Tag: LULUCF

Memo to Ministers: Close the LULUCF Loophole!

Ministers, would you like a glowing ECO article with your name on it?  
As you delve into the unresolved issues with the KP, the first thing you need to know is that the main proposal for LULUCF doesn’t ensure a robust, environmentally sound approach to forest management accounting.  While sorting this out may seem daunting when you are presented with the complex draft text, we can help make your mission very clear: close the Logging Loopholes!  And if you do, ECO will put your decision in lights and say your country did something really great to truly reduce emissions.
To get a sense of the problem, consider that the proposed reference levels for forest management, tucked away in an innocuous looking annex, would allow an increase in annual emissions of 451 Mt relative to the historical average (1990-2008). That’s a lot of tonnes!  
Surely a half-gigatonne divergence from recent trends is a red flag. The Copenhagen pledges are for emissions decreases, and yet the LULUCF reference levels go up. Up versus down, hmmm.  That means Annex I Parties now assume their own logging increases while asking other countries to reduce their emissions from deforestation. The forest sector should not be excluded, so how about actually building ambition right into the 
LULUCF rules.
So one huge step is to close the loophole of the projected reference level approach, which will only make climate change worse.  
And there are lots of ideas floating around the Moon Palace on how to do this.  Some of them already appear as options in the draft text: use a historical baseline (Tuvalu); combine historical and projected baselines (Africa Group); fix the rules and policy cut-off dates for reference level setting; revert to the current rules for the first commitment period.  Most of these options can be judged against their ability to shrink the loophole.
ECO stresses that LULUCF accounting must be mandatory, and not only for forest management, but for all sectors (to the extent it’s technically feasible).  For example, emissions from draining and rewetting wetlands are considerable, and they should be counted.
But it’s also important that mandatory accounting not come at the price of deeply flawed rules. The objective of this process wasn’t just to produce new LULUCF rules, but rather to produce better ones.
Another large loophole in the draft LULUCF text is the provision to allow Annex I Parties to exclude from the accounting books emissions from wildfires, infestations, extreme weather events, and the like.  This is known as force majeure, a legal term that means these emissions ‘could not have reasonably been foreseen by the Party’. Some Parties are trying to exploit this provision to exclude all emissions from natural disturbances, a recipe for diminished accountability and lost mitigation potential.  
Normal variations in natural disturbances and even increasing trends as a result of climate change can both be reasonably foreseen.  This means the force majeure text must involve a threshold below which emissions are not excluded.
Ministers, we’re facing a daunting gap between emissions reductions on the table and what science says is needed to avoid the worst impacts of climate change. It’s time to get serious and tackle emission reductions wherever we can. Start by closing the logging loopholes, and headlines galore will follow.

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Taking Bold Steps 
on Mitigation

