Tag: LULUCF

Close the logging loophole now

Most developed countries came to Copenhagen asking the world to ignore planned increases in greenhouse gas emissions from logging and erase them from the books. It was a proposal that never deserved to see the light of day at a climate conference. Now it has to be put to rest.

The Climate Action Network has developed and proposed to negotiators a reasonable, technically sound and objective way to close the logging loophole: Account for all changes in forest management emissions compared to the average level of emissions between 1990-2007. It is so simple and so obvious that it’s boring.

It is imperative this loophole is closed if we are to have an agreement with environmental integrity. Closing this loophole will also strengthen overall targets by nearly 4%.

Will developed countries make this most basic commitment to environmental integrity or will they insist on keeping increased forestry emissions out of accounting even though they are in the atmosphere.

Austria, Australia, Canada, Finland, Japan, New Zealand and Sweden – ECO is looking right at you.

Brazil emerges as leader

In the fifth edition of the Germanwatch-CAN Europe Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI), Brazil climbed to fourth place, as Sweden slid down its LULUCF projected baseline and landed in fifth. As the top three places were left vacant, Brazil earned the top rank among 57 countries surveyed for the CCPI.

At the other end of the scale, Saudi Arabia and Canada finished last and second last respectively at 58 and 59. Saudi Arabia’s negative rating was for blocking a fair, ambitious and binding treaty to protect the most vulnerable developing countries. Canada earned second last place for its weak domestic climate policy, huge per capita emissions and lack of any kind of constructive engagement in the UN climate talks.

The USA also fared poorly – it was ranked 53 – as President Obama and the Congress have yet to make good on the mandate of renewal (and renewables) which swept him to office.

The Germanwatch CCPI is an independent report, ranking the 57 largest emitters on their efforts to protect the climate. This year, like last year, witnessed blank spaces for the first three ranks. This was because no country was on a path to keep warming as far below 2°C as possible. For details, visit germanwatch.org

AI loopholes

Those of us who don’t like playing Russian roulette with the planet are looking for aggregate developed country targets greater than -40% from 1990 levels by 2020. In that light, the nominal pledges from developed countries, adding up to a humble 13-19%, look quite bad. But if one includes loopholes that could still make their way into the final deal, they look still worse. You may think you can fool the public with creative accounting, but you definitely can’t fool the atmosphere.

Sadly, ECO concludes that when loopholes are used to the fullest extent, aggregate developed country pledges allow their emissions to increase from 1990 levels by 2020. Even partial use of these loopholes results in a terrible outcome for the planet.

  • Full banking and use of ‘hot air’ (surplus AAUs) from the first and second commitment periods may add up to an extra 6% of the Annex I aggregate emissions to the atmosphere, according to several studies.
  • Creative free-for-all LULUCF accounting may add another 5% to the atmosphere, in line with several studies.
  • Emissions from aviation and shipping are currently just a footnote to Annex I national totals, but they are certainly seen by the atmosphere. These emissions are best tackled through a global cap, but if this is not achieved they will continue to rise, requiring deeper cuts elsewhere to keep the climate safe. If we don’t get a global agreement, the expected overall increase in bunker emissions until 2020 would add a further 6% to developed country emissions in 2020.

With these loopholes, the atmosphere sees 17% more in 2020 than the nominal pledges suggest, leaving an aggregate of -2% to +4% over 1990. But there’s more. Developed countries plan to meet a significant portion of their reductions through offsets, between 1.1 and 1.5 Gt, according to ECO’s estimates – equivalent to 6-8% of 1990 emissions. So domestic developed country emissions may even exceed 10% above 1990 levels in 2020. If, as under the CDM, non-additional projects make up a substantial part of the offsets (ECO has seen studies quoting a range from 40% to 79%), this further undermines the effectiveness of the targets.

If these loopholes are not closed, the gap between what’s needed for a stable climate and current developed country pledges widens into a mighty chasm.

ECO is pleasantly surprised, though, to learn that the EU has beaten us to it and has been shining a light on Annex I loopholes in Kyoto Protocol discussions yesterday. Whatever next, a move to a 40% cut?

REDD haunted by LULUCF?

A spooky story for the last day of negotiations: Once upon a time, ECO recalls, a list of LULUCF principles was determined and included the following: "That the implementation of land use, land-use change and forestry activities contributes to the conservation of biodiversity and sustainable use of natural resources."

Yet today, under the rules for forests in developed countries, conversion of natural forests to plantations is not accounted.  Indeed, native forests and plantations are not even distinguished, making it impossible to directly track this important indicator of the impacts of LULUCF on biodiversity. The LULUCF principles have become wispy spirits haunting the forests of the North.

Today, forest conversion has become a bone of contention in the REDD discussions. ECO is glad to see that the safeguard against conversion of natural forests is back in the REDD text, although it is bracketed and vague. Inclusion of an improved version of this provision in the final Copenhagen agreement will be an important step towards banishing LULUCF spectres from REDD.

In addition, however, principles alone cannot ensure that REDD lives up to its promises. How will Parties ensure that conversion of natural forests to plantations does not occur under REDD as long as the definition of “forest” encompasses everything from tropical jungle to oil palm plantations?

