CAN Press briefing - 1 June 2010
Submitted by dturnbull on
Tags:
Related Event:
Tag: unfccc bangkok
C’mon Aussies
Submitted by Anonymous on
Australia seems to be making progress – moving recently from its insistence on ending at 6pm to allow an extra hour of fun for KP discussions. But Australia, this simply will not do.
We cannot get to an ambitious agreement in Copenhagen under such conditions. You have got to do away with the pleated pants and pocket protectors, let your hair down and get ready for some late nights and long fights, but we promise the climate will thank you in the end. Furthermore, what are you possibly going to do in Barcelona at 6pm? The restaurants are not serving dinner and those “friends” of yours are a bad influence.
Australia, it is time for you to become climate cool.
Africa Must Unite on REDD
Submitted by Anonymous on
Africa’s forests are attracting increasing attention. And for two good reasons:
One, they hold great potential as a carbon sink.
Two, unsustainable land use, agricultural expansion, commercial harvesting and urbanisation are causing massive deforestation and forest degradation.
When African REDD [Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation] negotiators put together their country strategies, ECO highlights that for REDD to work for Africa the first step is to recognise the complexity and diversity of Africa’s forests as a whole. Their forest cover is about 635 million ha and account for 16% of the world’s forests.
Seventy per cent of the African people depend on forest resources for their survival. As forests and trees play a crucial role in the socio-economic development of the people, thinking of Africa in a united manner and diversifying livelihood options for the poor would ensure greater REDD success in Africa. At the same time, the underlying causes of deforestation and degradation must be addressed.
IEA World Outlook: Our Planet is Worth Saving
Submitted by Anonymous on
The benefits of taking serious steps to solve global warming far outweigh the costs, says the International Energy Agency (IEA) in its World Energy Outlook 2009 Climate Change excerpt report released yesterday.
A tool for the IEA’s regular projection of global energy use and global warming pollution, its report this time is particularly significant as the IEA has often been criticised for inflating costs and underestimating benefits. In this instance, the IEA used a measure of 450 ppm when the latest science shows the world needs to find a way to stay below 350 ppm to avoid even costlier effects of climate change. Hence, the IEA’s findings are actually quite “conservative” which make them even more compelling.
The IEA report provides the first analysis to account for the global impact of the financial crisis on energy emissions and the first time that they broke down their 450 ppm scenario on a country-by-country basis. Looking at 2010 to 2030, the report found:
• A total additional investment of $10,500 billion will be needed to bring global emissions slightly below current levels
• Savings in energy costs will be $8,600 billion
• Reduced costs of local air pollution will be $40 billion in 2020 and $100 billion in 2030
• Every year of delay will increase the energy sector’s mitigation costs by $500 billion.
Measures that provide economic benefits in the medium term will already yield positive results for the climate. Yet, it has to be noted that for staying below 2oC with good certainty, actions greater that those estimated by the IEA are required. Even so, based on its analysis it is fair to say that costs will remain reasonable compared to the massive benefits of taking action.
Other findings of note state:
If we do not take action we are headed for a 6°C world (a 1,000 parts per million one)
We can get onto a path to solving global warming with the right investments. Clearly it requires a large investment and political focus to drive these results but it pays off. Energy efficiency is the dominant source of reduction (65% of the reduction in 2020), followed by renewables (17% of the reduction).
Oil imports are reduced. In the industrialised countries imports are reduced by 7 million barrels per day in 2030 below what they were in 2008; in China and India oil imports are lowered by 10%. These kinds of energy security benefits and consumer savings drive tremendous public support for climate action in many nations.
Big reductions in local air pollution as a result of taking action on global warming pollution. In 2030, sulphur dioxide emissions are 29% lower, nitrous oxide emissions are 19% lower and particulate matter is 9% lower. This saves $200 billion in 2030 for the cost of pollution control and lessens the impact of smog and other air pollutants that contribute to asthma, death and lost work days (just to name a few).
