Eco Digital Blog

To be or not to be (binding)

So let us make sure we understand this correctly: the African Group, AOSIS, the G77, the EU, the UN and even the Umbrella Group want a legally binding instrument.

So where’s the problem?

It's true the acoustics are bad in the FIRA conference center, but ECO is quite sure it heard everybody saying that they want a legally binding instrument to be adopted in Copenhagen.  And yet, most of them are saying it can’t be done because “there isn’t enough time.”

Whatever happened to “where there’s a will, there a way”?

It is true that the delay in the US Senate provides the perfect excuse for those who say they want a deal but are really only stalling for more time. But more time do to what exactly? More time to allow emissions in both Annex I and  non-Annex I to grow even higher; more time to continue building inefficient cars and buildings; more coal plants; more deforestation.
So many climate disruptive activities, so little time (or is it too much time) . . . one has to admit this “time factor” has gotten us all confused.

Some delegates have even expressed disappointment at the lack of ambition by a certain chair who, not so long ago, was proudly displaying a “Mind the Gap” t-shirt.

Could it be, then, that Parties are having a hard time figuring out what it is they want to be legally binding.  In the course of the past few days, we’ve heard everyhing from a “politically binding agreement” (now there an oxymoron if we’re ever heard one), a “legally binding treaty,” and a “legally binding approach” to a “comprehensive universal agreement” (a real favourite) which would include, as ECO heard in one corridor conversation, future human colonies to be established on the Moon and Mars.

But in the interest of time (back again to haunt us), we should use what precious time e have left to do what is needed for the atmosphere, to sustain our respective national interests and, not least, to protect those who are and will be suffering the most from climate impacts.

In a recent response to a particularly short-sighted editorial in the Canadian Globe and Mail entitled “Targets set without a plan, and costs that are perilous”, the British High Commissioner to Canada, Anthony Cary, replied that “We can’t talk to the atmosphere.”  Need we say more?

A Convenient Truth


Never waste a good crisis, runs the adage. On Wednesday, the (IIASA) presented a new report outlining Annex I mitigation costs and potentials based on the effects of the economic crisis. The report uses post-crisis GDP projections based on the IEA’s 2009 world energy outlook.

Here are the headlines
•    In 2020 Annex I emissions are 6% below 1990 levels in the reference scenario.
•    The cost of implementing the most ambitious Annex 1 pledges would be  -0.03% to 0.01% of GDP.
•    The carbon price settles at EURO 3 per tonne.
•    An extra 10% reduction could be achieved at the same equilibrium carbon price (-27% instead of -17% from 1990).
•    Some country targets are well above their emissions in the reference scenario, which could create a new surplus of emissions rights.

In other words, it is now much easier to achieve the emission targets we need. The world is demand investments in the infrastructure of the 21st century – renewable energy, smart grids and mass transport. The economic transformation we need could become a job-generator for economies blacking out with systemic unemployment. And we can save our climate, which is set on a course to disaster.  So the economic crisis also turns out to be an opportunity, but this means making a choice.

For the benefit of parties, as an example here is a table of new economic models on the costs of the EU’s 30% reduction pledge, in the light of the crisis.

And what is true for the EU is true for Annex I as a whole: emissions caps developed for a pre-crisis world can easily been tightened again in a post-crisis world, to benefit both the climate and the economy.

A Little Clarity, Please

Now that the dust has mostly settled and Parties are back at the negotiating table in the KP track, it is a good moment to take stock and reflect on the African Group gambit earlier in the week.

An important result from Wednesday's plenary is that industrialized countries will put their emission reduction targets on the table with no further delays, including the portions that will be met through international offsets and from land use change and forestry.  It is truly amazing that after four years of negotiating the post-2012 regime this information isn't readily available.

Some Annex I countries haven't even tabled their overall targets yet.  (And ECO won't comment here on the non-Kyoto major developed country and whether they have numbers on the table.)

