Tianjin strategy session - adaptation
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The adaptation policy working group discussions policy at the CAN strategy session in Tianjin on 3 October 2010
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The adaptation policy working group discussions policy at the CAN strategy session in Tianjin on 3 October 2010
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CAN intervention AWG Monday 3 December 2007 4:30-6 pm
Mr. Chair, excellencies, distinguished delegates, welcome to Indonesia and Bali (say also in Bahasa Indonesia). Thank you for the opportunity to speak on behalf of the over 400 member organizations of the Climate Action Network, my name is Elshinta Suyoso Marsden of WWF-Indonesia.
2007 has been a remarkable climate year already. You have a unique opportunity, indeed responsibility, to crown this year with a Bali mandate that truly delivers on the personal commitments made by almost 100 heads of state to avoid dangerous warming through a post-2012 climate deal.
Like never before, the climate crisis is now in the public spotlight and expectations are very high for this meeting.
The combination of high population density and high levels of biodiversity together with a staggering 80,000 kilometers of coastline and 17,500 islands, makes Indonesia one of the countries most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. The impacts are noticeable throughout our Asia-Pacific region; more frequent and severe heat waves, floods, extreme weather events and prolonged droughts will continue to lead to increased injury, illness and death. Continued warming temperatures will also increase the number of malaria and dengue fever cases and lead to an increase in other infectious diseases as a result of poor nutrition due to food production disruption.
The IPCC reports are unequivocal about the impacts the world will experience if we continue down the current path. The IPCC also shows we have the technologies and policy measures we need in order to avoid dangerous climate if, but only if, immediate action is taken.
The Climate Action Network (CAN) wishes to be quite clear in its demands, what we need from Bali is industrialized country leadership - putting warm words into cool action, and living up to commitments, old and new. We also need incentives from industrialized countries to enable developing countries to increase their contributions and do their fair share. This will require new mechanisms that substantially increase the use of low-carbon technologies in developing countries, and other mechanisms to greatly scale-up financial and technological support for adaptation.
The signal from Bali must be clear: a comprehensive negotiation must be launched. This must result, by the end of 2009, in an agreement on substantially greater emissions reductions globally, consistent with achieving the target of staying well below 2 degrees Celcius of warming from pre-industrial levels.
As to the negotiation process under the Kyoto track:
The first task of the AWG is to agree in Bali the indicative range of emissions reductions required from Annex I. CAN believes the scientific basis established by the IPCC commands the reductions will be at least within the currently proposed range of -25 to -40% of 1990 emissions by 2020.
We need to expand the workplan of the Ad-Hoc Working Group (AWG) to include, amongst others, the following important issues related to Annex I commitments beyond 2012.
The following para was not delivered but distributed to delegates as part of the printed statement, at the request of the UNFCCC.
As to the Convention track, there is a real need to formalise the Dialogue. As Brazil stated in Bonn: “Discussions in the absence of negotiations cannot prosper”. The lessons from the Dialogue must be taken up in formal negotiations under the Convention that explore how industrialized countries will incentivise the enhanced actions by developing country to decarbonise their development.
The mandate for this working group on the Bali roadmap should include, amongst others, the following important elements:
Delivery resumed here...
Formal negotiations on both the Convention and Kyoto track should be concluded in 2009, to allow sufficient time for agreement to enter into force before the 31st of December 2012.
If global emissions are to peak by 2015, as the IPCC reports shows they should, what we agree in Bali is absolutely critical.
Do we condemn ourselves to suffer the litany of irreversible dangerous climate impacts laid out in the IPCC report, or do we embrace a sustainable future?
Negotiators, the world is looking to you to make the right decisions.
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Let’s face it, there hasn’t been that much progress here in Bonn to address the climate challenge. So ECO wants to share some thoughts about the Nairobi Work Programme (NWP).
The NWP was set up by decision 2/CP.11 to support all Parties in addressing vulnerability and impacts of climate change and adaptation. It was established as a 5-year programme and is due to end at COP 16. Through a succession of workshops involving Parties and observers – including NGOs – the NWP has created an open forum where information and experiences are shared in a cooperative manner across nine broad themes encompassing the whole range of adaptation needs. It has provided opportunities where observers can meet informally with Parties to discuss different approaches to similar challenges. Through an informal system of pledges, many different stakeholders have committed voluntarily to sharing knowledge and contributing in practical ways to capacity building. So it is not surprising that Parties are recommending to the COP to continue the NWP beyond Cancún. ECO also supports continuation of the NWP – it is one of the few activities under the UNFCCC that has actually made progress in building capacity to address the impacts of climate change. However, even a good thing can always be improved.
