Tag: LULUCF

A Disturbing Disturbance

Parties don’t want to have to account for forestry emissions not caused by humans, like wildfires. Fair enough you might say, but this is being used as another attempt to hide emissions.

Until recently, only events classified as force majeure - large-scale events beyond the control of Parties - would be excluded. However, the language of “force majeure has now been dropped in favour of the less specific  “natural disturbance”. Whether its called natural disturbance or force majeure, the CAN view is that any mechanism agreed in the LULUCF rules must transparently and conservatively factor out emissions and removals from extraordinary natural disturbances only.

So what the heck does that mean?

 “Extraordinary” has to be defined.  And its definition shouldn’t be wildly at odds with a plain English meaning of, well, extraordinary.  Common sense suggests that it should only be used for statistically extremely rare events and the same provisions for natural disturbance should be consistent for all Parties.

It also means you can’t hide just any (or all) of your debits.  And it means you shouldn’t hide emissions if they come from stuff you did (like harvesting, or salvage logging).  Because its natural disturbance, remember?  It means you need to really clearly say where, why, and how much you are calling natural disturbance (i.e. show your work!)

It means that you have to treat natural disturbances in exactly the same way in your baseline as you do in the commitment period you’re accounting emissions. Finally, it means you have to be able to measure them really well, and that requires high quality data.

So in short, a natural disturbance mechanism for LULUCF has to retain the common sense meaning of force majeure. If parties are worried their carbon sequestration will go up in smoke, they should discount the credits.

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Panama: Progress or Paralysis?

Durban is shaping up as a critical moment in the 20-year history of the climate regime.  The world can either build on what has been created in the Kyoto Protocol, raise the level of ambition as demanded by the science, and provide sufficient finance to meet developing countries’ needs for adaptation, mitigation, and REDD. Or it risks relegating the UNFCCC to a side show with little legitimacy to meaningfully address the climate crisis.

Let’s review what’s needed to avoid a train wreck in Durban:

Mitigation:In the Cancun Agreements, developed countries accepted that their aggregate level of ambition should be in the range of 25-40%.  Even while this range does not guarantee that global temperature rise will stay below 2 degrees Celsius, current developed country emission reduction pledges will result in reductions of only 12-18% going down to ~2% if currently existing and proposed loopholes are taken into account.  ECO suggests four critical elements in the Durban mitigation package for developed countries:: clarify what the net emissions would be based on current pledges and assumptions; close the loopholes;  move to the high end of current pledges; and agree on a process to increase ambition beyond 40%, for adoption at COP18/CMP8.

Panama can and must reach agreements on closing the loopholes.  The recent Review of proposals on forest management under LULUCF clarifies the size of the forestry loophole.  Now, Parties must adopt forest management reference levels that are comparable and that don’t significantly undermine Annex I Party targets. Overall, LULUCF rules should encourage Parties to achieve ambitious mitigation from land and forests.  On carry-forward of AAUs, Parties must eliminate the risk of “hot air” undermining the environmental integrity of future reduction commitments.

Kyoto Protocol: As acknowledged by both Executive Secretary Figueres and incoming COP President Nkoana-Mashabane, the future of the Kyoto Protocol will be decided at Durban.  While some developed country Parties would prefer to overlook the KP or at best, make a second commitment period conditional on what happens in the LCA over the next four years, it is  essential that in Durban, we cement a second commitment period of the KP.  The alternative – a pledge and review world – just won’t cut it.

Convention mandate: Given the urgency of the climate catastrophe unfolding daily before our eyes, nothing less than the greatest level of commitment is needed from all parties.  Therefore, in addition to preserving the Kyoto Protocol, Durban must agree that by 2015 at the latest, the commitments and actions of all Parties should be inscribed in legally binding instrument[s], whilst fully respecting the principles of the Convention.

Finance:The last session on finance in Bonn was dominated by discussions on the Standing Committee.  Negotiations need to also focus on the critical issue of where the money is going to come from.  Urgent attention on scaling up sources of climate finance from 2013 to 2020 is needed.  In addition to expanding direct finance from national treasuries, Parties should commit to raise significant revenue for the Green Climate Fund from innovative sources, implemented in a way that has no net incidence for poor countries.  Progress on a mechanism to levy bunker fuels would be an especially noteworthy achievement here in Panama, which licenses so much of the world’s shipping.

