5th Meeting of the Technology Executive Committee: Technology Assessment in the Technology Mechanism: Suggestions on the Way Forward

 

Now that the components of the UNFCCC Technology Mechanism – the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) – have been established and will become fully operational this year, there are areas of their respective mandates that could benefit from further elaboration. Among these is the ways in which the TEC and CTCNcould address Technology Assessment(TA), an area that will become increasingly crucial as the Technology Mechanism fulfills its mandate to facilitate and enable the actual development, transfer and deployment of environmentally sound technologies (ESTs) for countries, particularly developing and least developed countries and small island states, to address the impacts of climate change.
 
Para 61(a) of the Agreed Outcome on the Bali Action Plan adopted in Doha Recommends the
Advisory Board of the Climate Technology Centre and Network, in considering the programme of work of the Climate Technology Centre and Network, to take into account. Providing advice and support to developing country Parties, including capacity-building, in relation to conducting assessments of new and emerging technologies, in accordance with decision 1/CP.16, paragraphs 123(a)(i) and 128(e).
 
While the Doha Decision made reference only to the possible role of the CTCN in providing advice, support and building capacity in conducting assessments of new and emerging technologies, we would like to stress that there is an important role to be played by the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) in undertaking activities related to TA. As part of its mandate to consider and recommend actions to promote technology development and transfer with the goal of accelerating action on mitigation and adaptation,the TEC has already identified TA as a focus area. In its Rolling Workplan for 2012-2013, adopted at its second meeting, the TEC has identified possible guidance on technologies based on technology assessments as an outcome that is expected to result from its work in preparing an inventory of relevant technology briefs, technical reports and technical papers beginning in 2013. So far, there have been initial exchanges of ideas on TA within the TEC at its fourth meeting held in Bangkok in September 2012, with members seeking clarity on the nature and extent of the TEC’s involvement in TA and its value in the dissemination of ESTs.
 
As complementary components of the Technology Mechanism, the TEC should give policy limate Action Network International Submission to TEC, March 2013 guidance on TA while the CTCN provides support, operational guidance and capacity building to developing countries on the conduct of TA.
 
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Climate Action Network Position on Market Based Measures (MBMs) for International Aviation-February 2013

 

International aviation is a major and fast-growing source of greenhouse gas emissions. Despite on-going discussions for over 15 years within the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) there exists no legal instrument which addresses the limitation and reduction of emissions of the international aviation sector globally, even though emissions have grown to the point where aviation represents an estimated 4.9% of global radiative forcing.  Further, aviation activities are being under-charged from an environmental perspective. Yet there is high potential to reduce these emissions globally, beyond the energy efficiency measures being developed and considered under ICAO. Carbon pricing would be an effective means of addressing this situation and can be applied fairly and equitably.
 
The current year – 2013 – is a crucial year for decisions on the adoption of market-based mechanisms to address aviation emissions. The European Commission proposed in late 2012 a one year “stop the clock” exemption, temporarily deferring enforcement of the obligation of aircraft operators in respect of incoming and outgoing flights under the EU’s Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) to give a final chance for the adoption of a global approach through a multilateral process under ICAO. In late 2012 the ICAO Council created a High Level Group on Climate Change to provide political impetus towards agreement on measures to address GHG emissions, including a global market-based measure (MBM). The highest decision making body of ICAO – its triennial Assembly – is meeting in September/ October 2013. Since it only meets every three years it is essential that an ambitious global MBM for addressing the sector’s emissions is agreed upon at this year’s Assembly.
 
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Climate Action Network Submission on Joint Implementation to the UNFCCC, February 2013

 

INTRODUCTION
 
According to Decision 12/CMP.8 paragraph 12 admitted UNFCCC observer organizations are invited to submit
further views on how the joint implementation guidelines and other decisions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol pertaining to joint implementation should be revised. The above mentioned NGOs welcome the opportunity to submit their views.
 
OVERALL OBJECTIVE
 
Paragraph 3 “Stresses the need to ensure the continued success of joint implementation after the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol in contributing to the achievement of the objective of the Convention;” (Doha guidance relating to JI).
 
CAN welcomes the emphasis of ensuring that JI supports the objectives of the Convention which are: “to achieve […] stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.” (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change).
 