The phrases ‘legal form’ and ‘anchoring of pledges’ are on everyone’s lips in the corridors and sidewalks of the Moon Palace. While these are indeed crucial issues, like many of the Parties who spoke at Saturday’s stocktaking plenaries, ECO wants to see serious work this week on mitigation content for both the KP and LCA.
Looking first at the KP, if Parties are not able to fully agree a second commitment period here in Cancun, there must be at least a clear deadline and process to ensure that this will happen in Durban. Further agreement on some of the thorny details of the KP like the rules on LULUCF and surplus AAUs are also keenly awaited.  
As regards the individual and aggregate Annex I targets for the second commitment period, there has been a lot of talk about how and where they will be recorded. But what about the minor matter of what the numbers actually are, and whether they bear any relation to science?
The new text has put the need for developed country targets to add up to at least 25-40% below 1990 levels by 2020 in brackets.  The KP negotiating mandate towards Durban must include an explicit requirement that both aggregate and individual country pledges be clarified and assessed against this 25-40% figure, and their level of ambition increased accordingly in the final KP second commitment period agreement.  
And don’t forget, there are two tracks in these negotiations.  For the sake of balance the non-KP Annex 1 Parties (primarily, of course, the US) must take on comparable commitments to the KP Annex I Parties.  
The Chair’s text provides some workable openings for this, though it needs significant enhancement. Several options are given for the listing of pledges, but ECO’s most serious concern is that wherever they end up, there must be a clear acknowledgement in the relevant COP decision that they fall far short of what science requires – creating the Gigatonne Gap that was highlighted in the UNEP Emissions Gap Report.  
Unlike the KP, the LCA text does not so far include an explicit reference to the quantity of emissions reductions entailed by the goal of keeping global temperature increase well below 2o C, let alone 1.5o. That should be an immediate priority.
Acknowledgment of the inadequacy of the current pledges should be accompanied by a clear process to elaborate and facilitate the measures that will help to close the gap. The Chair’s text neatly includes a cross-reference to the KP, and if the KP Parties’ pledges are strengthened as set out above, they will contribute appropriately to the overall goal.
This leaves the pledges of developing countries and of the US. There should be agreement in Cancun on a mandate for next year’s negotiations under which the US will take on its fair and comparable share, and developing country pledges for nationally appropriate mitigation actions will be clarified and adequately supported.  
ECO was very pleased to see that low emission development strategies are mentioned in the Chair’s text. Such long-term strategic plans are needed to ensure the global goal is actually met, although there is room for elaborating the scope and nature of the strategies for developed countries. Agreement to all this would be a very positive signal of the seriousness of intent by developed countries.
Climate change demands that we keep a constant eye on what science is telling us and on the adequacy of our agreed actions. The review set out in in Chapter V of the Chair’s text provides a channel for this.  The re-inclusion of the 1.5o C global goal in welcome, although the proposed completion of this work only in 2015 is alarming.  We know that emissions must already peak by then.  In addition, it is not clear is how the results of the review would be operationalised into the updating of both the aggregate and individual country targets, another point to be addressed before we leave Mexico.
There is a lot of work to do this week, but Parties noted on Saturday their desire to see this centrepiece of the negotiations addressed.   Now is the time to stand and deliver.

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The Elephant Gap

Delegates, in case you haven’t noticed, there is an elephant roaming the halls of the Moon Palace, and it weighs something like 9 gigatonnes.  
As reaffirmed by UNEP in its new Emissions Gap Report, the climate pledges made in Copenhagen fall far short of what is needed to limit global temperature rise to less than 2 oC, and even further below a 1.5 oC limit which is needed to minimize the inundation of low-lying nations and coastal areas, the loss of coral reefs and the permanent disappearance of summer Arctic sea ice.  But instead of starting to bring the elephant down to size, Parties seem determined to fatten it up even further.
According to the UNEP, the gap between where the Copenhagen Accord pledges are now and where they should be in 2020 could be bigger than the combined emissions of China and Russia. At best, the gap ‘only’ equals all cars, trucks and buses in the world, or the combined emissions of the 27 EU member states.
The UNEP report identifies specific actions Parties can take here in Cancun to help close the Gigatonne Gap.  But their actions so far suggest they won’t admit to seeing the elephant and that the future of the planet is at stake.  For example, while strict LULUCF accounting rules would close the gap considerably, Parties are on the verge of cementing rules that will make the problem much worse.
The list goes on. The EU is promoting an 8-year commitment period, freezing the current low level of ambition in place for the remainder of this decade.  Russia and Ukraine insist on flooding the next commitment period with hot air from the first. The Umbrella countries have trouble acknowledging that there is any gap at all.  It should be obvious that just implementing their Copenhagen pledges won’t do the trick.
In the coming days ECO expects countries to act on the UNEP report. First, they need to drop the proposed accounting rules and loopholes that will 
expand rather than close the Gigatonne Gap.  
In addition, while grappling with proposals to anchor the Copenhagen pledges in the UNFCCC, they should also fully acknowledge the existence of the gap and commit to a timely process to close it as rapidly as possible – before the elephant stampedes across the planet.