It is no wonder that many developing countries are feeling more than a little frustrated by the lack of progress on emission reductions commitments from rich countries.  If all developed countries actually delivered the requested information on their targets it would, at long last, provide the needed clarity on their opening bids, including how much of their effort will be domestic actions to reduce emissions, as well as how much will simply be bought from abroad.  And countries planning on achieving a large portion of their target from LULUCF credits could be queried for clarification on how they expect to do so without resorting to weak accounting rules that allow phantom credits.

The agreement to put these details on the table is an important moment in the negotiations. But mind you, what this development does not do is deliver actual decisions, like an aggregate target for developed countries. If that kind of progress isn't seen soon, no one should be surprised if frustrations rise further and tactics become bolder. Of course, further breakdowns, here and going forward in Copenhagen, can be avoided if developing countries see political leadership from their rich counterparts on the critical issues such as Annex I emission targets.

Linking Conditions for Human Dignity: Climate Protection and Human Rights

When the African Group raised the stakes in the KP plenary earlier this week, its representatives explained that the action was prompted by the serious human suffering already occurring in Africa due to climate change.  This was an important reminder that negotiators must preserve and strengthen human rights language in the negotiating text.

Human rights are the expression of the most basic conditions necessary for a life of dignity.  In that light, the link to climate impacts is obvious.  As the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights concluded in a study released earlier this year, “Climate change-related impacts … have a range of implications for the effective enjoyment of human rights.”

The current negotiating text refers to the human rights implications of climate change as well as the need to protect vulnerable peoples.  This is a critical step in the right direction.  However, these references need to be fleshed out and strengthened.  Human rights must be central to the definition of both the problems created by climate change and their solutions.

The shared vision text explicitly recognizes that climate impacts “have a range of direct and indirect implications for the full and effective enjoyment of human rights.”  This welcome language should be strengthened by reaffirming that “human beings have the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being,” as recognized in the Stockholm Declaration, which is itself referenced in the UNFCCC.  The shared vision should also emphasize that a successful international climate framework will require effective mechanisms for participation at the local, national and international levels, reinforcing Article 6 of the UNFCCC and the Rio Declaration.

The “four pillars” text must also include rights language.  The mitigation text should reiterate Parties’ existing obligations to respect, protect and promote human rights.  Similarly, negotiators must reinsert the reference to human rights obligations removed from the adaptation text in Bangkok, and strengthen text on spillover effects that would ensure that human rights, such as the right to food, guide efforts to identify and prevent such harms.  In addition, strengthening the paragraph on climate-induced migration and linking it to human rights would provide crucial protections for the millions likely to be displaced as a result of climate change.

The European and InterAmerican courts of human rights have both recognized that access to information and participation in decision-making are fundamental to protecting human rights in the context of environmental threats.  The text must therefore guarantee all relevant stakeholders the rights to information and participation for all relevant stakeholders, including free prior informed consent for indigenous and other communities in accordance with international obligations.

Last month, the government of the Maldives held an underwater cabinet meeting to highlight climate impacts that would threaten the right to statehood itself.  From Africa to the Alps to the Islands, the rights of vulnerable individuals and communities require explicit protection in the final Copenhagen agreement.

As Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey said in September, “It is essential from a human rights perspective that the Copenhagen accord not only ensures the reduction of dangerous greenhouse gas emissions, but also guarantees the participation of citizens.”

USA is named a 'Fossil' at UN climate talks

fossil of the day

Barcelona, Spain, November 4, 2009: At the halfway point of the UN climate talks in Barcelona this week, the USA was named as ‘Fossil of the Day’, with Canada coming in second, by a vote of the Climate Action Network International (CAN-I) – a global coalition of over 450 leading non-government organisations. The daily award is given to those nations judged to be the ‘best’ at blocking or stalling progress in the global climate negotiation that day.

The first-place 'Fossil Award' was given to the USA for delaying passage of domestic climate change legislation.


