ECO 4, COP 16, French Version
Submitted by MBrockley on
Submitted by MBrockley on
Submitted by Anonymous on
Forest management is surely as important as everyone knows, but peatlands that have been drained for agriculture and other purposes are also important emissions hotspots globally.
Yet incentives for Annex I countries to reduce these emissions under the Kyoto Protocol were minimal in the first commitment period. In fact, accounting for land use activities associated with the drainage of peatlands (forest management, grazing land management and cropland management) is voluntary and therefore rarely selected.
The second commitment period of the KP offers a new opportunity to address this mega-gap. Parties will have higher reduction targets, and LULUCF can and should make a significant contribution to reducing emissions.
Further peatland drainage can be discouraged by making accounting for Article 3.4 activities mandatory, provided sufficient data quality is ensured.
In particular, further drainage for biofuel production should be decreased to prevent the development of a giant new emissions accounting loophole in the energy sector combined with unaccounted increased emissions in the land use sector.
In addition, rewetting of drained wetlands as an effective measure to decrease emissions should be encouraged by adopting the new activity ‘wetland management’. If countries fail to agree mandatory accounting of existing Article 3.4 activities, mandatory wetland management is the only way to close the emerging accounting loophole for peatlands under LULUCF.
Reporting and accounting for peatland drainage is already facilitated with IPCC 2006 guidance, but a number of gaps still remain. An IPCC expert meeting in October concluded that science has developed recently to such an extent that most gaps (e.g. rewetting of drained peatlands, wetland restoration) can now be filled. As well, the emissions associated with land use on peat (cropland, grassland, forestry, peat extraction) should be reassessed.
Here in Cancun, the SBSTA can request the IPCC to undertake this work and define a way forward to finalize improved guidance in time for the second commitment period. It’s all to protect one of our most important land sequestration resources . . . for peat’s sake!
Submitted by MBrockley on
Submitted by Anonymous on
The future of Annex I forests and their role in climate change mitigation is about to be decided here in Cancun.
ECO has long highlighted how inappropriate and possibly fraudulent LULUCF accounting rules could be used by Annex I Parties to avoid accounting for their forestry emissions. This week a group of NGOs assessed the scale of these impacts, in particular, the magnitude of proposed forest management baselines relative to the ambition of Parties’ pledges. Astonishingly, the emission reduction efforts of some Parties could be reduced by up to 66% as a consequence of unaccounted emissions from logging their forests.
There is still more than one proposal on the table, and it is clear that the impact of forest management accounting on countries’ pledges will differ depending on the approach agreed upon.
A review process was proposed by developing countries earlier this year to evaluate the robustness of favoured baseline proposals by Annex I countries. The new KP Chair’s text calls on Parties to provide the required information by February 2011 and for expert reviewers to conclude their review by May.
But let’s be clear. The impact of the proposed reference levels is unacceptable and a review won’t fix that. However, broadening the review to include an objective analysis of all accounting options could help Parties make an informed decision about which approach should be used in the second commitment period. To do this, Parties would need to provide information about each of the potential options on the table and how it will impact their pledges.
This analysis is urgently required for a meaningful discussion on numbers. That will achieve two crucial things: the discussion of ‘numbers’ will go forward with consideration of all potential options, and decisions will be made based on the likely real impacts on the climate.
| Party | Emission Reduction Pledge % 2020 | Unaccounted Logging Emissions % |
| Canada | -17 | +1.4 |
| New Zealand | -10 to -20 | +66.0 |
| Norway | -30 to -40 | +8.7 |
| Russian Fed | -15 to -25 | +5.5 |
| Australia | -5 to -15 | +4.0 |
| Japan | -25 | +3.6 |
| EU | -20 to -30 | +2.7 |
| Switzerland | -20 to -30 | +2.4 |
Notes: Figures are percentages of country-specific base years. Pledged emission reductions for 2020 (rel 1990) from FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/INF.2/Rev.1. Unaccounted logging emissions equals the difference between Party’s proposed reference levels and average of historical net emissions. The estimate of average historical net emissions from Annex I forest management calculated using data from 1990-2008 (forest land remaining forest land) from Parties’ 2010 inventory submissions. Any adjustments were made on consultation with Parties and technical experts. Japan has not yet indicated whether its pledges include accounting for forest management.
Submitted by Anonymous on
Many parties commented in the COP plenary about this year’s record temperatures and extreme weather events. This comes as ECO reflects on the Royal Society’s recent treatise on a rapidly warming +4 degree world . . . the kind of world resulting from a lack of ambition. The need for dramatic action on mitigation has never been so clear.
