Tag: Green Climate Fund

CAN Speaking Notes from GCF Board Meeting, March 12 - 15

 

Resource Mobilization:

·      In our earlier interventions we emphasized that the GCF should narrowly focus on ambitious, paradigm shifting actions. That, of course, implies that resources will be made available at the scale and urgency that the task requires, in accordance with the commitments of Article 4.3 and 11.3 of the Convention. So these are, in large measure, two sides of same coin.

·      Developed countries should put forward initial pledges as a matter of urgency in 2013, that could be reported back to COP19, as indicator of progress taking place here, and to prepare the way for disbursements next year.

·      We’d support Derek and several other’s preference for option 2, step-wise approach, with a caveat.

·      As a matter of credibility and impact, rapid resourcing leading to disbursements as soon as possible is critical, in the context of adequate environmental, social and fiduciary standards. .

·      Resourcing need not await agreement on a burden sharing allocation. Neither should it prejudge the outcome of a future agreement on burden sharing arrangements for future replenishment processes.

·      The longer term framework must be designed to deliver adequate and predictable resources. To that end, the resource mobilisation framework should be designed to also allow the receipt of revenues from sources of additional public finance other than direct contributions from developed countries, such as from financial transaction taxes, the use of special drawing rights, carbon taxes, and aviation and maritime levies.

·      The scale of the GCF’s ambition should not be limited by the claim that there is a scarcity of public money. Certainly, enormous sums have been made rapidly available to pay for other actions governments have seen as urgent, wars and financial bailouts.

·      Multiple feasible proposals exist for generating large amounts of public money from innovative sources, such as carbon pricing, closing tax loopholes, and redirecting fossil fuel subsidies in developed countries, etc.  At the end of the day, its an issue of political scarcity, not economic scarcity.

·      Finally, regarding section 6.3 on earmarking. We wouldn’t want to see individual contributors circumvent Board decision-making through earmarking. Allocation of funds should be decided by the GCF board, reflecting developing country needs and in accordance with the GI’s requirement for a balanced allocation between mitigation and adaptation. In particular, we are concerned that adaptation will be given short shrift under an earmarking arrangement.

 

Addressing "to promote a paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways.":

·      Address first 2 guiding questions: what it means to “to promote a paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways”.

·      Given the scale of the challenge and the unique mandate of the GCF, the objective of achieving a “paradigm shift” should be the central organizing principle of the GCF’s work.  How the GCF defines and prioritizes actions to spur a “paradigm shift” will be a key determinant of its impact and effectiveness on the climate crisis and in making a significant difference in the lives of affected people.

·      It is therefore critical for the Board to reach understanding on the “paradigm shift” the GCF will promote for mitigation and adaptation. This includes a discussion on how to apply it also to the PS facility. We believe the “paradigm shift” must include these three pillars: (1) ambition, (2) country-driven planning, and (3) multi-stakeholder, participatory and inclusive decision-making.

·      All 3 are critically important to us, but country led planning and participatory decision-making have other textual homes in the GI, so won’t address them further now. Ambition—what is suitably ambitious to merit GCF support? does not, so I’d like to spend the time discussing.

·      A couple introductory points:

·      Rough and ready understanding: When BAU for decisions by governments, investors and consumers, and civil society lead to the low carbon and climate resilient actions.

·      Consensus that GCF Funded initiatives should deliver sustainable development and resiliency benefits, including at the local level. Board should be clear about how those values be integrated in decision-making? 

·      GCF needs to be strategic and add value. For example, actions that would go forward without GCF support cannot, by definition, promote a paradigm shift.

·      Mitigation:

o   First, the GCF should focus on enabling a rapid shifting of emissions trajectories, taking into account environmental and social safeguards, and taking a gender-sensitive approach, ensuring social, economic and development co-benefits particularly for the poor.

o   Second, paradigm shifting actions should also include initiatives that may deliver smaller immediate reductions, but can contribute towards transforming markets and patterns of consumption and investment over the medium to long term.

o   In this regard, initiatives to support SME are critical. Many of the most transformational initiatives underway today are happening at the local level, scaling up these initiatives can be an extremely effective way to catalyze a paradigm shift at the scale and ambition that is required. Resist the idea that ambition and transformation are synomymous with big infrastructure.

o   In general, preference for supporting policy level shifts over one-off investments.

·      Adaptation:

o   Ambition in adaptation context is tougher to define. It means building resilience at different levels--national, regional and local—to the variety of climate induced stressors that need to be addressed comprehensively.

o   It must be understood in the context of developing country needs and the rights of those directly impacted, including critically, equitable resource access and the participation of affected communities in adaptation decision-making.

Thank you for the opportunity to come speak at this informal session, and we look forward to contributing to a rich discussion over the next 3 days. 