The US ratified the UN's 'Framework Convention on Climate Change' in 1992, promising to reduce its greenouse gases emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. But it has failed to meet this promise. The US delegation to the international negotiations now says they will follow the lead of the Congress – so the delay in climate legislation hamstrings the US delegation's negotiating ability.

Earlier this year, when the House of Representatives pushed forward climate legislation, it seemed likely that domestic legislation would be passed before the crucial Copenhagen climate summit this December. Recent delay tactics in the US Senate – boycotts and commissioning redundant economic analysis – leave the world wondering whether the US will get it done.

“Other countries – developed and developing alike – have moved forward, committing to emission reductions and advancing prospects of a global deal,” said Sara Svensson, a youth climate activist from Sweden.
“It is time for the US Administration and for those on Capitol Hill to get the job done. Their lack of action undermines international trust in the UN negotiations and endangers the prospects of reaching a global solution to climate change.”

The second-place 'Fossil of the Day' award was given to Canada, completing a picture of North-American delay tactics at the UN. The award was given for the announcement of Environment Minister Jim Prentice that, for a third time in so many years, Canada was going to postpone the adoption of the regulatory framework for large polluters in Canada – until after the Copenhagen Climate Summit.

As recently as September, Minister Prentice promised a full suite of regulatory policies by Copenhagen. This additional delay prompted CAN-I to send a message to Canada: "Third strike, you're out"...

The current Canadian commitment is to reduce it's GHG emissions by 3% below 1990 levels by the year 2020, falling well short of it's commitment under the Kyoto protocol. According to the UNFCCC, Canada has one of the worst emission records of all the industrialised world.

The satirical awards were presented in a game-show style ceremony – complete with a presenter adorned in a bright Spanish flamenco outfit – at the conclusions of the day's negotiations. is described as ‘the most fun you can have at a UN conference,’ where the dominant dress code is the grey suit.

Beyond Borders: Progress on a Global Level

Two experienced UNFCCC activists explain how to become “climate smarties” and create a fair, effective and ambitious global climate deal.

Generally, when we discuss the effects that greenhouse gases have on the world’s atmosphere, we prefer the term climate change. Global warming simply isn’t an accurate description. But we do like one thing about this description: it reminds us that the problem we face isn’t just local or national, it’s global. Humanity is experiencing a global problem -- and that problem requires a global solution.

The United Nations has a very important part to play in fighting climate change. It provides a forum for governments to work together, and hammer out solutions to international problems. Global problem- solving is a long, slow process -- and a thankless one a lot of the time. You may have read news articles about the countless international conferences on global warming and wondered what goes on at those meetings. Different nations bring competing agendas to the table; representatives from all nations must overcome language and cultural barriers; and national governments face pressures at home from business, organized labor, and opposition parties. The world’s glaciers may be receding faster than international agreements can move forward.

And yet, despite all the impediments, the world’s nations make progress. Even better, sometimes they enjoy huge successes, such as the international agreement to stop the destruction of the ozone layer. Our world today is a safer place because of global agreements.

Global agreements hold countries accountable for certain actions and give nations a set of rules enforced through United Nations international law.

The world’s governments have been struggling with climate change for more than 20 years. The process has been painfully slow, and those governments still have a lot to do. But, right from the start, every country (well, almost every country) agreed that no one nation can solve the problem of climate change alone.

Why Global Agreements Are Important

Countries can do a lot to tackle global warming individually, as we discuss in Chapter 10. But the problem is far too great, and the solutions are far too complex, for countries to attempt to address climate change on their own. Each country is responsible for a portion of greenhouse gas emissions and has the ability to reduce global emissions anywhere from a fraction of a percentage up to 25 percent. But it is only with a collective effort that global emission can be reduced 50 to 80 percent. The world needs a global agreement to reduce greenhouse emissions and fight climate change.

