Tag: climate action network

Elements toward a High-Performance MRV Framework

Welcome to this special supplement to ECO.  After a lively debate the first week of this session, we would like to  present elements of a balanced and comprehensive overview of the issues regarding MRV (monitoring, reporting and verification). While some would like to use the debate around MRV as an  opportunity to obscure their lack of ambition in other areas, we consider MRV as an essential element of a fair, ambitious and binding agreement including a dual obligation for developed countries and significantly enhanced actions by all countries. We believe Parties should aim to conclude negotiations on all elements of MRV at Cancún such that the requirements first set out in the Bali Action Plan are fully met and reflect the spirit of this new, innovative and collaborative approach to address the climate crisis.

To track the overall progress of emission reduction efforts, it is vital that accurate information be gathered and shared. This process – known as measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) – is fundamental to building trust amongst parties and ensuring environmental integrity.

MRV has emerged as a threshold issue in the negotiations on the road to COP 16.   Parties must agree in Bonn on a process to ensure that all the relevant guidelines are finalized by Cancún. This should include a mandate for the Chair to propose text on this issue at the August session based on submissions from Parties, as the current text on MRV is not sufficiently advanced.

What exactly is MRV? Here is ECO’s view:

Measurement includes both the collection and quantification of data.

Reporting involves regular, timely reports by parties using an appropriate format.

Verification refers to the technical assessment of the accuracy and reliability of reported information.

First, an overall caution: don’t confuse MRV with compliance! For developed countries, MRV serves as a building block to compliance, like teammates on a relay team.  MRV produces the information needed to determine a Party’s performance but leaves it to another process to keep score.

Differentiation

Developed nations became rich burning coal and oil – and emitting enormous amounts of greenhouse gases. According to the UN Human Development Report, rich countries are responsible for ‘about 7 out of every 10 tonnes of CO2 that have been emitted since the start of the industrial era’.

The guiding principle of the Convention, ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (CBDR), recognizes the vast differences among Parties with respect to their historical contribution and responsibility, as well as their respective capability – in other words, in accordance with this principle it is the developed countries that must act first.

The Bali Action Plan calls on Parties to agree to MRV of enhanced national and international action on mitigation.

This is firmly rooted in the CBDR principle.  It includes ‘measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions ... by all developed country Parties’, and ‘nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties ... supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner’. Parties – and the world – have a common interest in the environmental effectiveness of measures taken to mitigate climate change.  MRV fundamentally involves gathering and reporting consistent, comparable and accurate information on these measures and their environmental outcomes.

Credible MRV can strengthen trust amongst the parties and confidence in the overall regime for climate response and enable a stronger collective effort.  But at all times we need to keep our eye on the ball.

ECO notes that the Bali Action Plan is part of a road map that envisions a science-based aggregate emissions reduction target and ambitious developed country reduction targets.   MRV without ambitious targets won’t get the job done.  And while MRV is a fundamental building block of compliance for developed countries, MRV for developing countries is about different commitments for different parties with different capacities and different responsibilities.

See the difference?  ECO would also like to recall for a few well-known Parties that Annex 1 countries already have well developed MRV rules and institutions, otherwise known as the KP.

Developed Country MRV

ECO shouldn’t have to remind anybody of the importance and history of  MRV of developed country action.  The system currently in use by most developed countries has some keystones that provide the foundation for the MRV system, and developed country MRV is a cornerstone of the international system – so don’t let that building fall apart!  Here are some key elements:

  • Annual emissions inventories which fully cover sources and sinks using consistent guidelines, rules and methodologies.
  • Frequent reporting -- developed countries should complete their 6th National Communication by 2012.
  • Accounting for progress of the country’s emissions against a common set of rules.
  • Transparent, independent and scientifically based assessments by expert review teams of whether or not emissions and accounting actually show what the developed country says.
  • Assessment of compliance against international commitments.

Let’s get one thing straight.  MRV does not equal compliance.  As we have pointed out time after time, reviewing progress towards a target is only the first step of ensuring compliance with legally binding commitments.  There has to be a process for dealing with problems detected by expert reviewers – and it can’t just be name and shame!

Compliance procedures for legally binding commitments, with a range of appropriate consequences, are vital to building an effective regime for addressing climate change.  This regime is not only important for assessing countries’ compliance with their commitments, but also for the consistency of carbon market rules to ensure environmental integrity.

Developed countries don’t have to start from scratch.  The world already knows how to MRV developed country commitments – they’re called Articles 5, 7 and 8.  Many years were spent negotiating the intricate details of the system, including the standardized methodologies and guidelines vital to effective MRV and the compliance procedures for developed country commitments.  After all that effort, it would be a waste to depart from these rules and procedures, instead of building on and improving them.