 

BMF Intervention Notes

·      URGENCY! When we next come together in June, it will be 3.5 years after announced in Copenhagen, 2.5 years after agreed in Cancun. still talking about vision of fund, not even yet about mobilizing resources at scale and urgency required, let alone supporting action on the ground! We know this not easy, but urge board to redouble efforts to find a way forward.

·      That said, We fully support the effort to clarify proposed areas of work, objectives, gaps and opportunities in existing architecture, and indicators of success, as a matter of priority and indeed urgency.

·      But, This work should be undertaken in the context of the overarching objective of promoting a paradigm shift and resiliency in context of sustainable development.—so within each area of work, and for each proposed objective, this effort should identify the approaches that are likely to be suitably ambitious and transformational in their impacts, and will also serve the interests of the poor. Need for the overarching objectives to be translated into specific, measurable criteria for evaluating and prioritizing proposals.

Section C

·      Also don’t find wholesale/retail illuminating.

·      Convergence on principle of direct access and country drivenness—further work will need to include analysis of options how the PSF can serve to further the country-driven approach, and the role of national designated authorities in that process AND modalities for subnational and non-governmental access. 

·      transparency and accountability, input from CSO and PSO, (c5)

·      On leveraging:

o   Emphasize the importance of policy shifts, which may often have the potential to leverage greater change than discrete investments. This is true, even if you think that leveraging the private secotr is a critical priority. so a critical question here is the extent to which the Fund will focus on supporting those shifts.

o   Leveraging finance not an objective in itself, need to relate back to overarching objectives of paradigm shift, and promoting sustainable development and resilience, esp for the poor.  narrow indicators of leverage may not be helpful in benchmarking impact.

·      Annex and CONSULTANCY

·      We recognize this is an enormously difficult undertaking, and that the Board needs to bring an extremely broad array of expertise to bear.

·      But obviously, the full range of necessary expertise is unlikely to reside in any one consultancy or think tank, and so it is critically important that this process be open to a broad range of inputs. A couple of specific recommendations:

o   Build on the enormous body of work already undertaken under the convention, country needs assessments, national communications, country plans, and the work of the transitional committee.

o   Consultancy or think tanks should include developing country perspectives, and expertise beyond the financial realm

o   The TOR should be put out for public comment.

o   The TOR should make clear that the work should be based on broad consultation and public input

o   The report should present options and alternatives, not just recommendations.

 On safeguards in Annex I (f) (1): includes analysis of best practices in the participatory decisionmaking and application of safeguards/standards in funding decisions and implementation of activities, including the PCF

 

Notes for intervention

Readiness, including needs assessments, organizational capacity building and the development of strategic plans from which funding proposals can be derived will be essential.

Show real value in two ways:

·      Readiness will expand the universe of countries who can come forward with the kind of high quality, transformational proposals that the Board will be looking for.

·      Improve the overall quality of proposals that will be put before the Board, as countries learn from each other and build on previous proposals.

We also believe that at least an initial strategy for supporting readiness could be fast tracked within the broader BMF conversation, and I would submit that this might provide a useful way forward on the sequencing issue that arose in the last session. The preparation of a fast tracked readiness strategy might unlock  opportunities for more rapid capitalization, in advance of resolving all of the outstanding BMF issues.

 

Today´s good deed: Donate Your DSA to the Adaptation Fund

In his remarks to the Parties on Wednesday, the Adaptation Fund (AF) chair underscored the great achievement made by the Fund this year. He emphasised, among other things, that the AF has now accredited twelve National Implementing Entities, which allow for direct access of developing countries to the funds of the AF. Experience shows that this has also triggered the strengthening of institutional capacities to manage project funds. For ECO, this is evidence that direct access is no longer a pilot test programme perceived as highly risky, but rather a reality. In addition, two years after its first call for proposals, the AF has approved 25 concrete urgent adaptation projects covering all fields of adaptation, with several more in the pipeline. A key objective is to target the most vulnerable groups. 

Because of these significant achievements of the AF and at the same time the scarce resources at its disposal, ECO is seriously worried about the dwindling resources and lack of predictability that poor countries are facing. Due to the over-supply of permits, the lack of mitigation ambition and the global economic downturn, prices for CERs, which provide the main source of income for  the AF, have gone down to record lows below US$2.
 
While almost everybody is looking at  the Green Climate Fund (GCF), which will hopefully lead to the long awaited transformational change needed to tackle the climate crisis, ECO would like to draw the attention of Parties to the Adaptation Fund. It is the only operating fund providing direct access under the Convention.  ECO believes that the AF should play an important role until the GCF is operationalised, and beyond. So let us now secure the survival of the AF.
 