Hence, it is loud and clear that taking action on global warming at Copenhagen is a good investment for the world – the balance sheet is positive. The IEA’s new analysis adds to previous assessments which stated that addressing global warming saves countries money compared to continuing with the current business-as-usual pathway. And this does not include the costs of global warming impacts which will tip the balance sheet even further in favour of taking action.
The IEA’s report shows that addressing the climate challenge can reap financial benefits. As a clear and strong outcome in Copenhagen will unlock this potential, ECO calls on world leaders to focus on driving these solutions.
Tags:
Show us the Emissions
Submitted by Anonymous on
As ever in the arcane world of Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry LULUCF negotiations, progress towards a shorter text this week has not necessarily made it easier to understand. ECO has even caught whiff of some positive changes, though it is hard to get more than a whiff when everything is behind closed doors.
There is still something smelly in the draft text and it is hiding behind a bland name – projected baselines for forest management. Here is how it works: A Party tells you what its emissions from forest management will be during the commitment period and then will only be given LULUCF credits or debits if actual emissions are different from this projection.
ECO is confused (this is LULUCF after all). Depending on what level these “projected baselines” are set at, this could mean Parties might never have to account for their logging emissions. A country can pretend that its emissions from forest management are going to increase and not incur any debits, as long as this increase was predicted ahead of time. ECO shudders to think what this type of approach would mean if applied to all sectors.
Luckily, not everyone is behind this ruse. Past submissions from Norway and Switzerland have expressed a preference for accounting for changes in emissions from a historical level. Other countries may be out there that support such an approach, but they are hard to see; hidden inside the EU bloc on this issue. ECO calls those Parties to step out and identify themselves.
Is it any wonder, with ideas like this still on the table, that the G77 and China are considering how to cap credits from the entire LULUCF sector?
Build on Kyoto’s Strengths
Submitted by Anonymous on
The Kyoto Protocol is the first small step in industrialised countries taking the lead to fight climate change. While there have been some growing pains along the way and there is definitely room for improvement in some areas, the Kyoto Protocol forms a strong basis upon which to expand industrialised country commitments. ECO would like to take a moment to remind Parties what is good and what needs to be improved in Kyoto.
At its core, Kyoto is an internationally binding multilateral framework that requires that all play by the same rules: from how they account for their own emissions, which credits they can use towards their targets and what the consequences of non-compliance are. This cannot change. To ensure a level playing field, we must continue to compare apples with apples and not let Parties pick and choose their own rules domestically.
In other words, the legal nature of the obligation (quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives (QELROs)); the base year (1990); the gases and their global warming potentials (GWP); the sectors; the land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) rules; and the accounting (assigned amount units (AAUs)) or the concept by another name; and reporting, review and compliance must be the same for all industrialised country Parties. They must not be subject to any loopholes that their domestic laws may provide. When industrialised countries’ Parties finally step up to the plate and recognise their financial obligations to support action in developing countries, the financial reporting rules will also need to be the same.
There are many areas in which the Kyoto Protocol could be improved. This is not surprising as Kyoto was a first foray into uncharted waters. However improving is different from fundamentally changing the architecture. The most obvious section of Kyoto that needs to be improved in the next commitment period, but one that seems to be lost on most industrialised countries is the targets inscribed in Annex B and the aggregate in Article 3.1. ECO expects Parties to reach an agreement on a -40% below 1990 aggregate target for 2020 here in Bangkok as conclusion on this agenda item is well overdue. ECO also hopes to see development of the review and compliance regime of Kyoto.
Finally, let us not forget all of the good work the expert review teams have been doing behind the scenes to help Parties improve the quality of their inventories and national registries and systems, and resolve disputes related to data submissions. The international review process keeps Parties “on their toes” as they never know which issues might be raised. The power of expert review teams to adjust emissions data serves as a further incentive for Parties to produce high quality emissions data.
As the review of initial reports demonstrates, these adjustments are not insignificant amounts. A total of 124 potential problems were identified; 117 of these issues were resolved through a dialogue between the reviewers and the Party. This demonstrates the cooperative and problem-solving nature of the review process. The remaining problems related to two Parties where adjustments were made. While the work of the ERTs is largely facilitative, it does help to have “the stick” of referral to the Compliance Committee to ensure access to data and the full cooperation of Parties. Adopting a peer review mechanism with no referral function or dispute resolution procedure would lose these crucial elements and undercut the effectiveness of the regime.