Technology: CAN urges Parties to decide here in Panama on the criteria for the Climate Technology Center host, so that the Center and Network can be operationalized in 2012 as envisioned in the Cancun Agreement.

Adaptation: Parties aren’t far away from a good decision text on the Adaptation Committee.  Here in Panama, they should agree on the composition of the Committee with equitable representation, direct reporting to the COP, and linkages to other institutions, particularly on finance and technology.

Capacity Building: Parties should work with the Facilitator's notes and his new and highly comprehensive background paper to begin drafting text for a Durban decision. This paper should focus on the vital question of how to design effective and comprehensive co-ordination of new, additional and scaled-up capacity-building within the emerging new architectures for finance, technology, adaptation, MRV and mechanisms.

MRV: Parties should build on the MRV architecture agreed in Cancun by moving forward on common accounting rules for emission reduction targets and an enhanced common reporting format on finance. Parties should also adopt guidelines on the content, timing and structure of biennial reports, and agree procedures for strong International Assessment and Review (IAR) for developed countries and International Consultation and Analysis (ICA) for developing countries.  

On all these fronts, Parties need to agree here in Panama what text they will work from – and begin to constructively work on that text.  It’s time for all Parties to show they are serious about the UNFCCC, and serious about their commitment to prevent catastrophic climate change; small steps won’t cut it.

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LEAKED LULUCF LOOPHOLE TEXT

ECO just found (under a delegates desk) the draft final decision on LULUCF for Durban. In the interest of full transparency, we reproduce it here.

Decision -/CMP.7

Land use, land use change and forestry

Acknowledgingthat we have been working on this subject far too long and may have lost all sense of proportion,

Recallingthat we made a real mess of this last time as well,

Affirmingthe need to generate credits and hide debits from LULUCF activities,

Recognisingthe need to change jargon frequently, as with force majeure natural disturbance,

Hidingforest management emissions beneath unrealistically inflated reference level projections,

ForgettingArticle 4, paragraph 2 (a) of the Convention, which states that “Each of these [Annex I] Parties shall adopt nationalpolicies and take corresponding measures to mitigate climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs,”

Overlookingthe urgent need to reduce emissions in all sectors,

Underminingthe ultimate objective of the Convention,

Wonderingif we will get away with this,

Decidesthat each Party in Annex B can account for LULUCF activities however it likes,

Further decidesthat other Parties shall not use this transparent accounting scam as an excuse to fiddle their own LULUCF or REDD accounting .

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LULUCF…hoo Wow!!!

Mamady Kobele Keita
Climate change team leader
Guinee Ecologie
Guinea

During the June session in Bonn, I have been working on Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) and it’s amazing to see how most of the participants consider this issue. You are likely to hear  “Hoo wow, LULUCF?”, “this is not our concern”, “no it’s for Annex 1 countries only”, “I have a limited knowledge on the issue”, “ if you know more about it, please help me to understand”, “it’s definitely too complicated for me”, “ I have no idea about it”. This “staying far from LULUCF” does allow parties to understand the issue and accordingly take responsibility for their parts.

Why is CAN-International paying close attention to LULUCF and why should non-Annex 1 parties be interested in the LULUCF issue? Because under the current provisions of the Kyoto Protocol, Annex 1 parties can hide their emissions from forest management, thus earning more credits while emitting at least 400 Mt of CO2 annually. Just like in other sectors, all emissions should be accounted for and all related consequences addressed.

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is clear on the issue in the following provisions:
Article 3, paragraph 1:  “The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.”
Article 4, paragraph (a): …Parties shall (a) Develop, periodically update, publish and make available to the Conference of the Parties, in accordance with Article 12, national inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, using comparable methodologies to be agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties”

Although inviting Annex 1 parties to reduce their overall emissions of greenhouse gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012, the Kyoto protocol limits direct human-induced land-use change and forestry activities to afforestation, reforestation and deforestation, excluding in the same time activities related to forest management.

