Tag: Kyoto

The Elephant in the Room

Look carefully around you: there is an elephant walking the hallways in Bangkok (it’s not the local type). It’s an intangible but very sizable beast: 7.5 to 10 Gt CO2e worth of surplus assigned amount units (AAUs).

It’s important to understand the scale of the AAU elephant - almost a third of current, best-case Annex I pledges. If this gets off the track, it threatens to undermine real emissions reductions and collapse the price of carbon when carried over from Kyoto’s first commitment period to a post-2012 regime. This represents a serious threat to the goal of limiting warming to as far below 2oC as possible.

The collapse of economies in transition during the 1990s produced real social and economic hardship. Yet emissions fell dramatically, delaying the reduction of carbon space in the atmosphere.

However, this was by no means the result of climate policy, and rewarding this phenomenon as “early action” contravenes the principle that only targeted, policy-driven changes in greenhouse gas emissions should be accounted for. In addition, to no one’s surprise, surplus AAUs are currently the “grubby outcasts” of the carbon market (even worse than HFCs).

It wasn’t the best idea in Kyoto for Parties to allocate the surplus, but they can join together to correct this error in Copenhagen.

If countries with surpluses want to trade, that needs to be part of a credible, environmentally sound solution.

For example, countries holding extra AAU amounts could agree to a stringent discount (e.g., 60%) of the surplus, if carried over, and the remaining Annex I countries could increase their pledges by another 5%, insuring that overall Annex I aggregate emissions stay more than 40% below 1990 levels in 2020. If countries can’t agree to this kind of solution, carry-over should be forbidden under the Copenhagen agreement.

The EU Commission took a strong position on the AAU surplus issue. Options they have been considering should be rolled into the kind of compromise described above. AAUs cannot be used for compliance in the EU post-2012 climate and energy package. Now the EU can set the tone internationally, reaching a solution to absorb its surplus out of the global compliance system before Copenhagen.

Russia and Ukraine have set 2020 targets, but according to IIASA, those levels could actually be achieved by business-as-usual emissions growth from current levels, while still generating hundreds of megatons of credits annually. Talk about a free elephant ride!

This could divert huge financing flows away from mitigation in developing countries.

Russia and Ukraine should set more ambitious targets, well below BAU, and address the current surplus. While their emissions collapse slowed the growth of GHG stocks, this would be reversed if the Kyoto surplus was used to achieve targets, and especially so if future weak targets generate yet more questionable credits. From ECO’s viewpoint, that would be about as absurd as watching a magician pull an elephant out of a hat.

Comparability of Effort and Chances of Survival

Parties should welcome the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the nations of Kazakhstan, Turkey and Zimbabwe. Their action affirms Kyoto’s continued value and demonstrates a commitment to sparing humanity from catastrophic climate change.

A Copenhagen agreement that does not aim for a high probability of ensuring the survival and sustainable development of all nations, and the welfare of the most vulnerable, is not acceptable. The targets currently tabled by developed countries fall well short of guaranteeing these core objectives. Those targets put us on a trajectory to wipe sovereign nations off the map, add to development challenges and increase human suffering.

There is a very narrow envelope of possible emissions pathways to 2050 that have an acceptably high probability of avoiding the worst impacts of dangerous climate change. These pathways require peaking global emissions within the next 5-year commitment period and achieving reductions of at least 80% below 1990 levels by 2050.

Developed nation commitments must be based on a science-driven approach. A weak, bottom-up approach to reduction targets combined with loopholes and offsets creates a race to the bottom and a crash course on the harsh reality of catastrophic climate change.

Carbon markets should play a role in a post-2012 agreement only if the currently tabled developed country reduction targets are increased dramatically. In addition, the hazard of surplus AAUs must be addressed. The rules on LULUCF, offsetting and AAU banking must be consistent with keeping temperatures well below 2oC.

There is no avoiding the fact that deep and real emissions reductions are needed now. There simply is no atmospheric space for evasion of responsibility. For this reason, agreements in the KP track must be consistent with agreements in the LCA track in order to avoid double-counting, promote consistency, avoid loopholes and ensure the environmental integrity and fairness of the overall Copenhagen agreement.

The Kyoto Protocol provides a clear framework for industrialized country action. Rapidly evolving scientific evidence on the growing impacts of global warming does not allow for any more time to be wasted in renegotiating its architecture. Copenhagen must deliver robust, quantifiable, legally binding emissions reduction targets for all developed countries consistent with our world’s shrinking carbon budget.

