Tag: IPCC

Forest management is surely as important as everyone knows, but peatlands that have been drained for agriculture and other purposes are also important emissions hotspots globally.
Yet incentives for Annex I countries to reduce these emissions under the Kyoto Protocol were minimal in the first commitment period. In fact, accounting for land use activities associated with the drainage of peatlands (forest management, grazing land management and cropland management) is voluntary and therefore rarely selected.
The second commitment period of the KP offers a new opportunity to address this mega-gap. Parties will have higher reduction targets, and LULUCF can and should make a significant contribution to reducing emissions.
Further peatland drainage can be discouraged by making accounting for Article 3.4 activities mandatory, provided sufficient data quality is ensured.
In particular, further drainage for biofuel production should be decreased to prevent the development of a giant new emissions accounting loophole in the energy sector combined with unaccounted increased emissions in the land use sector.
In addition, rewetting of drained wetlands as an effective measure to decrease emissions should be encouraged by adopting the new activity ‘wetland management’.  If countries fail to agree mandatory accounting of existing Article 3.4 activities, mandatory wetland management is the only way to close the emerging accounting loophole for peatlands under LULUCF.
Reporting and accounting for peatland drainage is already facilitated with IPCC 2006 guidance, but a number of gaps still remain. An IPCC expert meeting in October concluded that science has developed recently to such an extent that most gaps (e.g. rewetting of drained peatlands, wetland restoration) can now be filled. As well, the emissions associated with land use on peat (cropland, grassland, forestry, peat extraction) should be reassessed.
Here in Cancun, the SBSTA can request the IPCC to undertake this work and define a way forward to finalize improved guidance in time for the second commitment period.  It’s all to protect one of our most important land sequestration resources . . . for peat’s sake!

Upon arriving in Copenhagen, US Special Envoy on Climate Todd Stern said: “Emissions are emissions. You’ve just got to do the math. If you care about the science, and we do, there is no way to solve this problem by giving the major developing countries a pass.”

ECO does care about the science and we have done the math. Stern and other developed countries may be interested in the conclusions.

IPCC AR4 highlighted the need for 25-40% cuts on 1990 levels by 2020 for developed countries and substantial deviation from business-as-usual (BAU) for developing countries by 2020. Subsequent peer reviewed science identified this substantial deviation as being in the range of a 15-30% deviation from BAU (subsequently adopted as the de facto yardstick by EU and others). As the IPCC  has  also pointed out, these mitigation targets give the world a 50-50 chance of averting a rise above 2˚C. More importantly, the disparity between woeful developed country ambition and the levels of actions proposed by developing countries are fairly stark.

According to recent estimates of Project Catalyst, an initiative of Climate Works, it is developing countries that are within their proposed emissions reductions range, and towards the upper end of it.

Using the high range figures for proposed mitigation actions and plans, Project Catalyst estimates that every developing country stating a target fell within the 15-30% range. And two exceed it – Brazil with 39% deviation from BAU and Indonesia with 41%.

The Maldives and Costa Rica have proposed going carbon neutral by 2020, humbling even the most ambitious Annex I ambitions.

South Africa has just announced it will undertake mitigation actions which diminish emissions below baseline by around 34% by 2020 and by around 42% by 2025. Like other developing country pledges this will depend on international finance. This means South Africa’s emissions would peak between 2020 and 2025, plateau for around a decade and then decline in absolute terms.

South Korea has a target of 30% reductions from BAU, and has committed almost US$100 million in environmental industries as part of its economic recovery package.

Of course, ECO acknowledges that there are genuine challenges with defining BAU. China and India’s intensity targets also are more difficult to quantify because they also rely on accurate projections of economic growth. It is also crucial to note that from developed country finance is a fundamental prerequisite for many of these mitigation efforts by these countries which struggle with poverty and still need resources for human development.

But, returning to Stern’s comments, let us take a look at how developed countries’ pledges measure up to what the science requires. Recall that developed countries need to make cuts of up to 40% on 1990 levels by 2020. Even on the lesser goalpost of 25-40% ranges the figures are seriously underwhelming. Of course, there are some climate leaders – notably Norway and Scotland with targets of 40% or above.

Calculations carried out by Ecofys and Climate Analytics show that developed country emissions reductions as an aggregate are projected to be only 8-12% below 1990 levels by 2020 after accounting for forestry credits. Other calculations taking full account of the various loopholes available to developed countries arrive only at a dismal -2% to +4% change in emissions on 1990 levels.

And Project Catalyst’s analysis of key developed countries puts only the EU’s high-end pledge into the -25-40% range. Japan, the US, Russia and Australia all fall short, with Canada potentially heading for increased emissions. At the lower end of the pledges by countries analysed not a single one made the grade.

When you do the math, it seems that developed countries are the ones getting the free pass.