The LULUCF working group within CAN-International has summarized the issue:

•    LULUCF is a set of rules determining how Annex I Parties account for emissions from their land and forests.
•    Currently it is mandatory to account for afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation, while it is voluntary to account for forest management, grazing land management, cropland management, and revegetation.
•    In the first commitment period, the voluntary nature of accounting is being exploited by Annex I Parties to obtain credits without accounting for debits. In the second commitment period, Annex I Parties are trying to change the rules to avoid accounting for increased emissions. Either way, LULUCF is being used to falsely exaggerate emission reductions.
•    Reports and analysis by the European Commission, the Stockholm Institute, the Postdam Institute, UNEP and CAN’s own analysis have all highlighted that LULUCF rules are playing a significant role in undermining Annex 1 mitigation efforts and contributing to the “Gigatonne Gap” between ambition in this process and what the science requires for addressing climate change.
•    LULUCF could, however, be a source of real mitigation action.

As you can see, it’s really important for all parties, especially non-Annex 1 parties to fully consider this issue and keep following it. During the last Bonn session, our group wanted parties to consider the introduction of a paragraph on review process in future agreed documents. We really expect for Durban to see LULUCF rules that increase accountability and strengthen the level of ambition of developed countries so that forestry and land use sectors deliver emissions reductions. This will only be possible when non-Annex 1 parties take their responsibility on the issue and act in the way that allows a review in the LULUCF accounting rules. Otherwise, the second commitment period, starting in 2013 and called by these non-Annex 1 parties, will not deliver as expected.

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LULUCF Briefing - Bioenergy

Under international accounting rules significant emissions from bioenergy are not being accounted for, meaning that bioenergy is not fulfilling its potential as a climate mitigation tool and in some cases emits more carbon than fossil fuels. This briefing explores the reasons for this accounting failure and what must be done to resolve this issue.

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CAN Talking Points - Mitigation - June 2011

Overview

A.  Clarify assumptions behind pledges:Developed countries must clarify their assumptions on domestic efforts and the use of carbon offsets, LULUCF accounting and AAU carry-over. Developing countries should provide information on key factors underlying BAU projections, e.g. energy use or economic development. They should also clarify what emissions savings they plan to achieve independently and what additional savings could be achieved with support.

B.   Close loopholes and agree common rules:Parties should seek to minimise or close off loopholes, such as bogus LULUCF accounting rules, AAU carry-over or new hot air from weak 2020 pledges in certain developed countries. This must lead to agreement on improved common accountingand reporting rules showing the true emissions of each country.

C.  Clarify conditions and move to the high end of pledges:By Durban at the latest, developed countries must move to the high end of their pledged ranges. Developed countries with conditional (upper end of) pledges must clarify these conditions, identify which conditions been met and indicate what is needed to meet the remaining conditions.

  1. Increase overall effort to get the world on a 1.5°C/2°C pathway:By Durban at the latest, Parties must begin negotiations to increase overall ambition, beyond the high end of current pledges[1]. This must lead to developed countries moving towards more than 40% reductions by 2020, but also developing countries increasing their overall effort, supported through international climate finance.
  2. Make progress on Low Emission Development Strategies:Between now and Durban, Parties should, through additional workshops, develop common templates and guidelines and review procedures for the Low Emission Development Strategies.


[1]Even in the best of all cases (countries implementing the high end of their pledges using strict accounting rules) global emissions are likely to be between 5 (UNEP) and 10 (Climate Action Tracker) GtCO2eq above what they should be for a 1.5°C/2°C emissions pathway.

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Umbrella Series Part 4: Here Comes the Russian Swan Song!

In Bangkok, Russia presented its different baselines and scenarios of Russian greenhouse gas emissions. These scenarios vary from an unrealistically fast economic growth based on old carbon technologies leading to a 14% emission reduction by 2020, to a more reasonable scenario with greenhouse gas emissions at -28% at 2020. While challenging, this ambitious scenario could be achieved through energy savings and energy efficiency measures, but the real Russian puzzle was not revealed in Bangkok.

 What Russia did not say was that these scenarios exclude any contributions from LULUCF and AAU carry over. That is, Russia already assumes that it will not carry forward its existing hot air (ECO and the atmosphere say thank you Russia!), and accepts that the reduction potential is noticeably bigger through reductions in the LULUCF sector.

In 2009, Russian greenhouse gas emissions without LULUCF were at -35%, but with LULUCF Russia was at -59% from 1990 levels! ECO believes that Russia should raise its emission reduction commitment to a minimum of -25% by 2020 -- without LULUCF and AAU carry-over. Including LULUCF, emission reductions targets for Russia could increase to at least -40% by 2020.