ECO finds it rather ironic that some Parties are now using Canada’s recalcitrance as an example for why Kyoto Protocol compliance has not worked. All this goes to show is that automatic early-warning triggers are required to bring Parties before the Committee (and not that the Committee itself does not work). ECO would be more than happy to refer recalcitrant Parties to the Compliance Committee, if Parties would only give us such an opportunity.
With only 10 negotiating days left until Copenhagen, let us focus on sewing up a deal that builds on Kyoto’s strengths rather than unravelling this multilateral structure in favour of domestic flexibilities.
[Article published in Climate Action Network's Eco Newspaper, Oct. 5, 2009 from Bangkok, Thailand UNFCCC negotiations - full PDF version here]
All Aboard?
Submitted by Anonymous on
The industrialised countries are pushing forward a model for a Copenhagen agreement based firmly around carbon markets coupled with weak targets. By and large, developing countries are not boarding any train headed to weak targets. Ever stopped to wonder why?
Industrialised countries talk about carbon markets and offset mechanisms in particular as if they are doing developing countries a favour, by providing financial flows from North to South. In fact, at least under the Clean Development Mechanism, it is more accurate to say that developing countries are the ones doing the favour – by giving Annex I countries a way of meeting their targets on the cheap.
The carbon markets question is emerging as one of the key fault lines in the negotiations. It cuts across discussions on Annex I targets, finance and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions. Until the discussion is reframed, it will be hard to make the progress we urgently need to see.
Part of the problem is that Annex I negotiators may be too busy to read the analysis by their own technical experts. Take the European Commission’s recent Communication on climate finance. Put aside for the moment the fact that the Commission’s model would give high probability of exceeding 2oC warming. The Commission says that developing countries will need around Euros 100 billion per year by 2020 for adaptation and mitigation. Carbon markets would provide around 40% of this total – and public finance from international sources would be some Euros 22-50 billion per year.
However, the Commission’s headline figures are based on an assumption that cumulative Annex I targets are 31% below 1990 levels by 2020. Has anyone seen that sort of ambition actually on the table here in Bangkok?
The EU has been less keen to draw attention to perhaps the most important line in the Communication. This concludes that if cumulative Annex I reductions end up at around 10% below 1990 levels, this “would require an increase in the transfer of international public finance to developing countries of around Euros 120 billion per year in 2020.”
Such “radical” voices as McKinsey, in its recent analysis for Project Catalyst, give the same simple message – weak targets require much, much higher levels of public finance from Annex I countries for mitigation in developing countries. There is no free lunch.
Unfortunately a lot of industrialised countries’ negotiators can’t get their heads round the simple maths, and are trying to have it both ways. ECO is clear – if markets are to play a role, enabling conditions must first be in place. Low Annex I targets do not enabling conditions make.
At Bonn III, developing countries called for a fundamental debate on the role of carbon markets in the Copenhagen agreement, and have strongly repeated the call here in Bangkok. An honest discussion of the conditions under which carbon markets could contribute to keeping warming well below 2oC is long overdue. Let’s strip out double, triple and quadruple counting and concentrate on what the atmosphere sees. And address the concern that the rich world is picking all of developing countries’ “low hanging fruit.”
The EU and other industrialised countries are sitting in the carbon market train wanting to discuss the colour of the seats, and wondering why developing countries won’t jump on board. The developing countries are on the platform waiting for the engine to turn up.
[Article published in Climate Action Network's Eco Newspaper, Oct. 5, 2009 from Bangkok, Thailand UNFCCC negotiations - full PDF version here]
The Elephant in the Room
Submitted by Anonymous on
Look carefully around you: there is an elephant walking the hallways in Bangkok (it’s not the local type). It’s an intangible but very sizable beast: 7.5 to 10 Gt CO2e worth of surplus assigned amount units (AAUs).
