Submitted by MBrockley on
Admitted UNFCCC observer organizations are invited to submit views, including experiences, positive and negative, on matters referred to in paragraphs 79 and 80 of the Durban decision of the AWG-LCA which establishes a work program to consider a Framework for Various Approaches (Framework). CAN welcomes the opportunity to submit views.
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Submitted by MBrockley on
Admitted UNFCCC observer organizations are invited to submit views, including experiences, positive and negative, on matters referred to in paragraphs 83 and 84 of the Durban decision of the AWG-LCA which defines a New Market-based Mechanism (NMM), operating under the guidance and authority of the Conference of the Parties. CAN welcomes the opportunity to submit views.
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Submitted by Anonymous on
Just in time for the arrival of ministers, we have removed the fuzziness from our loopholes chart. Current loopholes could easily negate all Annex 1 pledges and in the worst case leave plenty of left-overs to nibble on during a third commitment period. A couple key examples will suffice.
According to UNEP, surplus AAUs from the first commitment period amouns to 9-13 Gt CO2e. Given that current Annex I pledges amount to about 18 Gt of emissions reductions, it almost goes without saying that this loophole needs to be closed if we want to stop tinkering at the margins and start getting serious about 2°C.
The two countries with most hot air are Russia and Ukraine. To entice them and other economies in transition to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, they were allowed to keep emissions to 1990 levels.
It seemed cheaper at the time to take out a huge loan on the atmosphere, and now like a subprime mortgage this is coming back to haunt us.
Both Ukraine and Russia have made 2020 pledges that are above business-as-usual projections. These weak targets could add another whopping 4 Gt of ‘hot air’ until 2020.
We agree that banking can provide an incentive for early action, but that only holds true if the pledges are deep enough to require countries to go substantially below their BAU.
And then there’s New Zealand. Climate Tracker rates their commitment for 2020 as ‘inadequate’, the lowest ranking a country can get. On Friday, New Zealand won a Fossil for its efforts to water down the integrity of market mechanisms. Sorry, this does not look like ‘over achievement’ to us.
But don’t cheer too quickly if you’re from somewhere else in Annex I. Only five countries did not share the dubious distinction of being rated ‘inadequate’ by Climate Tracker.
May we remind all delegates: your country may get away with ruses and ploys in the world of politics. But nature does not go for accounting tricks: it is the future of your own children you are gambling away.
Submitted by Anonymous on
Here’s a quick reminder: According to the latest UNEP report, the weak pledges from Annex I countries get us only about a third of the estimated emissions reductions that are needed if we want to have a two-in-three chance of avoiding more than 2° C warming. Unfortunately we have even more bad news: loopholes!
Loopholes are weak rules that undermine reduction targets, usually resulting from political bargaining. The largest loopholes are:
We took a closer look at the loopholes and compared their total size to the cumulative emission reductions that could be achieved with the current Annex I pledges. We found that the current ‘loopholes’ in the system could negate their pledges.
In the worst case, they could leave Annex I countries with sufficient allowances and credits to revert to a BAU trajectory, and could even enable the carry-over of surplus allowances beyond 2020.
As you can see, a graph says more than 1,000 words. Our findings match those of the UNEP Report, the Stockholm Environment Institute and others.
The size of these current loopholes is staggering. Strong action is required now to effectively and efficiently close these loopholes if we want to preserve the possibility of staying below 2° C warming.
None of the technical issues around the loopholes are insurmountable. If developed countries are serious about fulfilling their responsibility to lead the fight against climate change, they need to put ambitious targets on the table that are in line with the science and do away with all these rotten loopholes.
There is no plan(et) B. Every passing day of inaction closes the door that much further on preventing catastrophic climate change.
Submitted by Anonymous on
‘Hot air’ (surplus AAUs) must be properly addressed in Durban. This is perhaps one of the most important points on which agreement needs to be reached for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The total amount of AAUs is around 7.5-10 Gt CO2e – in other words, roughly one-third of the current 2020 emissions reduction targets pledged by Annex I countries. This ‘hot air’ was created not because of effective climate policies but rather the economic crisis of the 1990s.
The biggest holders of surplus AAUs are Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and EU members from Central and Eastern Europe. Insisting that the full AAU surplus carries over to the second commitment period makes already weak pledges from developed countries even weaker.
Parties have several choices how to deal with this, from full carry-over to full restrictions. Dear delegates – don’t let this hot air go stale! It’s easy: ECO calls on Parties holding surplus AAUs to simply retire their ‘hot air’ by the end of 2012. If Parties are getting cold merely thinking about their hot-airless future, a very limited carry-over of surplus to the second commitment period may offer a cozier solution.