The NWP has synthesised a lot of information and made it available to Parties and observers, but it still has some gaps to be filled. Here are some issues that the NWP should address in the next phase. Has the programme had an impact on those most affected by climate change – the vulnerable communities in the LDCs and SIDS? How could the NWP be enhanced to meet their needs? How can a wider range of stakeholders, including indigenous peoples, be engaged to share their knowledge?
In a spirit of participation, there will be an informal meeting including observers, and an opportunity for all stakeholders to make submissions to the Secretariat, to collect views on the performance of and future scope of the NWP. ECO recommends that Parties engage more in the NWP and fully recognize its lessons not just on adaptation but also on cooperation in other areas of work under the UNFCCC.
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The failure of industrialized countries to reduce emissions and provide support for adaptation means that some countries on the frontline of climate change are facing unavoidable impacts on their economy and for some, their survival as nations. In the face of this threat, small island states and other developing countries have tabled a loss and damage mechanism in the adaptation negotiations. Disliking certain elements of the proposed mechanism, the pre-Copenhagen strategy of quite a few developed countries was to kill the issue by not talking about it at all. Ignoring the issue is not an option: it will not go away. In picking up the pieces from Copenhagen, parties should bring creative thinking on how to help people and countries when sea levels rise, lands disappear under water and deserts spread. ECO applauds the Chair for putting Annex I countries on the spot by posing questions on this issue. However, the answers given by Australia, Japan and others show that Annex I has still not grasped the rapidly growing importance of this issue. Strengthening existing initiatives on risk reduction and insurance is a good start but will not be adequate by themselves. A scale shift in global commitment and new mechanisms will be required to address the impacts both of extreme weather events and the more slowly emerging disasters of disappearing coastlines. A vital action ingredient is for Parties to acknowledge the consequences of unavoidable impacts. If most of London, for example, were just 1 meter above sea level (instead of a posted average of 24 m), would Annex I be more engaged?
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Stressed negotiators hurrying into today's adaptation focused LCA contact group need not worry if they have arrived somewhat unprepared. ECO is pleased to provide the four answers that have the potential to make a difference. On response measures (Q1), this question should be considered off-topic because the Bali Action Plan (adopted even by 'Friends of Response Measures') clearly gave the response measures a home under the pillar of mitigation. In any case, seeking compensation for reduced oil sales is holding the millions of people hostage who are suffering from climate change and in dire need of adequate support to cope with its adverse effects. On institutional arrangements (Q2), here's a summary, really just a soundbite, on the adaptation framework. It should facilitate and ensure the provision of financial support by developed to developing countries. It would not organise funding disbursement; however, the adaptation committee would recommend further action to the COP if insufficient funding undermines the scale of support required under the adaptation framework. It would do so by linking up with the Kyoto Adaptation Fund Board as well as other proposed institutions tasked with finance disbursement such as the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund. On loss and damage (Q3), Annex I Parties should answer this question: What would you do if your country, its lands and the livelihoods of your people were becoming untenable or even starting to disappear under water or sand. How would you face damages so substantial they are beyond your ability to adapt? Parties should set up the international mechanism to address unavoidable loss and damage from climate change, through risk reduction and management, insurance and rehabilitation – against internationally established baselines -- adaptation is no longer possible. In Cancún, Parties should establish such a mechanism and operationalise at least the insurance component, while agreeing to launch the rehabilitation component at COP17, using the year in between to study and develop its modalities. On matching adaptation with support (Q4), our longstanding view is that developing countries should receive regular flows of grant finance through the financial mechanism and its operating entities in support of adaptation efforts. Needs and priorities should be identified through in-country, transparent and participatory adaptation planning, implementation and evaluation. Adaptation strategies can be disseminated consistently at the international level to support the continuous influx of finance, but there is no need for an 'adaptation registry'.
