Tag: Copenhagen

Youth Sound the Alarm

Today the international youth delegation will sound the alarm to the world, declaring “no confidence” on the road to Copenhagen. A young person from every continent will join together to say they are not being dramatic. They will state what they see as obvious; what is likely to come out of Copenhagen will not secure their future.

But they have not given up hope. The youth believe that an acceptable outcome from Copenhagen is still possible. Specifically, they would like to remind delegates (once more) that to secure the survival of all nations and peoples, global warming must be kept below 1.5 degrees; this means stabilising CO2 in the atmosphere at 350 ppm.

But since none of the Parties here seem to want to step up and lead to this, it is time for someone else to show climate leadership.

Today, a new way will be proposed. The youth will lead. Please follow.

At a press conference at 1.30pm today, the youth will categorically remind leaders what an inadequate outcome in Copenhagen would mean to the nations of the world. It will then outline steps that must be taken to achieve a deal that puts everyone on the road to a secure future. They will show how youth all over the world are already taking action to achieve this future and are coming together to solve the climate crisis. They will show what it means to lead!

All Aboard?

The industrialised countries are pushing forward a model for a Copenhagen agreement based firmly around carbon markets coupled with weak targets. By and large, developing countries are not boarding any train headed to weak targets. Ever stopped to wonder why?

Industrialised countries talk about carbon markets and offset mechanisms in particular as if they are doing developing countries a favour, by providing financial flows from North to South. In fact, at least under the Clean Development Mechanism, it is more accurate to say that developing countries are the ones doing the favour – by giving Annex I countries a way of meeting their targets on the cheap.

The carbon markets question is emerging as one of the key fault lines in the negotiations. It cuts across discussions on Annex I targets, finance and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions. Until the discussion is reframed, it will be hard to make the progress we urgently need to see.

Part of the problem is that Annex I negotiators may be too busy to read the analysis by their own technical experts. Take the European Commission’s recent Communication on climate finance. Put aside for the moment the fact that the Commission’s model would give high probability of exceeding 2oC warming. The Commission says that developing countries will need around Euros 100 billion per year by 2020 for adaptation and mitigation. Carbon markets would provide around 40% of this total – and public finance from international sources would be some Euros 22-50 billion per year.

However, the Commission’s headline figures are based on an assumption that cumulative Annex I targets are 31% below 1990 levels by 2020. Has anyone seen that sort of ambition actually on the table here in Bangkok?

The EU has been less keen to draw attention to perhaps the most important line in the Communication. This concludes that if cumulative Annex I reductions end up at around 10% below 1990 levels, this “would require an increase in the transfer of international public finance to developing countries of around Euros 120 billion per year in 2020.”

Such “radical” voices as McKinsey, in its recent analysis for Project Catalyst, give the same simple message – weak targets require much, much higher levels of public finance from Annex I countries for mitigation in developing countries. There is no free lunch.

Unfortunately a lot of industrialised countries’ negotiators can’t get their heads round the simple maths, and are trying to have it both ways. ECO is clear – if markets are to play a role, enabling conditions must first be in place. Low Annex I targets do not enabling conditions make.

At Bonn III, developing countries called for a fundamental debate on the role of carbon markets in the Copenhagen agreement, and have strongly repeated the call here in Bangkok. An honest discussion of the conditions under which carbon markets could contribute to keeping warming well below 2oC is long overdue. Let’s strip out double, triple and quadruple counting and concentrate on what the atmosphere sees. And address the concern that the rich world is picking all of developing countries’ “low hanging fruit.”

The EU and other industrialised countries are sitting in the carbon market train wanting to discuss the colour of the seats, and wondering why developing countries won’t jump on board. The developing countries are on the platform waiting for the engine to turn up.

[Article published in Climate Action Network's Eco Newspaper, Oct. 5, 2009 from Bangkok, Thailand UNFCCC negotiations - full PDF version here]

Not the Wakeup Call, the Final Call


As Parties took stock of the snail paced progress achieved during the first week at the Conference Centre, residents of Metro Manila were taking stock of lost lives, dwellings and personal belongings that came about due to tropical storm Ondoy.  An unprecedented flood, drenching the region with a month's worth of rain in 6 hours, seems clearly linked to climate change.

Following the dual plenaries on Friday afternoon, stretching into the evening, ECO wondered how many people would have to die and how much property would be destroyed before governments around the world take stock of their serious lack of ambition and wake up to the urgency of the moment.

As the representative from Mauritius pointed out, “This is not the wake up call, this is the final call.”

The KP and LCA plenaries seemed a flat ending to a fitfully productive week.  Was it the late hour, the profusion of repetitious rhetoric, or the inability of delegates to find new and transformational elements in the long discussions?

To be fair, negotiations have moved forward at a slow but measureable pace on adaptation, technology transfer and capacity building. But the keystone, emission reduction targets by developed countries, was sadly still cast in cotton. This is not at all good news.  Perhaps, as New Zealand said, enhancing the scale of actual aggregate and country by country proposals for emissions reductions is out of the hands of this process and must be taken up at the political level.