Which brings us to the LCA. ECO welcomes the work by the Chair this year. Her approach to helping parties reach consensus is to be commended. In a spirit of mutual support, we present the following recommendations on the Chair’s possible elements.
The Shared Vision must safeguard the planet for future generations. Limiting warming to 1.5° C is necessary to avoid severe impacts, such as a loss of the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System, a small part of which is off the shores of Cancun, the second longest in the world and a locale for priceless biodiversity. Parties must aim for a 1.5° C temperature threshold, commit to a process that examines this objective, and agree a global peak in emissions no later than 2015. Mere preparation of a review in 2015, as currently proposed, would not be a call to action but a homily to squander a once-only opportunity.
The Finance section of the Chair’s note is useful in streamlining the text and identifying potential middle ground in some areas. It is also missing some crucial elements, such as a proper balance between mitigation and
adaptation finance, participation of vulnerable populations, civil society and women. And yet it is a very promising basis to build on. With additional refinement, it can provide a way forward to a substantive decision on creation of a new fund under the COP, establishment of an effective oversight body, and a process to decide on sources of funding, including innovative sources of public finance.
The text on Technology unfortunately does not ensure that the technology mechanism will be under the authority of and accountable to the COP. This weakens the objectives of setting up the architecture of cooperation through the Technology Executive Committee and Technology Network Centres, as there is no rules-based multilateral mechanism proposed. It also allows an ad hoc set of arrangements to emerge that invites prominent roles for the World Bank and regional development banks. Just to be clear, they still fund fossil fuels over conservation, energy efficiency and renewables. Even US clean energy companies are sceptical of the role of the World Bank. They and others would benefit from institutional arrangements that are clearly under the COP’s guidance.
CRP.1 as drafted effectively sidetracks CAN’s proposed building blocks for Capacity Building. The text drops the proposed CB Technical Panel, which should be the front end of a design-and-build programme for new, real and integrated CB to start happening in real places, in real time, backed by real and new resources. Without the front end the entire pathway essentially vanishes. Additionally, the text drops a proposed legal lock creating an obligation on developed countries to adequately support new CB.
The establishment of a strong Adaptation Framework for Implementation is essential and within reach. While not perfect, the Chair’s text lays out steps for a post-NAPA process for developing country parties and for loss and damage. The text also demands a decision on an Adaptation Committee but remains weak on linking the provision of finance to adaptation actions, a necessary connection. ECO is most pleased that references to response measures have been removed from the text.
Ironically, while Mitigation is arguably the most important element of a climate agreement, progress has seemed beyond reach. While the Chair’s text delivers only a very general and concise outline of the expected outcome, agreement on specific elements of mitigation is an essential part of the outcome from Cancun. Elements could include the creation of a mitigation registry to track action and provide support, recognition of the Gigatonne Gap that exists between targets and the level of action required, a process for addressing the gap, and preparation of zero and low carbon action plans.
Given the complexity of issues related to Mechanisms (both market-based and non-market-based), the Chair’s suggestion to establish formal processes to examine them is sensible.
The principles laid out in the Annex V include some useful language such as ‘moving beyond offsets’ to ‘net decrease in global GHGs’ and ‘preventing double counting’ of emissions. However, Parties should bear in mind that there is no room – or indeed need – for offsets with the current inadequately low pledges by developed countries.
The MRV text remains a blank canvas. A mere 36 words are dedicated to an issue that has blocked progress in these negotiations. Robust MRV is crucial for environmental integrity, but it must be equitable. Critical issues such as common accounting standards for Annex 1 countries, modalities for MRV of support in national communications, and a differentiated approach for verification of voluntary/unsupported actions taken by developing countries must be tackled in these negotiations. Let’s not forget that transparency should apply to the MRV process as well, assuring public access and participation throughout, and developing countries must be supported in their efforts to build domestic MRV capacity.
Finally, the text is silent on the ultimate Legal Form of the LCA outcome. Parties are going to have to come to terms with this question soon, since it is inextricably tied to progressing a second commitment period under the KP. Moreover, the text is silent on what mandate the LCA will have going forward. A clear sense of how both the AWG-KP and AWG-LCA will proceed after Cancun is essential to ensure progress towards a Fair, Ambitious and Binding deal.
The analogy of Swiss cheese has been suggested in this regard. Dearest delegates, ECO urges you to plug the remaining holes in this text – the result of which could well be the politically balanced package you have been looking for.