It’s important to understand the scale of the AAU elephant - almost a third of current, best-case Annex I pledges. If this gets off the track, it threatens to undermine real emissions reductions and collapse the price of carbon when carried over from Kyoto’s first commitment period to a post-2012 regime. This represents a serious threat to the goal of limiting warming to as far below 2oC as possible.
The collapse of economies in transition during the 1990s produced real social and economic hardship. Yet emissions fell dramatically, delaying the reduction of carbon space in the atmosphere.
However, this was by no means the result of climate policy, and rewarding this phenomenon as “early action” contravenes the principle that only targeted, policy-driven changes in greenhouse gas emissions should be accounted for. In addition, to no one’s surprise, surplus AAUs are currently the “grubby outcasts” of the carbon market (even worse than HFCs).
It wasn’t the best idea in Kyoto for Parties to allocate the surplus, but they can join together to correct this error in Copenhagen.
If countries with surpluses want to trade, that needs to be part of a credible, environmentally sound solution.
For example, countries holding extra AAU amounts could agree to a stringent discount (e.g., 60%) of the surplus, if carried over, and the remaining Annex I countries could increase their pledges by another 5%, insuring that overall Annex I aggregate emissions stay more than 40% below 1990 levels in 2020. If countries can’t agree to this kind of solution, carry-over should be forbidden under the Copenhagen agreement.
The EU Commission took a strong position on the AAU surplus issue. Options they have been considering should be rolled into the kind of compromise described above. AAUs cannot be used for compliance in the EU post-2012 climate and energy package. Now the EU can set the tone internationally, reaching a solution to absorb its surplus out of the global compliance system before Copenhagen.
Russia and Ukraine have set 2020 targets, but according to IIASA, those levels could actually be achieved by business-as-usual emissions growth from current levels, while still generating hundreds of megatons of credits annually. Talk about a free elephant ride!
This could divert huge financing flows away from mitigation in developing countries.
Russia and Ukraine should set more ambitious targets, well below BAU, and address the current surplus. While their emissions collapse slowed the growth of GHG stocks, this would be reversed if the Kyoto surplus was used to achieve targets, and especially so if future weak targets generate yet more questionable credits. From ECO’s viewpoint, that would be about as absurd as watching a magician pull an elephant out of a hat.
Tags:
Restoring EU Leadership
Submitted by Anonymous on
Rewind 10 months to December 2008: in Poznan, negotiators prepare for another day of working group discussions. Meanwhile the rest of the continent is intently watching Brussels, where European leaders make the big political decisions on the EU’s 2020 climate package.
Now fast-forward one year to December 2009: it’s mid-session in the climate talks in Copenhagen and European leaders are again meeting in Brussels. What sort of leadership can we expect?
Europe still talks a good game on climate change and headlines their place at the head of the Annex I pack. But the cracks in confidence in the EU’s leadership have turned into chasms of concern as ambition has weakened.
At a moment when the vast majority of countries want a strong agreement but the negotiations remain mired in distrust and distraction, ECO suggests that European delegates consider these steps toward restoring EU climate leadership.
Step one is to communicate a compelling vision of what success looks like at Copenhagen: a vision based on staying as far as possible below 2oC through a global transition to low carbon economies and sustainable development for all.
Step two is to demonstrate that actions lead to success. That means moving onto new ground with mitigation and finance proposals that reflect scientific necessity rather than political expediency, and not simply waiting to see what the others will do first.
Step three is to shift the dynamic of the negotiations from ‘after you’ to ‘follow me’ – to build an “ambition coalition” of countries willing to take round after round of stronger action as others take steps for action and support. Together, ambition and action will lead to success.
The EU showed real leadership when it first tabled its 20%-30% target for emissions reductions below 1990 levels by 2020 - the first major emitter to make a unilateral agreement of this kind. It is ahead of most Annex I parties in its willingness to negotiate seriously on climate finance. But there are some problems.
• Rather than preparing for success by setting out a plan to move to 30%, many European countries seem to be quietly hoping that they can stick to 20% and avoid another battle with carbon polluting industries.