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Protection for Peatlands

Forest management is surely as important as everyone knows, but peatlands that have been drained for agriculture and other purposes are also important emissions hotspots globally.
Yet incentives for Annex I countries to reduce these emissions under the Kyoto Protocol were minimal in the first commitment period. In fact, accounting for land use activities associated with the drainage of peatlands (forest management, grazing land management and cropland management) is voluntary and therefore rarely selected.
The second commitment period of the KP offers a new opportunity to address this mega-gap. Parties will have higher reduction targets, and LULUCF can and should make a significant contribution to reducing emissions.
Further peatland drainage can be discouraged by making accounting for Article 3.4 activities mandatory, provided sufficient data quality is ensured.
In particular, further drainage for biofuel production should be decreased to prevent the development of a giant new emissions accounting loophole in the energy sector combined with unaccounted increased emissions in the land use sector.
In addition, rewetting of drained wetlands as an effective measure to decrease emissions should be encouraged by adopting the new activity ‘wetland management’.  If countries fail to agree mandatory accounting of existing Article 3.4 activities, mandatory wetland management is the only way to close the emerging accounting loophole for peatlands under LULUCF.
Reporting and accounting for peatland drainage is already facilitated with IPCC 2006 guidance, but a number of gaps still remain. An IPCC expert meeting in October concluded that science has developed recently to such an extent that most gaps (e.g. rewetting of drained peatlands, wetland restoration) can now be filled. As well, the emissions associated with land use on peat (cropland, grassland, forestry, peat extraction) should be reassessed.
Here in Cancun, the SBSTA can request the IPCC to undertake this work and define a way forward to finalize improved guidance in time for the second commitment period.  It’s all to protect one of our most important land sequestration resources . . . for peat’s sake!

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LULUCF: Moment 
of Decision

The future of Annex I forests and their role in climate change mitigation is about to be decided here in Cancun.
ECO has long highlighted how inappropriate and possibly fraudulent LULUCF accounting rules could be used by Annex I Parties to avoid accounting for their forestry emissions. This week a group of NGOs assessed the scale of these impacts, in particular, the magnitude of proposed forest management baselines relative to the ambition of Parties’ pledges. Astonishingly, the emission reduction efforts of some Parties could be reduced by up to 66% as a consequence of unaccounted emissions from logging their forests.
There is still more than one proposal on the table, and it is clear that the impact of forest management accounting on countries’ pledges will differ depending on the approach agreed upon.
A review process was proposed by developing countries earlier this year to evaluate the robustness of favoured baseline proposals by Annex I countries. The new KP Chair’s text calls on Parties to provide the required information by February 2011 and for expert reviewers to conclude their review by May.
But let’s be clear.  The impact of the proposed reference levels is unacceptable and a review won’t fix that. However, broadening the review to include an objective analysis of all accounting options could help Parties make an informed decision about which approach should be used in the second commitment period. To do this, Parties would need to provide information about each of the potential options on the table and how it will impact their pledges.
This analysis is urgently required for a meaningful discussion on numbers. That will achieve two crucial things: the discussion of ‘numbers’ will go forward with consideration of all potential options, and decisions will be made based on the likely real impacts on the climate.

 

Party Emission Reduction Pledge % 2020 Unaccounted Logging Emissions %
Canada -17 +1.4
New Zealand -10 to -20 +66.0
Norway -30 to -40 +8.7
Russian Fed -15 to -25 +5.5
Australia -5 to -15 +4.0
Japan -25 +3.6
EU -20 to -30 +2.7
Switzerland -20 to -30 +2.4

Notes: Figures are percentages of country-specific base years.  Pledged emission reductions for 2020 (rel 1990) from FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/INF.2/Rev.1.  Unaccounted logging emissions equals the difference between Party’s proposed reference levels and average of historical net emissions.  The estimate of average historical net emissions from Annex I forest management calculated using data from 1990-2008 (forest land remaining forest land) from Parties’ 2010 
inventory submissions.  Any adjustments were made on consultation with Parties and technical experts.  Japan has not yet indicated whether its pledges include accounting for forest management.