We have heard many times that the United States not only rejects the need for compliance procedures, it also does not wish to have common accounting methodologies.  Considering that the US was a leader in developing the KP rules on MRV and compliance in the first place, this is uncomfortable, ironic or both. Parties agreed in Bali on a dual obligation of developed countries MRV for both mitigation and support.  Within that framework, an MRV system for financial support must be able to answer key questions such as whether or not funds are:

(1) new and additional;

(2) allocated in a balanced manner between adaptation and mitigation;

(3) equitably distributed between countries and in particular, prioritized for the most vulnerable countries;

(4) respond to developing country needs for the required levels of financing;

(5) establish clear criteria and indicators (such as the work that the EGTT has done on performance indicators); and

(6) are reliable.

We aren’t there yet, but there are some building blocks which can be used.  The current system of MRVing climate finance from developed countries is decentralized and fragmented, and as a result does not completely meet the six criteria above. Parties must make significant improvements to the existing system by adopting common measurement, reporting and verification rules under the UNFCCC that create a comprehensive and comparable picture of finance from both developed countries and multilateral development banks.  Also needed are transparency and comparability on non-financial actions (which is important for technology and capacity building), as well as private financial flows to extend the current MRV system  implementation for public financial flows.

Developing countries have a critical need to adapt to and mitigate climate change – a need that cannot be met solely with their own resources. Support from developed countries is crucial and needs to be comparable, transparent, accurate, efficient and timely.  Implementing such a system will ensure that resources flow to essential needs and

build much-needed trust. While a reporting process is being finalized, all developed countries must be as transparent as possible in the delivery of fast track climate funds to developing countries, including through regular reporting.

Non-Annex I MRV

We need a strong compliance mechanism and strong MRV for developed countries for their dual obligations of reducing emissions and providing support.  But in addition, we also need to have progress on non-Annex I reporting and review, noting that review should respect national sovereignty and not be used as a back-door manoeuvre to force binding emissions reduction targets on them.

Let’s start with the reporting. Most developing countries should submit greenhouse gas (GHG) inventories every two years and a full national communication at least once in each 5-year commitment period. These reports should receive full financial and technical support by developed countries, including fast start funding. LDCs and SIDS should, as far as feasible, do this work voluntarily with appropriate developed country support. GHG inventories can be included in a biennial update on national communications that outlines new developments in the country.  The most updated guidelines of the IPCC should be used for  these inventories.

Now let’s move to the issue of verification. GHG inventories along with supported NAMAs should be verified internationally, while unsupported actions should be verified domestically according to international guidelines negotiated and developed by the COP.

International verification of inventories is fundamental for assessing whether the world is on track with overall emissions reduction and temperature targets.

For supported NAMAs, international verification must be linked to MRV of support to assure that adequate support for financial costs, technical needs and capacity building are provided. Developing countries will need time and support to develop robust inventories.  Don’t forget, it took time for the quality and timeliness of many developed country inventories to improve, and these improvements were facilitated in large part by the expert review process.

In-country reviews are likely to be the most helpful, and this option should be open to developing countries.  The output of expert review teams should feed into a facilitative process that ensures the provision of further technical, financial or other assistance as needed. In anticipating a paradigm shift towards a low carbon economy, developing country parties (except for LDCs and SIDS, who should be able to opt in) should elaborate indicative or aspirational low-carbon action plans (LCAPs). These plans, which will only be possible with developed country finance and support, should outline a low carbon strategy for mitigation and adaptation.

Fast Start Needed for 1,5 Review

Earlier this week during a SBSTA contact group, a group of countries particularly vulnerable to climate change requested a workshop and technical report by Cancun on the costs and opportunities of mitigation to limit global temperature rise to below 1.5 o C. The report could draw on recent scientific studies in advance of forthcoming IPCC scenarios, and equip Parties with an early look well ahead of 2015 at the options available when they deliberate the long-term temperature goal under the LCA. Since many governments with a view to adopting 1.5o C as the long-term goal agreed the Copenhagen Accord in part because of the promised review of 1.5 by 2015, there should be a lot of support for getting the ball rolling. Perhaps not to our surprise, however, there are quite few a developed countries coming up with all sorts of excuses why such a report can or should not be done by Cancun – we don’t have enough time, the UNFCCC can't do this, it is in the wrong agenda item, etc. But ECO has to ask this: Why would parties raise excuses against assessing the most recent scientific research? Could such a report present some inconvenient truths? The UNFCCC cannot be serious about a long-term goal unless it is informed about the underlying science and all the resulting options.  A study on actions associated with limiting temperature rise to 1.5 o C would be well in line with the precautionary principle under the Convention.  But therein lies the problem -- that would involve Parties agreeing to align ongoing deliberations more firmly with the principles of the Convention, which has been a bit of a challenge lately.  We eagerly await the draft conclusions from the SBSTA contact group on Agenda Item 9, and for evidence that vulnerable countries' pleas wont fall on deaf ears again.