The existing monitoring, reporting and verification systems are essential to help ensure environmental integrity. The compliance system must be strengthened and expanded to include an early warning system to correct projected shortfalls as well as stronger consequences for non-compliance if early warning does not lead to a remedy. The system of 5-year commitment periods is vital to allow for reviews based on new science, particularly the 5th IPCC assessment report due in 2014.

Developed countries are deliberately blurring discussions by taking different rather than common approaches to negotiating their targets. Agreement must be reached here in Bangkok on a more than 40% aggregate reduction target by 2020 compared to 1990 levels, 5-year commitment periods, and an agreement on supplementarity. Only when these elements are fixed can fair, effective national targets be negotiated and the “comparability of effort” be evaluated, and our chances of survival be elevated.

[Article published in Climate Action Network's Eco Newspaper, Oct. 2, 2009 from Bangkok, Thailand UNFCCC negotiations - full PDF version here]

CAN Intervention - COP 12 - 7, Nov, 2006

Time is of the essence. The scientists who first brought the issue of climate change to our attention are beginning to show signs of panic. This issue is running away from us, and as you have seen in this workshop, we simply have no time left to dither and delay. The impacts of climate change will get much worse unless urgent action is taken, and taken quickly. For many regions, the scale of unavoidable changes in the next few decades will likely exceed the limits of adaptation possibilities. If we do not act now, what is unavoidable will likely become catastrophic.

CAN - AWG intervention CMP2

7 Nov 06

On behalf of the Climate Action Network, thank you Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to provide input to this important discussion.

Distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen.

Time is of the essence.

The scientists who first brought the issue of climate change to our attention are beginning to show signs of panic. This issue is running away from us, and as you have seen in this workshop, we simply have no time left to dither and delay. The impacts of climate change will get much worse unless urgent action is taken, and taken quickly. For many regions, the scale of unavoidable changes in the next few decades will likely exceed the limits of adaptation possibilities. If we do not act now, what is unavoidable will likely become catastrophic.

Before us now is the challenge of agreeing to emission cuts commensurate with the threat of global climate change. If we are to avoid dangerous climate change, we need keep average global warming well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. To achieve this, global emissions will need to peak well before the end of the next decade, and decline thereafter. This means that industrialized countries will need to reduce their emissions by at least 30% below 1990 levels by 2020. As the Stern review shows, the damages associated with climate impacts are orders of magnitude greater than the costs of mitigation. Any delay significantly raises the costs of both.

Parties must recognize that an analysis of global emissions pathways, with reference to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and the issue of cumulative emissions, are essential to the deliberations on commitments beyond 2012.

It must also be said that the current lack of demonstrable progress of some countries tends to undermine faith in this process. There is a clear need for Annex 1 to show leadership. Those whose good faith is no longer clear - and we name Canada here, as its present government has walked away from its Kyoto obligations - must revisit their positions for the common good of humanity and the planet. Those who seek to lead must do so: the time has come for the European Union to come out into the open and talk the talk and walk the walk, and do this well before Finnish Saunas become a place to go and cool down from the mid summer heat…

To establish a sound scientific basis for these negotiations, CAN is seeking intensive one-year analysis phases under both Article 3.9 and Article 9. We know that the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group must be connected to work on the Article 9 review, which should include exploring and elaborating the obvious links between the two processes. And we have read the submissions and know that some do not want any Article 9 review at all; or if there is one, it should be a moment in time, with a further date to be set, perhaps once the irreversible has taken place.

In CAN’s opinion, the Chair’s list is a good, comprehensive assessment of the issues that need to be discussed as part of the post 2012 process. The necessary science is already in the literature and can readily inform this analysis. It is, therefore, not necessary to wait for the publication of the final version of the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment.

The analysis phase must set the stage for the agreement of a negotiating mandate for a comprehensive post-2012 agreement at COP/MOP 3 in 2007. The outcomes of the Dialogue must also inform this mandate. The negotiations should result in a single coherent agreement to be agreed in 2008, with commitments adequate to address the enormity of the climate challenge. This end date is needed in order to avoid a gap in commitment periods.

Finally this meeting should adopt an ambitious work plan, in accordance with the scale and the urgency of the threat of climate change to people and the planet, which lays the groundwork for deeper, absolute binding emission reduction targets for Annex I countries. In 2007 Annex I Parties should come prepared and put numbers for such targets on the table.

Thank you Mr. Chairman
 

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