CAN members ask delegates to get rid of hot air in Doha
Submitted by MBrockley on

Photo Credit: SustainUS
Submitted by MBrockley on

Photo Credit: SustainUS
Submitted by rvoorhaar on
While ECO has not yet given up on countries strengthening their national emission reduction targets, there is another simple step that will have a substantial impact. Up to 13 billion tonnes of impact in fact. And ECO knows that the negotiators are well aware of the fact that strong new rules to eliminate the gigantic surplus of emission permits from the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period will make a real difference. As our dear readers may have noticed, it’s a subject very dear to ECO’s heart. We have been active in naming and shaming Poland, Ukraine and Russia for fighting for the rights to sell their hot air. We have called out the EU for losing its way on the road to progress and on leadership.
Submitted by Anonymous on
‘Hot air’ (surplus AAUs) must be properly addressed in Durban. This is perhaps one of the most important points on which agreement needs to be reached for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The total amount of AAUs is around 7.5-10 Gt CO2e – in other words, roughly one-third of the current 2020 emissions reduction targets pledged by Annex I countries. This ‘hot air’ was created not because of effective climate policies but rather the economic crisis of the 1990s.
The biggest holders of surplus AAUs are Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and EU members from Central and Eastern Europe. Insisting that the full AAU surplus carries over to the second commitment period makes already weak pledges from developed countries even weaker.
Parties have several choices how to deal with this, from full carry-over to full restrictions. Dear delegates – don’t let this hot air go stale! It’s easy: ECO calls on Parties holding surplus AAUs to simply retire their ‘hot air’ by the end of 2012. If Parties are getting cold merely thinking about their hot-airless future, a very limited carry-over of surplus to the second commitment period may offer a cozier solution.
To make sure these hot gases don’t foul our future, just a few small things are needed. Any additions to AAUs for the second commitment period have to be limited to 1%. Surplus-holding countries must commit to climate-friendly investment of revenues through transparent and internationally monitored Green Investment Schemes (GIS) which are subject to MRV, and/or to funds supporting climate actions in developing countries. Last but not least, AAUs cannot be used for compliance in domestic cap and trade systems in Annex I countries.
Submitted by Anonymous on

ECO did some maths and was astounded to find that surplus Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) under the Kyoto Protocol range between 7 to 11 GT CO2 for the first commitment period. That’s well more than one-third of all 2020 emissions reduction targets currently pledged by Annex I countries! ECO thinks that is the definition of a wake-up call.
If all of those surplus AAUs are carried over to the second commitment period, the carbon trading game will be fixed in favor of higher pollution levels. That kind of magical accounting will look great on the books, but the planet will still be boiling. This is why the overflow of surplus AAUs is called ‘hot air.’
It’s no secret that hot air is due to an erroneous calculation of future expected emissions for Russia and eastern European countries such as Ukraine and not because of the implementation of effective climate change mitigation policies.
A minor rewrite of Paragraph 13 of Article 3 can easily get us out of this quagmire. ECO advocates setting a stringent discount factor so that the annual average amount of emissions carried over is capped. For compliance in the next commitment period, a limited number of banked AAUs should only be used domestically in countries holding surpluses.
Furthermore, legal provisions should be agreed that prevent the ‘laundering’ of first commitment period AAUs via the sale of second period AAUs. If hot air is not fully addressed, ECO questions the viability of international emissions trading as a mechanism after 2012.
What it comes down to is this: you cannot cheat the atmosphere. Instead of using magic accounting tricks with AAUs, Parties should concentrate on innovative approaches that reduce emissions in the real atmosphere.