So that leaves the other essential task to be completed by next Friday in Bangkok: very substantial progress toward clean, non repetitive, negotiating text.  Parties should be in a position to step on the accelerator starting immediately.  This was the clear message from vulnerable country parties in the plenary.

The week-long discussions in the AWG-KP did not deliver the paradigm shift that would help keep global warming well below 2oC. Developing country parties raised the issue repeatedly in their interventions, pointing out among other things that for them this is a question of survival.

But a different and rather unfortunate emerging theme is the clear realization that the Kyoto Protocol is at risk of unraveling; indeed, as Mauritius said, a feeling that a deliberate attempt was being made to do so.  This is hardly the kind of  news the world is looking for while watching the evidence of our vulernability to natural disasters (whether or not climate related) in Metro Manila, Sydney, Samoa and Sumatra.

The lack of sufficient aggregate targets put on the table by developed countries, and only reluctant discussion on on finance and legal architecture, are holding other key parts of the discussions hostage. The lack of clarity on the future form and regulatory aspects of market and non- market based mechanisms is muddying the waters further.

The deliberate insertion of response measures into the adaptation text by some developing country parties is unhelpful and is verging on blocking progress in the contact group.  And the inability of both developed and developing countries to get their act to together on bunkers (especially on the issue of International Air Passenger Levy for Adaptation) is a looming failure in an increasingly climate constrained world.

Over the week in various contact groups it seemed that parties were resorting to their favorite activity – reiterating long memorized positions across the spectrum of issues so they can play the blame game later.  But blame aside, it is readily evident that the slow pace of negotiations only plays into the hands of those parties who don’t want a real deal at Copenhagen.

Despite the predictable recycling of rhetoric this past week, ECO doesn't mind repeating itself on this key reality: global emissions must peak within the next 5-year commitment period, and be reduced thereafter on the order of at least 80% below 1990 levels by 2050, in order to ensure the survival of the poorest and most vulnerable countries and communities.   These reductions must be pursued in the spirit of equity and justice, especially when it comes to the needs of the poor and vulnerable in developing countries.

Delegates should note that what was true in New York last week on the immensity of the climate challenge remains true here this week and next. Bangkok cannot be another lost opportunity for the international community to deliver on its obligations to the the environment, future generations and particularly the most vulnerable communities and countries.  The disaster zones we saw on our TV screens and laptops this week were a mere hint of the losses to come if dangerous climate change is not averted.

So ECO returns to the theme that closed our first review of the week.

Delegates here in Bangkok must realize that the best rhetoric in the world won’t by itself build a single wind turbine, save a single acre of rainforest, or help a single village respond to the impacts of climate change.  Actions speak louder than words.

[Article published in Climate Action Network's Eco Newspaper, Oct. 3, 2009 from Bangkok, Thailand UNFCCC negotiations - full PDF version here]

The Elephant in the Room

Look carefully around you: there is an elephant walking the hallways in Bangkok (it’s not the local type). It’s an intangible but very sizable beast: 7.5 to 10 Gt CO2e worth of surplus assigned amount units (AAUs).

It’s important to understand the scale of the AAU elephant - almost a third of current, best-case Annex I pledges. If this gets off the track, it threatens to undermine real emissions reductions and collapse the price of carbon when carried over from Kyoto’s first commitment period to a post-2012 regime. This represents a serious threat to the goal of limiting warming to as far below 2oC as possible.

The collapse of economies in transition during the 1990s produced real social and economic hardship. Yet emissions fell dramatically, delaying the reduction of carbon space in the atmosphere.

However, this was by no means the result of climate policy, and rewarding this phenomenon as “early action” contravenes the principle that only targeted, policy-driven changes in greenhouse gas emissions should be accounted for. In addition, to no one’s surprise, surplus AAUs are currently the “grubby outcasts” of the carbon market (even worse than HFCs).

It wasn’t the best idea in Kyoto for Parties to allocate the surplus, but they can join together to correct this error in Copenhagen.

If countries with surpluses want to trade, that needs to be part of a credible, environmentally sound solution.

For example, countries holding extra AAU amounts could agree to a stringent discount (e.g., 60%) of the surplus, if carried over, and the remaining Annex I countries could increase their pledges by another 5%, insuring that overall Annex I aggregate emissions stay more than 40% below 1990 levels in 2020. If countries can’t agree to this kind of solution, carry-over should be forbidden under the Copenhagen agreement.

The EU Commission took a strong position on the AAU surplus issue. Options they have been considering should be rolled into the kind of compromise described above. AAUs cannot be used for compliance in the EU post-2012 climate and energy package. Now the EU can set the tone internationally, reaching a solution to absorb its surplus out of the global compliance system before Copenhagen.