Excerpted from Global Warming for Dummies, Elizabeth May and Zoe Caron (John Wiley & Sons, 2008).

Hatoyama Initiative: Is That All There Is?

Is this it? Hope not.

When Prime Minister Hatoyama of Japan announced his “Hatoyama  Initiative” for financing developing country actions in his speech at the UN Summit in September, ECO was enthused about several of the principles laid out in his speech: "substantial, new and additional public and private financing" . . . "innovative mechanisms to be implemented in a predictable manner" . . . "an international system should be established under the auspices of the UN climate change regime."

Naturally, ECO was looking forward to hearing more about all this.  This Monday, there was an announcement from Japanese delegation about the Hatoyama Initiative as an input to the LCA finance informal group.

Frankly, this was a disappointment and it took a day or so to sink in.  First of all, the announcement lacked the drama ECO had anticipated, and the paper was not even distributed.  After finally acquiring and reading the text of the submission, things were even more puzzling.

Japan's proposal suggests establishing three funds and a 'dating agency.'  So far, so good.  But it does not address many of the crucial issues about financing, and it almost looks like they got hold of the US proposal and copied their homework from that.

For example, the proposal does not address the scale of the funds required, and so it falls short of the principle of "substantial, new and additional." It has a mixture of voluntary pledges and a levy on an offsetting mechanism – but relying on pledges is against the spirit of Bali.  Finally, Climate Change Funds and Green Enabling Environment Funds seem to be managed by existing institutions like the World Bank and GEF with guidance of COP.  But is this what "under the auspices of the UN climate change regime" means?

The government of Japan is said to be developing the proposal further.  And so, ever helpful and practical, ECO has one suggestion: let's come back to principles and rebuild this initiative from scratch. After all, Japan still has time to come up with a clearer, stronger proposal for Copenhagen.

The Quagmire of Baseline Years

Although voices from many quarters in Barcelona are complaining that the US delegation has put no numbers on the table, there is one number that just keeps popping up. That number is 2005, the base year for the US legislation currently on the table.

Even though it was four years ago, 2005 just happens to be the year of the highest US emissions in history. Coincidence?  You be the judge.  But to the point, this proposed base year distorts an important discussion on 'comparability' and has become a red herring in assessment of the adequacy of the scale of mitigation targets.

The US delegation often seems to insinuate that 1990 was just an arbitrary base year. Of course, 1990 was not selected at random: it was the year of the IPCC’s First Assessment Report; the year when the world began negotiating what became the Convention.

But arbitrary or not, shifting to a different base year like 2005 allows the US to imply that the EU proposed mitigation target of 20% by 2020 relative to 1990 is about as ambitious as that in the US legislation. In effect, this amounts to suggesting that emissions reductions elsewhere between 1990 and 2005 are irrelevant to negotiations today.  The comparison we really should be making is the distance between the proposals on the table and what the science is saying we have to do.

Many countries including the US failed to begin reducing emissions between 1990 and 2005.  But greenhouse gases cannot simply be written off by changing the base year. They collect and persist in the atmosphere, and all the while carbon sinks have been degraded and lost.

Countries may find it domestically convenient to use a different baseline year, but this presents several problems. Converting reporting data from one country to another appears to be simple enough in theory.  But in practice, measurement, reporting and verification requires comparing apples to apples.  Converting multiple data points across multiple countries using a variety of different baselines is a convenient recipe for confusion and avoiding the big picture (remember? “compare the targets to what the science demands”).  So even if the experts can provide conversion formulas for differing baselines, there is still a question of public transparency and accountability.

And finally, if the baseline changes, so must the targets. Were we to use a 2005 baseline, the IPCC says global emissions should come down 35-50% by 2020 (as opposed to 25-40% with a 1990 baseline). In the context of history and science, using 1990 is not at all arbitrary.