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ECO is eagerly awaiting today’s side event at which the EU will present its preliminary report on its fast start finance pledge. Not because the report itself will bring any new information to light -- it was leaked to the press weeks ago -- but to see EU negotiators try to answer the question on the lips of NGOs and developing country negotiators everywhere . . . how exactly is EU fast start finance 'new and additional'? Other developed countries might like to attend and pick up some tips. The EU had the right idea in suggesting a report on whether they were keeping their promises. This might help make up for the fact that most EU Member States have done a pretty good job over the years at breaking long-standing promises to provide finance to poor countries, whether as aid or climate finance under the UNFCCC. The Spanish Presidency started well, collecting information on Member State pledges, but then a problem arose. The EU's commitment first made in Brussels at the December leaders’ summit did not address whether the promises they were making were “new and additional” as required by the Copenhagen Accord. It is clear that this means over and above the target to provide at least 0.7% gross national income (GNI) in official development assistance (ODA). Climate change imposes new costs on developing countries, so new money is needed to tackle it. Instead of owning up to relabeling old some ODA pledges and then adding them to the new fast-start climate finance total, EU governments thought it best to keep quiet and hope no one noticed . . . but some did. Failing to ensure that climate finance is new and additional to existing ODA targets takes money that would otherwise have been available for spending on schools and hospitals in developing countries, to name one example. And that at a time when budgets for essential services are already being cut in the face of economic downturn. And we won't mention more than just this once that most countries aren't even achieving their longstanding ODA pledges. All that said, ECO welcomes the EU’s readiness to face the music in today’s side event. We hope they come clean about recycling past promises and are ready to answer questions on the scale of money going to different countries, and will detail how it will flow through bilateral and multilateral channels, as grants and loans, and for adaptation and mitigation. This is just a preliminary report, and the EU will have another chance to get it right in the annual report due at COP 16. But to provide genuine transparency, and to ensure that the US and other rich countries are held accountable too, they should seek a common reporting framework. The Secretariat could be asked to take that on and add meat to the EU’s bare bones.
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This is the International Year of Biodiversity. ‘So what’ ECO hears you say. ‘Nothing to do with us – we just deal with climate change.’ That would be wrong! Biological diversity supports ecosystems essential for human life, including climate regulation, water, food security and protection from natural disasters. Climate change is an increasing cause of biodiversity loss that in turn adds to the impacts of climate change. Healthy ecosystems are particularly important for people living in poverty – they depend far more directly on natural resources for their livelihoods and survival. Ah, now you’re seeing the connection to our agenda . . . The starting point is that mitigation and adaptation must be based on sound science. An important new report, ‘Global Biodiversity Outlook 3’ (Convention on Biological Diversity, May 2010) supports this. GEO3 is also a wake up call. In many places across the world, natural systems supporting economies, lives and livelihoods are at risk of rapid degradation and collapse. While the poorest people suffer disproportionately from deteriorating ecosystems, ultimately, everyone stands to lose. Climate change and biodiversity are inextricably linked. Government policy and our personal choices determine how human drivers of both will shape our future. Time is short. The challenge to stay below 2o C of warming looms ever larger. The current Copenhagen pledges add up to a 3o to 4o C world by 2100 at best. At the same time, we have massively failed to meet the CBD’s target to significantly reduce the rate of biodiversity loss globally by 2010 (agreed by world leaders at the Johannesburg World Summit in 2002 and integrated into the Millennium Development Goals, MDGs). Catastrophic changes to our planet could happen well within the lifetime of our children. One planet. Unabated, these crises will change our planet’s unique human-life supporting conditions. Above 2o C of warming, ecosystem capacity to meet the needs of present and future generations will be severely compromised. In fact, even at a 1.5o C increase, lives in vulnerable places such as small island developing states and communities in the polar regions will be tremendously difficult, and for some, impossible. Costs increase the more we delay. TEEB (The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity, 2009) is providing an economic evidence base for decision-makers, as Stern did for climate change. Addressing these challenges together will reduce costs and secure multiple benefits. But we must not steal from one pot to put money into another. New, not recycled, public money is essential. Money promised in the CBD process in the past should not be counted towards satisfying fast-start finance promises. Adaptation can support or harm nature and people. Supporting natural and social resilience is cost effective, locally appropriate and our insurance mechanism for the future. Mitigation. Nature can help. Ecosystems such as forests and peatlands absorb and store carbon, as do oceans and water bodies. If our mitigation choices harm natural systems, such as biofuels replacing natural forest, we risk releasing stored carbon into the atmosphere. 190 Parties engaged in the UNFCCC are also signatories to the Convention on Biological Diversity. Meeting the MDGs by 2015 is the international commitment to tackle poverty. This year through to Rio+20 in 2012 provides an opportunity not to be missed. Governments will meet to discuss biodiversity in New York this September and Nagoya in October, international development at the MDG Summit in New York in September and climate change in Cancun at the end of 2010. Parties in the UNFCCC have a crucial role to play in encouraging cooperation and ensuring effective opportunities to make sure the links are made at national and international levels. Addressing these interconnected crises in a mutually reinforcing way is the only realistic and cost effective way forward for our modern world.