Russia and Ukraine have set 2020 targets, but according to IIASA, those levels could actually be achieved by business-as-usual emissions growth from current levels, while still generating hundreds of megatons of credits annually. Talk about a free elephant ride!

This could divert huge financing flows away from mitigation in developing countries.

Russia and Ukraine should set more ambitious targets, well below BAU, and address the current surplus. While their emissions collapse slowed the growth of GHG stocks, this would be reversed if the Kyoto surplus was used to achieve targets, and especially so if future weak targets generate yet more questionable credits. From ECO’s viewpoint, that would be about as absurd as watching a magician pull an elephant out of a hat.

Time for a Course Correction

The Bali Action Plan (BAP) provides a clear timetable and outline for negotiations aimed toward a fair and effective deal in Copenhagen. That outline differentiates between the mitigation commitments of developed countries and the MRV actions undertaken by developing countries.

The BAP did not, however, provide space for the crucial overarching discussion on architecture. That includes a discussion about the relationship between an enhanced Kyoto Protocol (or a successor Protocol) and the legal outcome of negotiations under the LCA. This architectural debate goes to the heart of the Copenhagen outcome.

Such a discussion will have to include consideration of the comparability of the efforts of those rich countries that have avoided doing so under Kyoto -- especially the United States -- and those who have inscribed their commitments in Annex B.  It should fully consider all architectural proposals that aim to flesh out all the requisite responsibilities, as the climate regime evolves and builds on the solid foundation the Convention provides.

ECO has been a bit surprised by the confusion the US was able to create with its call for a discussion of the “common” elements of the BAP.  Indeed, it is the US that is on review until it is ready to commit to doing its fair share, both in reducing its own emissions and taking on a concrete financial obligation. The clock is ticking on the US Senate turning the good intentions of President Obama into legislative action. Today, the main bill from Senate leadership is being released: game on.  The countdown to Copenhagen continues.

As for the developing countries, based on what they have been tabling recently, like China last week, they have nothing to fear.

Developing countries need not be defensive, and they should welcome a broader debate on architecture.
ECO calls on all delegations to enter into this debate with an open mind, without dwelling too much on the motivations of the US. We welcome political statements if they are used as a means to clarify country positions, rather than as detours slowing down progress towards an equitable and ambitious deal that has real environmental integrity.

These refinements to the course of the debate would help shorten the negotiating text to its bare essence, by articulating areas of convergence and divergence in legal terms and conducting actual negotiations, rather than further process discussions. Yet for all the diplomatic niceties: this is a fight worth having.

[Article published in Climate Action Network's Eco Newspaper, Sep. 30, 2009 from Bangkok, Thailand UNFCCC negotiations - full PDF version here]

Adaptation is Additional by Definition

As negotiators continue to wrangle over procedural issues in the adaptation contact group, Parties should be preparing for a possibly contentious debate on an issue that is nonetheless essential – the additionality of climate finance.

ECO has overheard very few developed countries in the corridors who are ready to provide climate finance in addition to their obligations to provide 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) for overseas development assistance (ODA). Most developed countries apparently hope to get away with cherry-picking their future aid budgets to meet the potential provisions of a Copenhagen agreement on financial support for adaptation (and mitigation as well) in developing countries.

There are some important reasons why climate finance needs to be additional – and that means not only additional to existing ODA flows, but additional to ODA targets.

First: Finance for adaptation is not aid but advance compensation for climate change impacts experienced by developing countries from emissions by developed countries.

Second: The pledge to deliver 0.7% of developed countries’ GNI as aid was made long ago – and long before the additional burden of climate change became apparent. To be sure, 0.7% is not exactly a huge amount of money if we are to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and the developed countries aren't on track for their ODA targets on the MDGs.  Not even close, in fact.

Third: In a fair Copenhagen agreement, developed countries would have to provide public finance of at least $50 billion per year for adaptation (and $100 billion for mitigation and other needs). If just a portion of these totals were to be obtained by diverting money for climate change purposes from future aid budgets, this would come at the expense of already scarce resources needed for basic education, health care, sanitation, housing and poverty eradication.

The argument is often heard that adaptation interventions cannot be considered as separate from development. However, while it's true that adaptation efforts should be consistent with poverty reduction and development programs, adaptation funding must be additional.

An increasingly hostile climate makes development increasingly expensive. This necessitates new resources for agriculture, increases in social and private insurance, and investment in new buildings and infrastructure, to name only a few.  These are the costs of adaptation, and they are by definition additional. Therefore, adaptation financing should also be truly additional, and not extracted from future aid budgets.

ECO will be listening closely when developed country colleagues speak on their plans to provide new and additional financial resources. If the LCA adaptation text in para 14(p) made the 0.7% target explicit, it would have it just right.  So developing country delegates may wish to focus on this paragraph when working on the finance chapter of the LCA text.

[Article published in Climate Action Network's Eco Newspaper, Sep. 30, 2009 from Bangkok, Thailand UNFCCC negotiations - full PDF version here]

Pages

Subscribe to Tag: Copenhagen