Canada: Three Strikes, You’re Out

Last week, Canadian environment minister Jim Prentice did a great job not protecting the environment. First he broke his promise to reveal the government's full suite of climate change policies before Copenhagen. As of now, there's no word on when the strategy (the third in four years) would be completed or even when draft regulations will be tabled.

So yes, strike three. And the minister will travel to Copenhagen with an empty briefcase (unless it contains a manual on how to continue disrupting progress in the climate talks).

A few days later, the minister reacted to a groundbreaking economic modeling study showing that Canada could dramatically reduce emissions by 25% in 2020 relative to 1990 levels, as well as build a strong economy and boost employment. His response to this great news?  It was “irresponsible” to contemplate such a plan because the study showed annual growth rates between now and 2020 would drop mildly from 2.4% to 2.1%.

Here's what the minister didn't say: No mention of the economic opportunities provided in clean energy solutions. Nothing about Canadian emissions being 47% above 1990 if the country continues to do nothing, and nothing about the economic impacts of dangerous climate change.

Minister Prentice made it clear that his primary concern is the economic cost to Alberta, home of the tar sands and his own constituency. Yet the study showed that Alberta would still grow faster than every other province. Seems that, for the Canadian government, unhindered growth and damage from the tar sands trumps action on climate change. Now that’s “irresponsible.”

Commissioning the Climate Finance Castle

When constructing a solid building, starting from scratch is often more efficient and cheaper than to trying to retrofit an existing building for a new, much larger purpose.  In the same way, developing countries argue that when it the design of the financial mechanism, a new architectural approach is needed.

ECO observes that over the last two years the construction of a modern home for climate finance has progressed significantly, with one particular building block providing an increasingly solid foundation from which the rest of the design can benefit: the Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol.

This result has come about because of solid guidance from the commissioning body (the Kyoto Parties) combined with the time and attention of the architects (the Adaptation Fund Board) to carefully lay out the necessary details of both form and function.

First, developing countries will soon be able to use their keys to access the front doors (direct access through national implementing entities), or enter through the side (multilateral implementing entities) if their personal keys do not yet fit.
Second, house rules are crucial for the successful long-term maintenance of the castle. The condition for obtaining a key will be agreeing to the house rules (that is, special attention to particularly vulnerable communities and sound fiduciary management standards).

The crux of the matter in this construction project is that all those who commissioned the Adaptation Fund (the Kyoto Parties) had equal influence and represented a balance of interests in guiding the architects. Clear instructions from the commissioners to the architects were a crucial precondition for a solid and successful construction, while the architects had to work out the operational details. In the event, the architects did good work last year before Poznan, where about 99% of their proposals satisfied the Parties without major controversy, with significant additional progress over the last months.

The same principles applied successfully to the Adaptation Fund 'building' also will apply to the climate finance 'castle.'  The heading for the instructions for the climate finance blueprint (‘guidance’/’authority’) is not sufficient by itself. The climate finance architects must also be clearly accountable to those who have secured their services. Furthermore, the architects must adhere to their original instructions rather than project plans other clients propose.

There is no complete agreement yet on what the final climate finance castle will look like. But ECO has checked the plans and is pleased to see that many proposals reflect elements of the Adaptation Fund blueprint.

The Japanese finance proposal published on Monday contains an explicit reference 'to take into account the current practices of the Adaptation Fund.'  The US finance proposal also outlines support activities administered by domestic institutions in host countries. This sounds quite compatible with the way the Adaptation Fund architects designed the direct access modalities.

The Group of 77 and China are reasonably demanding their own keys (direct access), but also a balanced representation of all Parties in the group of architects. So there are positive signs that the blueprint of the Adaptation Fund is now providing a useful model for constructing the climate finance castle, extending well beyond just adaptation finance.

Now that one building block of the climate finance castle is laid, it is crucial that the necessary investments are made, since this part of the castle is much smaller than what is needed to fulfill the requirements of climate finance.  Putting in additional resources to the Adaptation Fund would consolidate and accelerate the castle construction work immediately.

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