• Rather than sending a strong signal that Europe is serious about building a low carbon economy at home, it has proposed achieving much of its target through land use loopholes and cheap international offsets.
• Rather than recognising the need for additional, innovative and sustained public financing flows to help ambitious developing countries transform their economies and adapt to climate change in the coming decades, it is busy lowering expectations of Europe’s “fair share” of the bill.
It’s still not too late to turn this around. The economic crisis has created an opportunity.
Europe’s emissions have fallen to a point where achieving a 30% reduction is no more difficult or costly than 20% was expected to be when leaders signed on the dotted line. In fact, by adopting more ambitious targets, Europe can ensure that the economic recovery is built on low carbon investment rather than a return to business as usual.
Furthermore, if the EU really wants to reaffirm its role as a climate change leader, it will move toward a 40% reduction target. Not only is it the right economic pathway for Europe, it is also the most credible political strategy for success at Copenhagen.
[Article published in Climate Action Network's Eco Newspaper, Oct. 2, 2009 from Bangkok, Thailand UNFCCC negotiations - full PDF version here]
Tags:
Comparability of Effort and Chances of Survival
Submitted by Anonymous on
Parties should welcome the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the nations of Kazakhstan, Turkey and Zimbabwe. Their action affirms Kyoto’s continued value and demonstrates a commitment to sparing humanity from catastrophic climate change.
A Copenhagen agreement that does not aim for a high probability of ensuring the survival and sustainable development of all nations, and the welfare of the most vulnerable, is not acceptable. The targets currently tabled by developed countries fall well short of guaranteeing these core objectives. Those targets put us on a trajectory to wipe sovereign nations off the map, add to development challenges and increase human suffering.
There is a very narrow envelope of possible emissions pathways to 2050 that have an acceptably high probability of avoiding the worst impacts of dangerous climate change. These pathways require peaking global emissions within the next 5-year commitment period and achieving reductions of at least 80% below 1990 levels by 2050.
Developed nation commitments must be based on a science-driven approach. A weak, bottom-up approach to reduction targets combined with loopholes and offsets creates a race to the bottom and a crash course on the harsh reality of catastrophic climate change.
Carbon markets should play a role in a post-2012 agreement only if the currently tabled developed country reduction targets are increased dramatically. In addition, the hazard of surplus AAUs must be addressed. The rules on LULUCF, offsetting and AAU banking must be consistent with keeping temperatures well below 2oC.
There is no avoiding the fact that deep and real emissions reductions are needed now. There simply is no atmospheric space for evasion of responsibility. For this reason, agreements in the KP track must be consistent with agreements in the LCA track in order to avoid double-counting, promote consistency, avoid loopholes and ensure the environmental integrity and fairness of the overall Copenhagen agreement.
The Kyoto Protocol provides a clear framework for industrialized country action. Rapidly evolving scientific evidence on the growing impacts of global warming does not allow for any more time to be wasted in renegotiating its architecture. Copenhagen must deliver robust, quantifiable, legally binding emissions reduction targets for all developed countries consistent with our world’s shrinking carbon budget.
The existing monitoring, reporting and verification systems are essential to help ensure environmental integrity. The compliance system must be strengthened and expanded to include an early warning system to correct projected shortfalls as well as stronger consequences for non-compliance if early warning does not lead to a remedy. The system of 5-year commitment periods is vital to allow for reviews based on new science, particularly the 5th IPCC assessment report due in 2014.
Developed countries are deliberately blurring discussions by taking different rather than common approaches to negotiating their targets. Agreement must be reached here in Bangkok on a more than 40% aggregate reduction target by 2020 compared to 1990 levels, 5-year commitment periods, and an agreement on supplementarity. Only when these elements are fixed can fair, effective national targets be negotiated and the “comparability of effort” be evaluated, and our chances of survival be elevated.
[Article published in Climate Action Network's Eco Newspaper, Oct. 2, 2009 from Bangkok, Thailand UNFCCC negotiations - full PDF version here]
Pages