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LCA Finance Comes Alive

After a unexciting first couple of days, today out of the blue in the LCA contact group on finance, delegates picked up the pace. It was a pleasure to see negotiators giving thoughtful and creative responses to the Chair's questions and to each other's proposals. The Chair chose wisely in selecting finance, which underpins progress on many other areas, for the first deep engagement with the new negotiating text. Parties responded by presenting new ideas and arguments on the complex linkages between institutions as well as the need for effectiveness and accountability to the UNFCCC and its governing bodies. There is a clear consensus about the establishment of a new fund, and some new and creative thinking about how an overarching Finance Board could provide an oversight or coordinating function. But no institutional framework for financing can be effective without sufficient funding. To ensure rapid progress on scaling up finance, the LCA must also continue its discussion of sources, in parallel with the discussions under the Advisory Group on Climate Finance (AGF), which is holding a workshop on Saturday to report on progress and receive input. The AGF has an opportunity to make rapid progress on identifying sources of funding for climate actions in developing countries. However, the LCA cannot just wait until the AGF presents its final report in November to take up the issue of sources, if it hopes to move from analysis to action this year. Parties should start actively discussing sources of public funds in the LCA now, and incorporate and build on the analyses and recommendations of the AGF, starting with the interim report expected in July. Avenues to explore include new and innovative sources of public finance, including bunkers mechanisms, financial transaction taxes (FTTs), Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) and international auctioning of AAUs. Then in Cancun, the LCA can be in a position to adopt substantial decisions and provide clear guidance for the work of the UNFCCC and other bodies in the coming year. This can lead to adoption of a comprehensive set of decisions on financing sources and institutions as part of an ambitious comprehensive agreement in Cancun.  All this is possible if leaders have the political will; but short of that, Parties can agree a more modest but still ambitious package of decisions to demonstrate the viability of the UNFCCC process and support the scaling up of mitigation and adaptation actions on the ground.

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The Vital Rol of Full Public Participation

The irony is rich: interventions by two nongovernmental were mysteriously overlooked in the SBI yesterday.  The topic?  Public participation in the climate negotiations. Civil society participation plays a critical role in this process.  We can't say it better than the Secretariat itself in its guidelines.  Vibrant public participation "allows vital experience, expertise, information and perspectives from civil society to be brought into the process to generate new insights and approaches [and] promotes transparency."  Importantly, effective public participation also helps ensure the legitimacy and public acceptance of negotiation outcomes. To be sure, the experience in Copenhagen – where the public was more engaged than ever before – has caused some Parties to forget that they agreed in the Convention to "encourage the widest participation in this process, including that of non-governmental organizations." Instead, civil society is being pushed to the margins, with opportunities to contribute increasingly limited to chance hallway encounters and loading up the tables near side events with food and drinks to entice elusive negotiators. Civil society is happy to promote conviviality and informal contact, but the negotiations require substantive and formal involvement as well. ECO suggests the UNFCCC and its parties embrace the growing popularity of the process and seek to use that as an opportunity to improve performance rather than shy away.  And now is the time to start.  A contact group is meeting today to discuss process issues related to intergovernmental meetings. This group must take up the question of public participation ensure meaningful participation throughout these processes.  It should start by permitting designated NGO representatives to actively engage on the issue of participation in today's contact group, as well as in future formal and informal sessions on this issue. As the SBI and the Secretariat consider these issues, ECO urges them to ensure a few basic principles.  Measures should always be aimed at ensuring the broadest participation possible in the given circumstance. At a minimum, this means preserving and enhancing opportunities for routine civil society input through official interventions, submissions and consultations.  Relevant rules must be transparent and provide for independent review of particular decisions limiting participation. Access to information is the lifeblood of meaningful participation; all key documents should be posted on the Secretariat's website as soon as they are finalized. Indeed, the Secretariat should take the lead in ensuring meaningful public participation and so must have sufficient and increased resources to be able to do so effectively.  Additionally, each host country government bears great responsibility as well.  Host country agreements should be made public and incorporate an obligation to facilitate participation. As host of COP-16, Mexico must take proactive steps to guarantee effective civil society participation in Cancún.  Ambassador de Alba's proven record as a strong defender of human rights gives ECO hope in this regard.  Unfortunately, Cancún's geography creates a cause for concern. Direct access to negotiators is essential.  Civil society should have broad access to the venues where formal negotiations are taking place except in extreme conditions.  In addition, Mexico must guarantee that space for side events and other civil society activities is easily and quickly accessible to all participants. Civil society also serves as an extremely valuable technical and political resource for Parties, especially in developing countries. Parties should always be enabled and encouraged to take advantage of these resources however they choose, including by inviting them onto their delegations where appropriate. Finally, the SBI and the Secretariat should take advantage of an expert resource: the Secretariat of the Aarhus Convention has offered its assistance in resolving UNFCCC public participation concerns.  Aarhus input would be valuable. Civil society is not here just to vent our frustration or make the negotiations more difficult.  We have a right to participate and much to contribute.  It is time for the Parties and the Secretariat to take heed, and then take action.