To make sure these hot gases don’t foul our future, just a few small things are needed. Any additions to AAUs for the second commitment period have to be limited to 1%. Surplus-holding countries must commit to climate-friendly investment of revenues through transparent and internationally monitored Green Investment Schemes (GIS) which are subject to MRV, and/or to funds supporting climate actions in developing countries. Last but not least, AAUs cannot be used for compliance in domestic cap and trade systems in Annex I countries.
Submitted by Anonymous on
Durban is shaping up as a critical moment in the 20-year history of the climate regime. The world can either build on what has been created in the Kyoto Protocol, raise the level of ambition as demanded by the science, and provide sufficient finance to meet developing countries’ needs for adaptation, mitigation, and REDD. Or it risks relegating the UNFCCC to a side show with little legitimacy to meaningfully address the climate crisis.
Let’s review what’s needed to avoid a train wreck in Durban:
Mitigation:In the Cancun Agreements, developed countries accepted that their aggregate level of ambition should be in the range of 25-40%. Even while this range does not guarantee that global temperature rise will stay below 2 degrees Celsius, current developed country emission reduction pledges will result in reductions of only 12-18% going down to ~2% if currently existing and proposed loopholes are taken into account. ECO suggests four critical elements in the Durban mitigation package for developed countries:: clarify what the net emissions would be based on current pledges and assumptions; close the loopholes; move to the high end of current pledges; and agree on a process to increase ambition beyond 40%, for adoption at COP18/CMP8.
Panama can and must reach agreements on closing the loopholes. The recent Review of proposals on forest management under LULUCF clarifies the size of the forestry loophole. Now, Parties must adopt forest management reference levels that are comparable and that don’t significantly undermine Annex I Party targets. Overall, LULUCF rules should encourage Parties to achieve ambitious mitigation from land and forests. On carry-forward of AAUs, Parties must eliminate the risk of “hot air” undermining the environmental integrity of future reduction commitments.
Kyoto Protocol: As acknowledged by both Executive Secretary Figueres and incoming COP President Nkoana-Mashabane, the future of the Kyoto Protocol will be decided at Durban. While some developed country Parties would prefer to overlook the KP or at best, make a second commitment period conditional on what happens in the LCA over the next four years, it is essential that in Durban, we cement a second commitment period of the KP. The alternative – a pledge and review world – just won’t cut it.
Convention mandate: Given the urgency of the climate catastrophe unfolding daily before our eyes, nothing less than the greatest level of commitment is needed from all parties. Therefore, in addition to preserving the Kyoto Protocol, Durban must agree that by 2015 at the latest, the commitments and actions of all Parties should be inscribed in legally binding instrument[s], whilst fully respecting the principles of the Convention.
Finance:The last session on finance in Bonn was dominated by discussions on the Standing Committee. Negotiations need to also focus on the critical issue of where the money is going to come from. Urgent attention on scaling up sources of climate finance from 2013 to 2020 is needed. In addition to expanding direct finance from national treasuries, Parties should commit to raise significant revenue for the Green Climate Fund from innovative sources, implemented in a way that has no net incidence for poor countries. Progress on a mechanism to levy bunker fuels would be an especially noteworthy achievement here in Panama, which licenses so much of the world’s shipping.
Technology: CAN urges Parties to decide here in Panama on the criteria for the Climate Technology Center host, so that the Center and Network can be operationalized in 2012 as envisioned in the Cancun Agreement.
Adaptation: Parties aren’t far away from a good decision text on the Adaptation Committee. Here in Panama, they should agree on the composition of the Committee with equitable representation, direct reporting to the COP, and linkages to other institutions, particularly on finance and technology.
Capacity Building: Parties should work with the Facilitator's notes and his new and highly comprehensive background paper to begin drafting text for a Durban decision. This paper should focus on the vital question of how to design effective and comprehensive co-ordination of new, additional and scaled-up capacity-building within the emerging new architectures for finance, technology, adaptation, MRV and mechanisms.
MRV: Parties should build on the MRV architecture agreed in Cancun by moving forward on common accounting rules for emission reduction targets and an enhanced common reporting format on finance. Parties should also adopt guidelines on the content, timing and structure of biennial reports, and agree procedures for strong International Assessment and Review (IAR) for developed countries and International Consultation and Analysis (ICA) for developing countries.
On all these fronts, Parties need to agree here in Panama what text they will work from – and begin to constructively work on that text. It’s time for all Parties to show they are serious about the UNFCCC, and serious about their commitment to prevent catastrophic climate change; small steps won’t cut it.
Submitted by Anonymous on
Submitted by Anonymous on
Overview
A. Clarify assumptions behind pledges:Developed countries must clarify their assumptions on domestic efforts and the use of carbon offsets, LULUCF accounting and AAU carry-over. Developing countries should provide information on key factors underlying BAU projections, e.g. energy use or economic development. They should also clarify what emissions savings they plan to achieve independently and what additional savings could be achieved with support.