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Chris Henschel explains LULUCF

UNFCCC Tianjin Chris Henschel - Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society

Chris Henschel of Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society explains LULUCF (Land Use Land Use Change and Forestry) and the good news and bad news of LULUCF for developing countries. 

(from OneWorld TV)

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No Time to Lose

Dearest delegates, we gather you’ve been working hard behind those mostly closed doors. But let’s face it, following the failure of Copenhagen to deliver a fair, ambitious and binding agreement, the refusal all this year to set aside differences and focus on areas of convergence may yet scupper the UNFCCC talks. At Cancun, you will bear a heavy responsibility.
If one were to believe the international media, the story of Tianjin has been a high stakes standoff between the US and China, ‘I won’t do till you do’ stalling, and negotiating paralysis. So let’s unpack that a bit.
On the one side there is the United States, the emissions superpower that so far has not submitted itself to internationally binding carbon reduction commitments, and really has to do far more than a measly 4% reduction target on 1990 levels. A commitment on long-term finance would suit the Americans much better than a tone of righteous indignation. And though it pains us to say it, as in Bali, the US should step aside if it is not able to make real commitments, and let the world conclude an ambitious deal.
On the other side, China has been working hard at home to implement a commendable low carbon vision. China could propel the negotiations forward by agreeing to international consultation and analysis of its low carbon actions.
There are, however, more than two countries in the world and every country has something to offer in the negotiations. Whilst things have not gone smoothly this week, we gather that Parties made some incremental progress. However, incremental progress does not cut it with the planet, nor will it be sufficient at Cancun.
Creating momentum requires commitment. At Cancun we need to refuel and take aim at the most ambitious level of agreement possible across all elements. Crucially, we need to map out the next important step of our journey to a fair, ambitious and binding deal in South Africa. A failure to plan our route – with a timeline, workplans and format for negotiations – will have us meandering along the dirt tracks as if we had all the time in the world, whilst climate destruction takes the fast road.
A positive development at this meeting is that negotiators have begun to grapple with the package for Cancun. The fact that a vast majority of Parties are seeking a legally binding outcome in the LCA track is self-evident.
But we are also pleased that so many Parties have expressed willingness to recommit to the Kyoto Protocol with a second commitment period. That must be crystal clear in the Cancun package.
It is essential that the stand-off in the legal matters group ends, otherwise there may be unintended consequences to the future of the Kyoto Protocol.
Parties gave assurance in Bali that there would be no gap between commitment periods. But that’s not what is happening, and carbon markets, already soft since Copenhagen, will likely weaken further.
Here are essential elements of the package to contemplate between Tianjin and Cancun:
FINANCE
Discussions on finance have focused on the establishment of a new fund under the Convention. The COP should also establish an oversight body to perform crucial functions such as ensuring coherence of the financial mechanism, coordination, and assuring a balance of funding.
We know that some countries have been working hard to bridge the divisions on these issues. At Cancun we expect that Parties will establish a Fund with democratic governance, providing direct access for developing countries, and functioning under the guidance and authority of the COP.
TECHNOLOGY
Technology often tops the lists of potential outcomes in Cancun, yet the details have remained elusive in Tianjin. The key question is the institutional arrangements of a multilateral mechanism, with the aim to scale up and speed up the use of climate friendly technologies. Here again, governance should be placed under the authority of an entity whose mission is focused on limiting warming to 1.5o C.
MITIGATION
Mitigation clearly is a most essential element of the package. Despite this, negotiators chose to dive into contention rather than seeking convergence. A focus on developed country pledges, the NAMA mechanism, as well as NAMA design, preparation and implementation took form only on Thursday.
In preparation for Cancun, Parties should replace their ‘dog ate my homework’ excuse with a willingness to agree rules that will ensure the environmental integrity of their emissions reductions.
Before Cancun, we recommend catching up on the science. Preventing dangerous climate change clearly requires more substantial emissions reductions. A balanced Cancun package will require Annex I parties to show how they are going to meet their moral obligations and to act in line with the science. We recommend acknowledging the gigatonne gap between current pledges and science based targets, and agreeing a route to South Africa that addresses ways to close the gap.
CAPACITY BUILDING
Everybody appears to agree that capacity building is both vital to success and key to movement in Cancun. The principles were well-established as early as COP 7, and developing countries (particularly LDCs, SIDs and Africa) have been clamouring for years for a dedicated capacity building framework with real resources and a genuine desire to succeed. And yet still nothing happens. How long will it take at this rate?
LULUCF
The logging industry must be thrilled at how forest negotiators mangled the
LULUCF accounting rules this week. The proposal forwarded to Cancun undermines the environmental integrity of Kyoto by hiding increases in emissions and awarding false credits to loggers.
Because so much time was spent on devising these accounting tricks, minimal
attention got paid to emissions from land-use change beyond forests – another potential loophole. The only proposal for managing forests that has any environmental integrity was given short shrift.
Furthermore, the damage this proposed decision can do to REDD accounting is not to be underestimated. To prevent another Marrakesh, the damaging impact of forest accounting on the targets will have to be addressed in the broader KP numbers discussion.
REDD
From time to time this week, the curtain has lifted on the Dante-esque world of the REDD+ Partnership. We have been mesmerised by the heroic, if misguided, struggle between the co-chairs and the rest of the world. However, we are also saddened that what could be a valuable institution has become a farce. We can only hope that things will get better.
ADAPTATION
A focused atmosphere prevailed in the adaptation talks, which are progressing on content and may eventually deliver a compromise agreement. ECO reminds parties that the adaptation framework must include operational elements and result in action on the ground.
To move forward, Cancun must clarify the functions of the adaptation committee, enable a tangible solution on loss and damage, finally put response measures back in its box, and search for balance between adaptation and mitigation funding, including a pre-allocation scheme.
 