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ECO is deeply concerned that the planet is on a fast track to dangerous climate change. The lack of ambition and plain inaction by the world's richest countries has created a negative spiral that needs to be broken. So-called 'political realism' and current lifestyles will use up the global carbon budget by the early 2020s. Not unlike the financial crisis, an emergency bail-out package is needed to prevent a climate collapse.
There is a widely-acknowledged ‘gigatonne gap’ from the mitigation pledges made at Copenhagen to a global carbon budget and realistic pathway that will be consistent with avoiding dangerous warming of 2º C or more, not to mention 1.5º C, above pre-industrial levels.
On the current path, science tells us we are facing a world that is at least 3º to 4º C warmer. What does that mean? The answers are shocking. This could spell the extinction of countries, ecosystems and species. People will perish. It is already starting to happen. Parties need to urgently take ownership of this gap and acknowledge the responsibility they share in closing it.
ECO has highlighted before that the complexity of the climate problem has instilled fear and mistrust – particularly between industrialized and developing countries. Without fairness and respect we will never have trust. The reality of historic responsibility, the difference in per capita emissions, the primary importance of development for countries whose populations struggle with the crisis of poverty – these are very real. The dynamic of fear and division is obscuring the urgency of the disaster we face.
The fundamental reason why the world is heading for a climate disaster is the feeble ambition on reduction targets and finance coming from all industrialized countries. In particular, the excessive emissions from the US now and to 2020 and beyond are stretching the world’s carbon budget beyond the breaking point.
Whatever else we could say about Copenhagen, it certainly underlined the need for a Fair, Ambitious and Binding agreement which combines the environmental security of a robust emissions cap with a much-needed energy and economic transformation spurred by policies, measures and innovation. Given the size of the gap, we urgently need creative thinking and courageous action.
Further work by SBSTA can support the analysis of available solutions and taking the necessary decisions. ECO proposes that Parties agree, here in Bonn, to hold a workshop under SBSTA Article 9 (‘Scientific, technical and socio-economic aspects of mitigation of climate change’) in the first inter-sessional before Cancún, to come to a common understanding of the scale of the gap, and for steps that could and must be taken to address it.
Developed countries have not adequately reduced their emissions since agreeing the Convention in 1992. The aggregate target of -5% agreed in Kyoto may have been a political success, but it was far from consistent with the scientific realities even at that time. And in the event, many Annex I countries haven't achieved those modest targets, and some have barely even tried. They need to do more.
And still, ECO also notes that fingerpointing is not a survival strategy. We will only stay afloat with a concerted effort from all, according to their abilities.
Climate realism requires action, not new accounting tricks. So another problem is the loopholes that were built into the Kyoto architecture . . . LULUCF rules that hide increased forestry emissions, prodigious offsetting with little additionality (and not even targeted towards sustainable low carbon development), and AAU banking that has become an increasing concern as the end of the first commitment period approaches. The Secretariat’s technical paper recalculated the levels of effort pledged and sheds a clear light on the assumptions behind the targets. While these issues are part of the KP negotiations, they must also be put in a consolidated context.
Finally, ECO suggests that the workshop explore the potential of new sources, sectors and approaches to reduce radiative forcing in the atmosphere and generate funds to support action. Such innovative approaches could include, inter alia:
* International aviation and shipping, a large and rapidly growing source of emissions (business-as-usual would result in 2.2 Gt CO2 by 2020), and one that can be a significant source of climate finance.
* Designing REDD, market mechanisms, NAMAs, etc., to avoid double-counting of both developed country mitigation and financial support obligations, all relevant to the MRV agenda item.
* Reducing emissions of black carbon.
* Inclusion of new F-gases in the climate regime, as technically feasible.
* Taking industrial GHGs (N2O, HFCs and NF3) out of the CDM. Their abatement costs can be better met through a fund. The CDM can be better targeted at transformational measures.
A comprehensive and realistic approach to closing the gigatonne gap is needed now. The inclusion of new sources and sectors should not replace efforts in existing sectors, but be additional so as to bridge the gigatonne gap and peak global emissions by 2015.