CAN Statement given at the UN Security Council Arria meeting on climate change and security

 

CAN Statement at UN Security Council Arria Meeting

15 February, 2013

Given by Wael Hmaidan, Director of Climate Action Network 

 

Thank you Co-chair:

I am making this statement on behalf of Oxfam and the Climate Action Network, a coalition of more than 700 national and international NGOs.

Let me join others in thanking governments Pakistan and the United Kingdom for providing us with this opportunity, and also thank the panel for their excellent input.

For many years, civil society has warned that our collective planetary failure to cut greenhouse gas emissions entails grave consequences. These consequences are already being felt, first and foremost by the poorest and most vulnerable within our societies. They include a heightened risk of poverty, inequality, instability, and conflict that ultimately affects us all; and they demand an unprecedented commitment to collective action to drastically reduce this risk.

Nowhere can this climate risk be more clearly seen than in the global food system. 870 million people will go to bed hungry tonight, a billion more are malnourished. They are among the billions of people in developing countries that are dependant on agriculture for their livelihoods. As net food consumers, many spend more than 50% of their incomes on food. Many are living in post-conflict or fragile States.

Climate change means they are facing increasing uncertainty from rising temperatures and changing rainfall patterns that act as a drag on crop yields. Droughts or floods can wipe out entire harvests, as we have seen in recent years in Pakistan, in the Horn of Africa and across the Sahel. And when extreme weather hits major world food producers – like last year’s droughts in the US and Russia – world food prices rocket. This presents a major risk to net food importing countries, such as Yemen, dependant on imports for 90% of its wheat consumption.

It is clear that mass hunger, exacerbated by climate change, can be a major driver of instability. As the Zulu proverb goes: "Plenty sits still, hunger is a wanderer." The food riots and social unrest seen in the wake of the 2008 food price spikes were not a one-off phenomenon, but a sign of the risks we face through our failure to feed a warming world.

Extreme weather has continued to drive and exacerbate food price volatility in the years since. This week the US seasonal drought outlook warned that severe drought conditions persist in much of the region. With other major producers like Australia and Russia either suffering or barely recovering from extreme heat and drought too, and with world cereal stocks falling again, world food security remains on a knife-edge. 

In addition to these new and increasing pressures on the food system, climate change is also driving scarcity in critical natural resources like water and land. While conflicts between and within countries over such resources are driven by multiple factors, it seems clear that in many cases climate change is a contributing or exacerbating factor, that should be taken into account in our efforts towards prevention and risk reduction, crisis management and peace-building.

Finally, we are gravely concerned by the prospects for mass displacement of people within States and across borders - which the Security Council has already recognised as a threat to international peace and security - driven directly by climate impacts like sea level rise, droughts, desertification and indirectly by its impacts on food and natural resources. For countries such as Bangladesh and many Small Island Developing States, the threat to their people is already visible; but it is a threat which peoples around the world – rich and poor alike – will face in the coming years and decades.

We recognise that the decision to leave one's home and community is often the result of multiple factors, but that climate change impacts are often a critical driver. For example, the thousands of people who were displaced from Somalia into neighbouring countries in 2011 were not only fleeing conflict, but in search of food in the wake of drought. As climate change impacts become increasingly severe and in some cases permanent, unlike migration driven by conflict or natural disasters, climate-forced migrants may have no hope of ever returning home. Without adequate provisions from the international community, the consequences of displacement and landlessness on such a scale for international peace and security will be profound.

For more than 20 years, global civil society has raised the alarm about the diverse consequences of rising greenhouse gas emissions on our international community. We are already seeing the impacts in our work around the world, and we know from scientists that the window to prevent further, non-linear and catastrophic impacts is now rapidly closing. As repeatedly urged by the Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, leaders must act fast with all the tools available to reduce this risk.

This includes a major scaling-up of public investments to help communities and countries adapt to the changing climate. It includes a gear-shift in international efforts to cut greenhouse gas emissions to prevent much greater harm. And it includes adequate preparation for permanent loss and damage inflicted by climate change, including the establishment of a new international mechanism under discussion at the UNFCCC and the recognition of new rights for climate-forced migrants.

We stress that many of these initiatives can and must be delivered through the UNFCCC, - in particular through the legally binding global instrument to be adopted by its 2015 conference. The UNFCCC should remain the central locus of fair global efforts to confront climate change. But given the far-reaching consequences of our ongoing failure to take decisive action in that forum, we are grateful for the opportunity to explain again here today the gravity of the risks we see posed to the international community by unchecked climate change.

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