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LULUCF: the Second Agenda

You’ve heard about all the trouble with the logging loophole in LULUCF. But there’s another important agenda on emissions from non-forest lands under the Kyoto Protocol.
Several ideas such as mandatory accounting for cropland management and grazing land management, and the introduction of a new activity category of wetland management, have languished with very little discussion. Yet Parties seem to think they are on the downhill run wrapping up LULUCF.
Emission from biofuels (processing crops and burning them as transport fuels) also risks being mostly ignored at a time when they are expected to grow rapidly as an alternative to fossil fuels.
There are issues with data availability and accuracy in accounting for these activities. But that is no excuse for deferring action in the second commitment period. One thing that can be done is to use a hotspots approach, concentrate MRV efforts on identifying the lands with the most significant sources of emissions, and estimate these activities in the most accurate and practicable way whilst commencing on a SBSTA program to introduce more comprehensive accounting.
The new rules could well make a huge amount of forest management emissions vanish through a loophole, but even worse, also fail to capture significant emissions arising from the other land use activities.
There is still time to construct a complete agenda for LULUCF rules with integrity for the next commitment period, but there is not a moment more to lose.
 

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Fossil of the Day: New Zealand

A fossil is awarded to New Zealand, as an ambassador for all Annex I Parties, for bluntly declaring that if they don’t get the rules they want on forest management, they’ll have to change their overall emission reduction target. Does this mean that the LULUCF sector is just a slush fund and Copenhagen pledges are open for renegotiation if the slush fund disappears?

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New Zealand

 

A fossil is awarded to New Zealand, as an ambassador for all Annex I Parties, for bluntly declaring that if they don’t get the rules they want on forest management, they’ll have to change their overall emission reduction target. Does this mean that the LULUCF sector is just a slush fund and Copenhagen pledges are open for renegotiation if the slush fund disappears?

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