Tag: oil

Oil King Turns Solar Pioneer?

Have a strong coffee, shake your head and rub your eyes. Saudi Arabia, the well-known guardian of fossil fuel interests, is planning a massive renewable energy scheme in its country. So says the news in the region and rumours from inside the Royal Family and their ministries. Apparently 52 Gigawatts (GW) of renewable power will come online by 2030, 130% of existing electricity generation capacity - most of it as concentrated solar power and the remainder as solar photovoltaics and wind. Reportedly, the government is looking for a quick start, with about three GW to be installed in 2013 and another four GW in 2014.

It all started about one year ago when Saudi Arabia announced a US $100 billion investment for solar power, which was followed shortly after by oil minister Al-Naimi declaring to the media "Saudi Arabia plans to generate solar electricity equalling the amount of its energy from crude exports”. Although the current plan does not come close to that ambition, it still represents a remarkable and substantive move. For comparison, in 2011, which was another renewable energy boom year, total newly installed renewable power worldwide was about 80 GW.

ECO is not naïve. We know that high oil prices on world markets of more than $100 per barrel are strong incentives for any oil exporter to save the crude domestically and reap the benefits of exports. Certainly one, if not the key, motivation for the Saudis presently.

But there is another logic. Saudi Arabia admits that using renewable energy makes much more sense than “abundant” fossil fuels. And expanding renewables substantially, for whatever reason, is good for our atmosphere and the climate. Each ton of CO2 saved through renewables is one ton saved permanently. Could we also imagine that some clever folks in Saudi Arabia assume that the desire for fossil fuels in the world economy will end some time before we physically run out of them? We should be reminded that OPEC’s call for increased oil prices in the early 80s met with this advice from the then oil minister Yamani of Saudi Arabia to his peers: “The stone age did not finish because mankind ran out of stones”. Is it now time to assume that the Saudis are seriously preparing to export solar and become a technological hub for solar industry manufacturing?

Before ECO applauds Saudi Arabia’s constructive contribution to climate change policy, ECO would like this renewable energy target officially confirmed in Riyadh and announced internationally. If this happens, ECO will rub its eyes again and be happy to publicly acknowledge a landslide in Saudi policy, especially when those with greater responsibility are shirking their pollution reduction obligations.

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"CAN Collectibles" Series! NORWAY

Announcing: A New "CAN Collectibles" Series!

Fast Facts About Countries That Can Increase Their Ambition in Qatar

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Best things about Norway: Brown cheese, 2600 km of ski tracks around Oslo and vast fish stocks
When in Norway: Don't talk to strangers on public transport. Norwegians will consider you
Norwegian favourite entertainment: freakish. Except maybe if you are offering compliments on our great country
Annual number of SMS sent per capita (2010): Whale hunting and jokes about the Swedes
National high point: 1300
Worst thing about Norway: 1994: Winter Olympics and 2nd referendum rejecting EU membership
Existing unconditional pledge on the table: Chronic oil addiction
Existing Conditional pledge (upper end): 30% below 1990 by 2020
Next step to increase ambition by COP18: 40% below 1990 by 2020
  40% by 2020 with at least 2/3 of the target through domestic mitigation
Rationale: Norway has pledged to move to a target of 40% if this will contribute to achieving an ambitious global agreement. Increased mitigation ambition from rich countries such as Norway is probably the most important thing that can contribute to increasing overall ambition at the moment, so Norway should make good on this promise right away. Secondly, Norway needs to make clear  that it intends to meet its target mainly through domestic action rather than offsetting. This is important for Norway's credibility in UNFCCC negotiations.
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CAN Submission - CCS in the CDM - Feb 2011

In CAN’s view, discussions about the future of the flexible mechanisms including the consideration of new project  activities should be firmly grounded in an analysis of their performance so far. So far, the CDM has failed to meet its dual objectives of supporting cost-effective climate change mitigation and sustainable development in developing countries. Yet, even when accepting some of the well-known shortcomings of project-based CDM mechanisms, CCS is highly likely to fail most of the requirements in this specific offset framework. Therefore despite the abovementioned CMP decision, CAN does not believe including CCS in CDM is an appropriate way forward. Therefore this submission sets out  reasons for  CAN´s  opposition to the inclusion of CCS in CDM and subsequently addresses the different issues referred in paragraph 3 of  the CMP  Decision It should be noted, however, that this submission does not refer to use of various CCS technologies outside the CDM and for general mitigation purposes both in developed and developing nations.