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CAN Position - Effective Participation - June 2004

CAN strongly believes that procedures and modalities for timely, meaningful, and representative participation by NGOs in all Convention-related processes are essential both to ensure that the Convention and Protocol meet their environmental and sustainable development objectives and to comply with emerging public participation principles in international law.  In this paper, CAN outlines its views on the options identified in the Note by the secretariat, “Promoting effective participation in the Convention process” (FCCC/SBI/2004/5).  CAN calls upon all Parties to recognize the fundamental and critical role played by NGOs in the negotiation process by supporting substantial improvements in the mechanisms and policies for NGO participation.  

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Presentation - Building on Kyoto - Dec 2004

While the Kyoto Protocol is not yet in force (due to the unilateral declaration by the George W. Bush Administration of the United States that it would not follow the Kyoto Protocol, as well as delay in Russiaís ratification of it) already many difficulties have been overcome, with deailed operational rules for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol having been agreed upon at the Seventh Conference of the Parties (COP7), and more than 120 countries having ratified it.  This indicates that the large majority of the countries and people of the world are strongly in support of the Kyoto Protocol as the only international system of rules that could allow us to confront global warming.

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Bonn III: Creative Accountants for Rent

As regular readers will know, ECO prides itself on seeking out the most shocking, least noble attempts by parties to avoid their responsibilities for tackling climate change, no matter how well hidden. And after thirty years of fearless reporting, there aren't many tricks of the climate negotiating trade that haven't been exposed on these pages.

In this year alone, who could forget the shameful 'bar to zero' exposé that rocked the LULUCF closed sessions? Or the moment the news broke that the Japanese 2020 mitigation target was not as ambitious as their choice of base year suggested or their government claimed?

So it is with great excitement this week that ECO stumbled upon the latest trick from developed countries, this time seeking ways to avoid their obligations to provide adequate new and additional public climate financing to developing countries.

It is old news that developed countries are often found seeking to "double count" carbon offsets - both towards their own mitigation targets, and towards financing for mitigation in developing countries. But the EU and US have this week given the story a new twist.Confounded by accusations of "double counting", the big brains in the EU have been working over-time to find ways to get recognition under a Copenhagen deal for all the money they send out of their own countries to buy offset credits for mitigation projects in the South. ECO can understand why - after all, if they don't count funds flowing through offsetting, developed countries would actually have to fulfill their commitments to find and pay the new and additional public money they owe.

They found the solution in a single word: 'rent'. CDM offset credits are sold at the marginal price set by the market, but most are generated at much lower costs, meaning a significant economic rent, or profit, is earned on the sale. It is this profit margin that the EU have been considering counting towards their public financing obligations under a Copenhagen agreement.

It seems the idea is catching on fast. On Wednesday night, US chief negotiator Jonathan Pershing was heard to claim the US would be trying a similar trick. At a stroke it seemed Annex I financing obligations could be slashed without any further effort required beyond clever accounting.

Except there is just one problem. The rent that accrues from the sale of CDM offset credits is captured not by developing country governments, but by private sector companies operating in developing countries. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee whatsoever that this money will be used to take additional mitigation measures in developing countries nor to fund adaptation to climate impacts amongst the poorest and most vulnerable people. It takes real creative accounting to consider this climate value for climate money.

So ECO would like to suggest some homework for the EU, US and any other developed country delegation considering this latest scam as they leave Bonn: think again about what climate financing is needed for. ECO suggests that a minimum of US$150bn annually by 2020 in public finance is needed to cover the incremental costs of mitigation and adaptation for developing countries to meet the <2˚C target. And not a penny of public money less.

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