B. Close loopholes and agree common rules:Parties should seek to minimise or close off loopholes, such as bogus LULUCF accounting rules, AAU carry-over or new hot air from weak 2020 pledges in certain developed countries. This must lead to agreement on improved common accountingand reporting rules showing the true emissions of each country.
C. Clarify conditions and move to the high end of pledges:By Durban at the latest, developed countries must move to the high end of their pledged ranges. Developed countries with conditional (upper end of) pledges must clarify these conditions, identify which conditions been met and indicate what is needed to meet the remaining conditions.
[1]Even in the best of all cases (countries implementing the high end of their pledges using strict accounting rules) global emissions are likely to be between 5 (UNEP) and 10 (Climate Action Tracker) GtCO2eq above what they should be for a 1.5°C/2°C emissions pathway.
Submitted by Anonymous on
This is not the first time ECO has commented on the surplus of assigned amount units (AAU) present from the first Kyoto commitment period, and how the overflow could deliver a body blow to the future aggregate actions of annex B countries if carried over to the second commitment period. So far this issue has not seen much progress at all in the AWG-KP.
However, the Chair’s new revised KP text proposal contains interesting options which might bring us quite far in solving the AAU loophole crisis, which threatens the future environmental integrity of the Kyoto protocol.
Option 2 on Article 3, para 13 and 13bis shows a smart way of ensuring that this surplus does not contaminate the domestic aggregate reductions of Annex B countries. This is done by allowing the AAU surplus to be exclusively used by countries which have registered such surpluses, and only where their emissions are higher than their AAUs for the second commitment period. This option also does away with the risk of ‘AAU laundering’ where second commitment period AAUs are sold off and the first commitment period surplus is used for compliance.
However, there still is a risk that this option might encourage countries with AAU surpluses to stall their climate action. ECO once again suggests that the surplus for domestic compliance also have a discount applied to limit the availability. This could be achieved by combining option 1 in the chair’s text with option 2.
ECO in particular invites the EU to remove the gag from its mouth and speak out in an ambitious way. Wasn’t the EU one of the parties demanding more environmental integrity in the Kyoto Protocol as condition of signing on to a second commitment period? Bonjour Bruxelles, it’s crunch time!
Finally, let’s also not forget the bigger picture and learn from the past. Vast amounts of surplus AAUs could continue to occur in the second commitment period if the current low pledges of developed countries are not improved significantly. To further minimize the negative impact on environmental integrity, all countries should commit to climate friendly investments of the revenues from the sales of second commitment period AAUs through transparent and internationally monitored Green Investment Schemes. The existence of a complex problem does not negate possible solutions. Instead, it accelerates the need for them.
Submitted by Anonymous on
Dear Ministers, it’s ECO again. We welcome your early arrival and commitment to a global agreement on climate change!
Your delegations have been working hard. In front of you are choices that have been clearly laid out by delegates with the assistance of your capable LCA Chair and facilitators. We trust that you bring flexibility and a strong desire to agree options that are sufficiently ambitious to ensure a successful outcome this week.
Which raises the question, what does success at Cancun look like? First and foremost, COP 16 must provide substance and direction toward a fair, ambitious and binding deal at Durban in 2011. Trust and commitment in the UNFCCC process will be reinvigorated if Parties act together and the public sees this process producing what the world expects – a legally binding deal in Durban.
The result in Cancun must be completely clear that a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol will be finalised and agreed at Durban along with a legally binding outcome in the LCA track.
To be sure, the emission reduction pledges presently on the table are insufficient to prevent dangerous climate change. Cancun should acknowledge the gap of 5 to 9 gigatonnes that the UNEP has spotlighted, and establish a process to strengthen the pledges by Durban.
Recall also, the Bali Action Plan acknowledged the target range of 25-40% reductions by 2020 for developed countries. But the science has moved since then, and we now know that even more mitigation is needed. Your citizens will not accept a Durban deal that locks in the current low levels of mitigation and the disastrous climate change that would ensue.
Clearly there are other elements of success needed here. Adaptation, technology, capacity building, surplus AAUs, REDD+ and more – all must make significant steps forward. There is no excuse for these issues to be held hostage to narrow political agendas and miscalculated national interest.
Instead, it is in every nation’s interest to agree an ambitious climate deal. Serious
action will not only save the vulnerable countries, but provide economic, social and environmental benefits for us all.
Establishing a fair climate fund, with sufficient content in the text for it to be realised, is the minimum level of expectation from you in regard to climate finance. The negotiations also need a clear indication that the required scale of finance will be forthcoming, from guaranteed public sources such as the innovative sources of climate finance identified in the Advisory Group on Finance (AGF) report.
Ministers: your task here is not simple and it is not easy. All the same, it is essential. It is essential to restore faith in this process, to restore credibility to your governments, and to secure a real future of all of us.