In Search of An Honest Response

As usual, ECO has a lot of questions about what Saudi Arabia is really after.  Just yesterday, they gave a free lesson to the chair of the LCA. She is not supposed to prepare new text, so it was said, but only facilitate discussions, since this is a Party-driven process and only Parties can work out texts. Well, ECO would like to offer a friendly amendment. Preparing a new text based on Party submissions is still a Party-driven process, and the reorganization of the text is in the mode of facilitation. So, let the chair do her job. Then there is a puzzle. What is it about Saudi Arabia and the Copenhagen Accord?  They helped draft it, they supported it in one session in Copenhagen but retracted their support in another. Later they did not associate with it, and finally now they say it is not important. The Accord falls well short of the mark, we agree, but why did they approve it in the first place and then retract their support? After all, they got response measures linked to adaptation in the Accord text, reversing the agreement to separate them in the Bali Action Plan.  One theory is that ‘no deal’ is better than a ‘bad deal’ (even though a ‘bad deal’ is a good deal for the Saudis).  Although they always have suggested that ‘response measures in adaptation’ is a placeholder, they have never indicated what they want in order to drop this issue. Naturally, the question arises whether the position on response measures is just a tactic to stall negotiations, more than achieving an agreed outcome.  And all this seems to confirm that Saudi Arabia remains in the obstructionist camp. If Saudi Arabia is eager to prove other-wise , perhaps they should approach other Parties and indicate what they want in place of the response measures/adaptation ‘place- holder’. Maybe, for example, something under the technology track to help diversify the economy, such as renewable energy industrial development – that might get ‘response measures’ out of their system. But it doesn’t seem likely, since they also success-fully blocked the bunkers discussion (as we said at the time, ‘never underestimate the Saudis’). For the adaptation discussion to move forward, Saudi Arabia must drop their ‘response measures’ argument. It is not morally right to receive compensation if oil demand goes down, for two main reasons. First, they have already benefited by trillions from selling oil, which has significantly contributed to the climate change problem. Second, they provided no compensation to the affected poor when the demand on oil went up and so did price.  Why then should Saudi Arabia be compensated when the demand goes down?

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Playing the Convention Against the Plan

The “response measures” discussion – which OPEC countries seem to want included in absolutely every negotiating context, regardless of what Parties have previously agreed – drags on in the most inappropriate places. Why compensation for potential loss of oil revenues should be considered in the same breath as supporting adaptation for the world’s most vulnerable countries and communities has been a deep mystery to many Parties – and to ECO -- for some time.

Sure, response measures is an important issue. It should be discussed, and it is – in the KP and LCA mitigation groups. But shoehorning response measures into LCA adaptation box is a problem. It takes time and energy away from addressing the more urgent needs of countries that see the impact of climate change not only on their bottom line but on their declining elevation above sea levels and their fight against hunger. All this reduces trust, and it diminishes the likelihood of an effective adaptation outcome.

Various Parties have made the call for some time for response measures to be dropped from the adaptation discussion. Despite that, the Saudi intervention on the opening day’s LCA adaptation contact group took a legalistic tone. Response measures are in the same sentence of the Convention as the needs of countries affected by the impacts of climate change. Therefore, it is said, they should remain in the adaptation discussion.

But the Algerian negotiator may have inadvertently given us a way out from OPEC’s desire to keep response measures in the adaptation arena. Speaking in support of the Saudi intervention, he pointed out that the Bali Action Plan does not replace the Convention, and is expressly for the purpose of facilitating its effective implementation. In short, “Don’t play the Convention against the Plan.”

ECO couldn’t agree more . . . though maybe not in the way he was hoping. The Bali Action Plan clearly separates response measures from the adaptation discussion and places it under mitigation. That’s how parties agreed to effectively implement the terms of the Convention.

If OPEC members are truly serious about implementing the Convention, then their course of action is equally clear. Stop playing the Convention against the Plan – drop response measures from the adaptation discussion.

[from Eco, Sep. 30, 2009 from Bangkok, Thailand UNFCCC negotiations - full PDF version here]

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