Tag: unfccc global warming

As parties walk into the LCA contact group on Shared Vision this morning, ECO will be thinking ahead to a final destination does not yet look clear. Nearly all Parties agree to a global goal of staying below 2o C, and even so, more than 100 parties call for stabilizing temperature rise at well below 1.5o C compared to pre-industrial levels.   But the current path Parties are taking us towards is a close to a 4o path. So we hope the contact group proceeds with the right motivation and a visionary mindset. The Shared Vision discussions can help avoid the 4o path only if parties engage in a constructive and trust-building dialogue today that will advance the text in substance, move towards convergence of views and provide clarity to both.

ECO has been excited about the buzz that’s been created around closing the gigatonne gap over the last few days. Delegates are waking up to the need to raise ambition, close loopholes and seek new and innovative solutions to cutting emissions. But ECO would like to remind developed country delegates that it’s not just a mitigation gap – it’s a finance gap too. In line with the mandate to implement all elements of the Bali Action Plan, billions in new, additional, public finance are needed to support nationally appropriate mitigation actions in developing countries.  Failure to do so would keep the gigatonne gap wide open.

ECO has always called for “rules before targets” when it comes to land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF). We certainly don't want to repeat the mistakes of Kyoto, when LULUCF rules were negotiated specifically to allow countries to meet their emissions reduction targets, rather than to aid in climate change mitigation or adaptation.  In that light, it makes sense for the Chair of the AWG-KP to call for rules to be finalized.

While ECO applauds the push to finalize text here in Bonn, agreeing the current LULUCF proposal would be even worse than the status quo. The proposal currently tabled would frame rules that actually allow countries to increase emissions and not account for them. This will seriously undermine targets for Annex I countries before they are even finalised. We assume this isn’t what the Chair of the Kyoto Protocol really wants to see.  In fact, it contrasts rather dramatically with the approach being proposed for REDD, which starts from the assumption of emissions reductions from non-Annex I countries.

Forest management accounting rules on the table from Copenhagen allow countries to hide or ignore substantial increased emissions from forest management in their baselines. Around 400 MT annually could be released without being accounted for, equivalent to 5% of the total 1990 emissions of all Annex I parties, and a significant fraction of their proposed reductions post-2012.

Instead, what we need is a strong and unambiguous commitment to deliver emissions reductions and increases in removals in this sector, in the form of a goal in the LULUCF framework. We also need to see protection for existing forest carbon stocks. We urge all parties to consider the consequences of enshrining hidden emissions increases into a climate deal and to instead move rapidly to reduce emissions from land use, land use change and forestry.

ECO has always called for “rules before targets” when it comes to land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF). We certainly don't want to repeat the mistakes of Kyoto, when LULUCF rules were negotiated specifically to allow countries to meet their emissions reduction targets, rather than to aid in climate change mitigation or adaptation.  In that light, it makes sense for the Chair of the AWG-KP to call for rules to be finalized.

While ECO applauds the push to finalize text here in Bonn, agreeing the current LULUCF proposal would be even worse than the status quo. The proposal currently tabled would frame rules that actually allow countries to increase emissions and not account for them. This will seriously undermine targets for Annex I countries before they are even finalised. We assume this isn’t what the Chair of the Kyoto Protocol really wants to see.  In fact, it contrasts rather dramatically with the approach being proposed for REDD, which starts from the assumption of emissions reductions from non-Annex I countries.

Forest management accounting rules on the table from Copenhagen allow countries to hide or ignore substantial increased emissions from forest management in their baselines. Around 400 MT annually could be released without being accounted for, equivalent to 5% of the total 1990 emissions of all Annex I parties, and a significant fraction of their proposed reductions post-2012.

Instead, what we need is a strong and unambiguous commitment to deliver emissions reductions and increases in removals in this sector, in the form of a goal in the LULUCF framework. We also need to see protection for existing forest carbon stocks. We urge all parties to consider the consequences of enshrining hidden emissions increases into a climate deal and to instead move rapidly to reduce emissions from land use, land use change and forestry.

The US proposal on financial architecture has received considerable interest over the last few days, and with good reason. It is an interesting mix of new and old, good and bad, promising and perverse.

ECO can see movement in two respects.

First, after consistently resisting calls for a new institution, the US has now endorsed the creation of a new fund.

Second, as Article 11 requires, the US has agreed that the fund should be under the guidance of and accountable to the COP; that the COP should determine its policies and priorities; and that it should have balanced and equitable representation of all Parties.

The more cynical among ECO readers may wonder whether restating the provisions of the Convention really counts as progress. But we will take movement wherever we can find it. After all, in the quest for a useful negotiating text, we could do a lot worse than the Convention itself.

It now appears that we have a broader basis for agreement on parts of some critical issues of financial architecture and
governance (we are assuming, of course, that the silence of some other umbrella Parties and the EU can be taken as assent). And it would appear that the US has heard the concerns of developing countries regarding simpler administrative procedures and, perhaps, on direct access to financing.

The proposal may also provide a basis for a deal on another contentious issue – the use of existing institutions. Many Parties have expressed their bitter experience and deep frustration with the procedures and governance of multilateral development banks. And while ECO is not a Party, we cannot see giving a policy-making role to an institution like the World Bank. Its own senior sustainable development economist recently called the Bank’s continued support for coal a moral imperative. Another contentious issue is a reaffirmation and expansion of the role of the GEF, which may provide additional fodder for developing countries to resist this proposal.

But we understand that the US may wish to use existing institutions only for fiduciary oversight and auditing functions, leaving the substantive work to the new mechanism and its technical panels. If this is indeed the US position, they should say so clearly. Nobody wants to see this money squandered, so the need for strong fiduciary oversight should attract broad support.

Unfortunately, the US proposal brings us no closer to agreement on a number of other key issues. All countries except LDCs will be expected to contribute, and there are no guarantees that the funds that are made available will be new and additional to existing ODA.  And assessed contributions are off the table. Instead, the fund is to be replenished on a voluntary basis. Periodic pledge parties, rather than a common understanding of historic responsibility and capacity, will determine contributions. This ECO is told will maximise contributions and provide predictability.

Other issues remain to be resolved. Key among these are the specific makeup of the board, how it will be appointed, and whether there will be separate thematic windows.  But for the US, these issues can be negotiated. The key point is that it provides sufficient fiduciary assurances that donors will put money into it.

Of course, fiduciary oversight is only an issue if there is actually money to safeguard. Now let us see some movement on scale. ECO has previously stated that US$150 billion of public financing is required to deal with climate change in developing countries.