Submitted by MBrockley on
Submitted by MBrockley on
Submitted by MBrockley on
Submitted by Anonymous on
Cancun should deliver a substantial package of decisions that provides a clear framework for climate action. Such a package will move forward toward a legally binding agreement and put positive pressure on countries to go beyond their current quite inadequate pledges and commitments. The Cancun package must progress both the KP and LCA tracks and secure agreements on all building blocks, namely mitigation/MRV, finance, adaptation, REDD, technology, the legal form, the science review, and a road map for South Africa and beyond.
This means all countries must do their fair share to secure success in Cancun. And so ECO would like to take the liberty of identifying some opening moves that key countries should make so that Cancun starts on a constructive note, open negotiating space for the coming two weeks, and deliver outcomes that will set us on the pathway towards the ambitious, global treaty we need.
ECO supports the United States objective of increasing the transparency of mitigation actions by developing countries, but it must be part of a broader framework that includes greater transparency of developed country actions on both mitigation and finance. And so instead of pressurizing others, the US should announce its willingness to increase the transparency of its own actions. The draft decision text being circulated by the EU calling for more detailed information in Annex 1 national communications would be a very good way to start. Making it clear that supporting enhanced transparency for everybody includes the US itself will make adoption of a balanced package of decisions here in Cancun much more likely. Just say yes!
ECO expects the European Union to speak out much more clearly in favour of a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, so that a constructive dialogue between developed and developing countries leading to a legally binding agreement from both tracks can be achieved. To provide further support for the Kyoto Protocol the EU should also help close the loopholes in its own position on AAU surplus and LULUCF. Those helpful moves on the Kyoto track can be bolstered by the EU championing the establishment of the UNFCCC climate fund.
China should take a more progressive role in the international negotiations instead of just continually reacting to provocations from others. That way, China can building strongly on its domestic momentum for low carbon and clean energy development. For Cancun, this means China should now put forth its own views on the form international consultation and analysis should take, as well as challenge the US to clearly commit itself to proper MRV, along with other developed countries.
Japan must show more flexibility about the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Upfront rejection will create an unconstructive atmosphere for the entire negotiations. Kyoto was the product of hard negotiations, not only for the specific targets, but also for a top-down approach so that aggregate emission reductions are driven by the science. ECO hopes that Japan still remembers the sleepless nights in Kyoto and knows that while the Protocol is not perfect, there is still a lot to be proud of. More openness on Kyoto will signal that it acknowledges that the Kyoto architecture is important to a vast majority of Parties and opens the way forward for securing a stronger global architecture.
India should help broker a solution to the dilemma of international consultation and analysis by tabling its own ICA proposal, unequivocally stating that it will work towards creating a rule-based system of multilateral governance within the UNFCCC and ensuring transparency and accountability. Another constructive move will be to support efforts to identify substantial and innovative sources of public finance for the new global climate fund.
Brazil could come forward as a champion for the creation of a fair climate fund in Cancun, supported through innovative sources of public funding, which fully funds not only mitigation but equally so adaptation. Brazil also should come forward as a leading country fighting for responsible and transparent LULUCF accounting rules to help reduce and close the Gigatonne Gap.
It’s time for Mexico to play a more creative role in its welcome efforts toward trust-building in the COP 16 presidency. Mexico is well positioned to spur Parties to tackle the issues that could otherwise drive the negotiations into deadlock: legal form, the road map on crunch issues post-Cancun, the Gigatonne Gap, the science review and more.
Russia has an AAU surplus of 6 billion tonnes of CO2 that is creating grave uncertainty for the negotiations, carbon markets and the environmental integrity of the Kyoto Protocol. It’s time for clear statements from Russia that it will not sell its AAU surplus from the 1st commitment period. That kind of good political will can go a long way to ensuring progress can be made in Cancun on dealing with AAU surplus, and give a big boost to closing the Gigatonne Gap.
ECO hopes this list of substantial but manageable first moves will help clarify the middle game on the Cancun chessboard and lead to a solution that makes everyone a winner.
Submitted by Anonymous on
La COP 16 en Cancún debe ser un paso significativo hacia un acuerdo justo, ambicioso y vinculante a ser alcanzado en la COP 17 en Sudáfrica. La COP 16 debe adoptar progresos en importantes áreas de política, establecer una visión clara para Sudáfrica y acordar un proceso para alcanzar un acuerdo justo, ambicioso y vinculante, incluyendo los puntos fundamentales señalados en los Los cimientos de Cancún