If this does not happen, we will see Russia, together with Ukraine and Belarus, undermining the environmental integrity of global action on climate change.

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Does Anyone think that there is no gap?

Hearing no objection it is so decided. So can ECO take it then, that, thanks to the challenging question by the European Union in Thursday’s workshop on developed country mitigation pledges, there is universal agreement that there is a gap? Fine.

So let’s move to the next step: looking at ways to increase ambition (to close the said gap), which was among the agreed purposes of the workshop, yet tacitly but plainly avoided by most developed country presenters. The European Union, at least, made a good faith attempt on the issue, and, yes, including more gases and sectors is among the things to look at. Yet ECO missed a slide explaining what the MRV- able conditions the EU has to move to (at least!) a 30% target. Instead, we were slightly amused when told that even the 20% target would be hard work. ECO reminds Parties that current EU legislation allows for more than half of the effort needed between 2013 and 2020 to be covered by carbon offsets instead of domestic action. That would also mean that with current emission levels (-16% below 1990 levels), no more domestic action is needed until 2020.

Yet, ECO’s readers will know the story of the one-eyed among the blind. Canada merrily implied that its pathetic target be comparable to the EU’s (considering that Canada is suggesting an increase over 1990 levels), and smartly dodged the question by a delegate how a target that is even weaker than its current Kyoto target could possibly constitute progress towards meeting the 1.5°C/2°C challenge. Canada’s Southern neighbours had, likewise, not much to offer, except maybe the notion that one needn’t be worried about the gap now because the review could maybe fix it later. ECO wonders if the US understands that leaving the gap unaddressed now, will require very, very steep reductions to make up for the delay, and if the US will be the country to champion that.

Delegates planning to attend today’s spin- off groups on developed country mitigation might want to keep in mind the conclusion by the co-chairs at the end of the workshop: that there is a gap, that there is some resolve to address it, and that further work needs to be done. ECO couldn’t agree more and suggests a four step approach for today’s informal sessions: (1) Developed countries make clear what their net domestic emissions will be in 2020; (2) Parties agree to close the loopholes by Durban, e.g. on hot air or carbon offset use, and have Parties not use bogus LULUCF projections meant to hide emissions but use historic reference levels and cover all emissions (see separate article in this issue); (3) Developed countries move to the high end of their pledges, by Durban, as a first important step; and (4) begin addressing the remaining gigatonne gap, by recognizing its size and a firm resolve in Durban to close it through a fair sharing of the globally needed mitigation effort, based on responsibility for emissions and capability to cut them.

And now: it is so decided!

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LULUCF Rules… Which Rules?

It is tough to spot the actual emissions reduced through the current thicket of different Annex I country pledge formats. And many countries suggest to further obscure the actual impact by including complex means of accounting for sources and sinks from land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF).

In the Annex I mitigation workshop on Thursday, AOSIS highlighted the potential contribution of lax LULUCF rules to the gigatonne gap, as described by UNEP. The Secretariat’s recent paper on the assumptions and conditions of Annex I Parties’ targets begins to clarify the extent to which Annex I countries will rely on the LULUCF sector to comply with their targets.

However, the question remains: which LULUCF rules are we talking about? These rules for the 2nd commitment period have not yet been decided!            ECO seconds the statement made by St. Lucia on Thursday that there is a pressing need for much greater transparency regarding what assumptions Parties are using in their LULUCF accounting, and encouraging the use of common methodologies.

Targets without clear LULUCF accounting rules are like a box of chocolates – you never know what you are going to get. To remedy this situation, ECO thinks Annex I Parties should take the suggestion that Colombia made in Bangkok – to submit tables showing what

their commitments would be under different accounting options, including the different options on the table for LULUCF. These tables would make the role of this sector clearer to everyone.  They would also illustrate clearly which countries are relying on their forests to help meet their targets, and which Parties are expecting to use delayed accounting for wood products or the exclusion of emissions from natural disturbances in their accounting.

It is impossible to make informed decisions on targets until it is clear what rules underpin them. With the kind of clarity and transparency Colombia has requested, Parties may be able to complete the task of decision-making that they failed to finish in Cancun.

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