Conversion of forests to plantations not only has dire consequences for biodiversity, it also increases emissoins.  And so ECO asks, what about the 'E' in REDD?  If you look closely, the definitional gap that exists in LULUCF as an important lesson for REDD.  Natural forests and plantations must be defined separately and emissions from conversion must be accounted for, just as degradation of forests must be defined and accounted for.

Relying on carbon accounting alone to prevent conversion is not enough, warn the ghosts of LULUCF, who whisper that accounting for degradation never became mandatory.  In the real world of tropical forests, proxies may be used to estimate carbon stocks, and if forest cover is one of them, then distinguishing plantations from forests becomes crucial. In addition, defining natural forests and plantations will help clarify what REDD is all about, and ensure confidence in its effectiveness to protect the climate.

ECO knows Parties are hesitant to enter a process of developing definitions akin to a recurring ghost story of the Marrakesh Accords. However, negotiators must use several potions to banish the phantoms of LULUCF loopholes. One of them is carbon accounting strong enough to ensure that emissions caused by conversion are seen by all and not just the atmosphere. Another is definitions. Employing the forest categories suggested by the Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group (AHTEG) of the Convention on

Biological Diversity would help protect REDD from the grinning spectre of unaccounted-for emissions lurking in the newly converted forests of Annex I.

LULUCF Report Card


End of term is nearing for LULUCF and ECO presents the report card for some Parties, indicating their grade based on interesting statements made in Wednesday morning’s contact group on Annex I Parties’ emission reductions.

ECO notes that this subject is a difficult one with several Parties routinely handing in incomplete assignments and struggling to understand the basic concept: account for emissions.


European Union: D

Although the EU’s intervention was fairly focused on the implications of LULUCF for targets, it allowed a glimpse of that most troubling idea of projected baselines (an idea the EU just does not seem able to shake). Surprise, surprise: they estimate that the impact of this approach on EU targets is zero, because it is defined to be so! The EU gets a D for handing in an incomplete assignment with a non-position that points in all directions, some of which are absolutely unacceptable.

New Zealand: D

For continuing to parade its graph showing that their planned harvest of forests creates an unacceptable hit on the national accounts. The graph on page 13 of their submission (not shown during the contact group) shows that these unacceptable forest management debits are balanced by credits from afforestation!

Canada: C

Canada deserves kudos for being the only Annex I Party to explicitly observe that countries need to account for emissions from all management activities. However, the code behind their accounting principles is clear: remove all natural disturbances from the inventory, use projected business-as-usual baselines, and account for carbon stored in wood products.

Japan: C

Japan had a mixed performance: good marks for observing that forest management projections are not a good idea, but demerits for their continued support for the existing rules when what we really need are rules with greater environmental integrity.

Australia: B

ECO considered handing out the only A for an Annex I country to Australia for being the only country to propose that the national emission reductions target apply to LULUCF as for other sectors. Great idea! But then ECO remembered that Australia had very high deforestation emissions in 1990, and that this proposal would (coincidentally?) make it much easier for Australia to meet ambitious targets.

Norway: B

Norway almost got a high grade for being willing to accept a simple accounting approach of measuring changes in emissions since 1990, but slipped behind when it observed that special adjustments may need to be made for some countries.

G77 & China: A

For giving Annex I Parties a wake-up call and proposing the revolutionary concept that the same set of simple rules should apply to all Annex I Parties: account for changes in emissions/removals compared to a base year. Although their proposal to apply a cap to the entire LULUCF sector is difficult to evaluate without more information, it appears that they are interested in using it to ensure that mitigation happens both in LULUCF and in other sectors. Makes sense to ECO! Finally, G77 & China have rightly called for a resolution to these negotiations by Barcelona so that new Annex I targets can be agreed in Copenhagen.

Micronesia: A

As well as supporting the call for simple, transparent accounting and environmental integrity, Micronesia also added some humour to the discussion in describing the data submissions by Annex I Parties: “Whoops, data gaps! Whoops, data uncertainty! Whoops, different rules for everyone!”

Show us the Emissions

As ever in the arcane world of Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry LULUCF negotiations, progress towards a shorter text this week has not necessarily made it easier to understand. ECO has even caught whiff of some positive changes, though it is hard to get more than a whiff when everything is behind closed doors.

There is still something smelly in the draft text and it is hiding behind a bland name – projected baselines for forest management. Here is how it works: A Party tells you what its emissions from forest management will be during the commitment period and then will only be given LULUCF credits or debits if actual emissions are different from this projection.

ECO is confused (this is LULUCF after all). Depending on what level these “projected baselines” are set at, this could mean Parties might never have to account for their logging emissions. A country can pretend that its emissions from forest management are going to increase and not incur any  debits, as long as this increase was predicted ahead of time. ECO shudders to think what this type of approach would mean if applied to all sectors.

Luckily, not everyone is behind this ruse. Past submissions from Norway and Switzerland have expressed a preference for accounting for changes in emissions from a historical level. Other countries may be out there that support such an approach, but they are hard to see; hidden inside the EU bloc on this issue. ECO calls those Parties to step out and identify themselves.

Is it any wonder, with ideas like this still on the table, that the G77 and China are considering how to cap credits from the entire LULUCF sector?

Pages

Subscribe to Tag: LULUCF