Publications

• Thanks and Introduction

• As the US has noted, words matter. I'd like to respond to her request for any wording that specifies there is still work left to do.

• First I will add that context also matters. There are now more than 30 Parties in the room. This is more than we have had for a very long time----probably not since as far back as at BKK-2 here 3 years ago (as the EU has already observed)

• This is an indicator of how the context is changing---momentum may be swinging back to one where CB is afforded the degree of importance and attention it has always deserved (in CAN's view at least)

• Putting context and words together, we need to go back to Marrakech and 2/CP-7 to find the right words and a mandate for further work

• In the chapeau to Section VI of 2/CP-17 (the most recent LCA text on CB, which this group agreed in Durban) you will find the following words; "CB should be a continuous, progressive and iterative process that is participatory, country-driven and consistent with national priorities and circumstances"

• Those words form the basis of the Marrakech Framework for Capacity Building in Developing Countries, which underpins all UNFCCC work on CB. They have been in the chapeau of every COP decision on CB since Marrakech. However, as can sometimes be the case, because they are so basic, sometimes they get forgotten.

• The three key words here are the adjectives: "continuous", (most importantly) "progressive", and "iterative". Taken together, they mean we are never done (as in fact the EU has already acknowleged)

• As the EU has also already observed (holding exactly the same view as CAN) while there may well be no Bali Building Block solely for CB (as the US has pointed out, as a reason for discontinuing work) the LCA agreed to create a dedicated discussion precisely because evidence from the ground demonstrates there is still a long way to go on developing capacity for developing countries - action must continue, must be progressive, and must be iterative

• Jamaica and Burundi in particular have spoken eloquently of the unfulfilled capacity needs that still need to be addressed – precisely the same ones CAN has been emphasising time and time again

• CAN has also been maintaining for a long time that unless some sort of effective and dedicated CB oversight and co-ordination structure is created, these capacity needs have very little chance of ever being adequately met

• In this light, we do not unfortunately (referring again to the US emphasis on the importance of words) consider that the Cancun para 137 requirement to further elaborate institutional modalities has been fully implemented by merely establishing the Durban Forum

• With all due respect to its potential utility as a dialogue, the Durban Forum is only scheduled to meet for one day in 2013 and (presumably) one further day sometime in 2014

• CAN's suggested yesterday that the LCA could neatly conclude its work on agenda item 3 f) by mandating a COP-18 decision for the COP to supervise an intensive 2 year programme of work in the SBI throughout 2013-2014, offering the opportunity for some concentrated work across and through 4 full sessions of the SBI

• With sufficient content, this programme might be worthy of being called the Doha Capacity Building Action Plan

• Thanks again Chair and delegates for this opportunity. We look forward to further opportunities to offer our assistance and views

SPEAKING NOTES – Pat Finnegan on behalf of CAN-International

• Thanks and Introduction
• As the US has noted, this is a relatively small group of negotiators, and there is a sense of community
• However, equally, this morning it is clear that the debate continues to be largely binary, and is polarised into two largely opposing sets of views
• The role of NGO's is very often (we like to think anyway) to assist Parties to move forward and make progress
• In that light, CAN would like to respond to the US view that there is no text on the table, there is no decision to have text, and there is no mandate for text
• The secretariat has (as usual) done its usual excellent work in providing material for this session
• Nevertheless, CAN would like to point out that missing from the decision matrix is any reference to 13/CP-17 (the Durban decision on CB that this group agreed)
• 13/CP-17 para 6 decides to further enhance the framework for capacity building under four main headings:

• But para 6 contains no detail on how to implement and deliver these decisions
• As the EU has observed, there are other opportunities to move this forward
• With all due respect to the Durban Forum on Capacity Building (as mentioned by the EU and others) CAN does not believe that is capable of moving fast enough, or substantially enough, given that it is just a one day session to be held once a year and is not scheduled to be held again until next June (2013)
• CAN is suggesting Parties concentrate their forces right now instead on working towards a substantive COP-18 decision in Doha establishing an intensive two year programme of work in the SBI, dedicated to further enhancing developing country capacity and means of support, and to building an institutional structure capable of ensuring universal delivery by 2014
• Such a decision does not actually require a mandate from the LCA. But CAN suggests that a LCA decision to provide one would give the appropriate stamp of approval for some concentrated work through the COP and in the SBI between 2013-2014
• We hope this suggestion may help Parties in moving forward.
• Thanks again Chair and delegates for this opportunity
• We look forward to further opportunities to offer our assistance and views

Kyoto Protocol rules allow countries to carry over any unused (ie. surplus) Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) into the next commitment period. A number of countries, such as Russia, Ukraine and Poland, have very large surpluses of AAUs. By the end of 2012, up to 13 billion AAUs, could be carried over into the Kyoto Protocols second commitment period. This is almost three times the annual emissions of the European Union or more than twice those of the United States.

This surplus threatens the viability and effectiveness of international climate policy regimes. If no restrictions are placed on the surplus of Kyoto units, weak pledges together with the surplus will allow countries to have emissions that are as high as business-as-usual emissions are projected to be in 2020. This holds true even if the largest surplus, that of Russia, is excluded.  Allowing the full AAU surplus to be carried over could eliminate the chances of avoiding dangerous climate change by overshooting the +2˚C limit agreed by all Parties to the UNFCCC in Copenhagen in 2009.

The issue has to be addressed by the end of 2012 when the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol ends, otherwise the existing rule that allows full carry-over will be applied by default.

By COP18 in Qatar a solution must be found to make a second commitment period under the Kyoto protocol viable and to avoid stifling progress on a new global climate deal called for by the Durban Platform. The Climate Action Network International (CAN-I) urges the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to fully address the issue of surplus AAUs and makes the following recommendations:

• Almost all of the surplus must be eliminated, including surplus emissions credits from the CDM and JI e.g. solutions based on the proposals made by AOSIS and the African Group. Both proposals would eliminate approximately 95% of the Kyoto unit surplus.
• The surplus must be eliminated permanently. Option that would not restrict the carry-over but limit the use of any carried-over surplus are insufficient because they do not resolve the question of what would happen to the surplus after the end of the second commitment period. The surplus could continue to exist decades from now.
• To be eligible to use any surplus AAUs, CERs and/or ERUs at all, a Party must have a reduction target for the second commitment period that is lower than its 2008 emissions.
• A new “hot air” AAU surplus must be avoided at all costs in the next commitment period. The current limited emission reduction targets of Russia, Ukraine and the EU risk generating a further AAU surplus within the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, on top of the existing surplus AAUs from the first commitment period. Any 2020 reduction target for any Annex I country must be substantively lower than current baseline emission estimates.
• Annex I countries must significantly raise second commitment period emissions reduction targets and participation in the Kyoto Protocol. Higher targets would work most effectively if combined with a stringent limit on the use of the surplus. According to UNEP a combination of stronger reduction targets with stricter Kyoto rules (such as the reduction of the surplus) is needed to keep the global average temperature increase below +2˚C.
• CAN-I calls on the G-77 to develop a joint proposal based on the proposals made by AOSIS and the African Group.
• CAN-I calls on the EU to find an intra-European solution so it is able to take a clear position at the UNFCCC negotiations. If the EU wants to maintain its constructive and proactive role in the climate mitigation arena it needs to follow up with clear and strong positions on elements that could threaten the environmental integrity of a future global climate regime.
• If the EU and the G77 put their diplomatic weight behind a joint position, it would greatly increase the chances of addressing the AAU surplus to strengthen the environmental integrity of a second commitment period and a new climate treaty to be agreed by 2015.