In order to increase funds for the AF, Parties are discussing the extension of the CER levy to other mechanisms. Furthermore, since yesterday, individuals can donate funds into the AF through a simple procedure on its website. Dear COP participants: Why not donate one DSA into the AF for your daily good? (The donation function is also open to individuals from non-Kyoto Parties, and, by the way, hosted in the US). The more people contribute, the stronger the signal to incoming ministers that there is support for the AF. Looking into the books of the AF, ECO has found out that some not too poor countries, such as Japan, Norway, France and Canada, have not yet made contributions to fund projects. ECO wants to see additional contributions being pledged in Doha. The system allows for amounts of up to 13 digits (that may be sufficient to solve all adaptation problems now!). So ministers, bring credit cards to Doha!
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CLIMATE FINANCE: UP AND NOT DOWN!

To our freshly arrived negotiators, get ready for a major wake up call (or at least a loud and not particularly polite noise) on finance, when the countries most vulnerable to climate change will be rightly asking: what happens when Fast Start Finance runs out at the end of this year?

 
And what happens now that we know Fast Start Finance (the money pledged between 2010 and 2012) was mostly a false start? Yes, ECO did the maths and estimates only 33% of FSF was “new” money (that is, additional to existing, pre-Copenhagen pledges), and around 24% additional to existing aid promises. Only one-fifth of finance was spent on adaptation, and less than half was available as grants. It seems developed countries need to re-learn some basics about climate finance. Which part of “new and additional, predictable, and adequate in relation to rapidly spiralling needs...with balanced allocation between mitigation and adaptation” are they failing to understand?
 
And to those who need illustration of “spiralling needs”, please count the unprecedented number of climate related disasters in 2012 which - along with sea-level rise, and the gradual but deadly effects on agricultural and
fresh water systems - mean that the bill from carbon pollution just keeps going up and up. If we are to tackle the consequences of current inaction, the hundred billion annual figure promised before Copenhagen is now looking implausibly small.
 
Here in Doha, we are facing a “finance cliff” with fast start finance ending just at the point when we need ramping up. ECO is concerned that many developed countries have arrived in Doha unwilling to pledge new resources. For vulnerable countries this is a daunting prospect, and will hugely reduce their trust that these countries intend to make good on their $100 billion a year by 2020 promise. By holding back on money they have promised, developed countries are shooting the 2015 global deal in the foot.
 
Luckily, ECO is giving countries two extra weeks to do their homework on how to:
 
SCALE UP – ECO will not accept Doha as a success without reassurance that climate finance will go UP, not down and especially not off a cliff in 2013. For 2013-2015, developed countries should at least double the amount delivered under Fast Start Finance levels and channel US$10 to 15 billion to the Green Climate Fund.
 
PROGRESS ON SOURCES – To sleep tight, ECO needs to see a scaling up of climate finance to meet the $100 billion per year commitment by 2020. Advancing promising new sources of finance will be crucial to provide
predictable and scalable finance and needs genuine commitment by developed countries. ECO supports the recommendation on the Long Term Finance Work Programme to establish a high-level experts group across the ICAO, IMO and UNFCCC secretariats to examine finance-raising options from a fair carbon pricing mechanism. ECO will give top grades to the EU member states who allocate at least a quarter of the upcoming Financial Transaction Tax to the Green Climate Fund.
 
STRENGTHEN MRV – False Start Finance has taught ECO the tricks for how to count existing aid as new and additional. ECO is now looking forward to learning how to do things the right way. Parties now need to agree on MRV reporting formats on climate finance that help assess whether the promises are “new and additional” finance, and ensure “balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation”. It is high time that the reporting is transparent, verifiable and clarifies what is “real” and “legitimate” climate finance.
 
HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL PROCESS – Finally, ECO intends to be an ongoing and relentless nuisance, by insisting on a high level political space for negotiations on finance, if and when the AWG-LCA comes to an end after COP18. In whatever context negotiations continue, finance MUST NOT be relegated to the status of a “technical” issue. There is nothing technical about being on the receiving end of climate disaster. Lives and livelihoods are at stake, and we expect this issue to be treated with the political seriousness it deserves.
 

 

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“We are sinking” and “no-agreement-text”- What is the relation between both ideas?

Mónica López Baltodano
Officer for Climate Change
Centro Humboldt
Nicaragua

While the negotiations in the UNFCCC concluded in the Bangkok intersessional meeting in September 2012, many questions arise for us in preparation for COP 18 in Doha. Can we find any logical relationship between developed countries’ claims that this was an “informal session, meaning “no-negotiation-text” should be agreed in Bangkok, while we read there´s super-shrinkage of the Arctic sea ice?

The massive heat wave melting the Arctic is just one –of many- clear signals that expose governmental representatives of countries around the globe aren´t achieving what they are supposed to in UNFCCC negotiations. The ultimate objective of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is to guarantee the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”. But, that clearly can´t be achieved if developed countries are limiting the negotiation process, hiding their lack of political will to act with procedural claims and “formality” excuses.

Coming from a highly vulnerable country to the impacts of climate change, this seems more like a bad joke - not funny at all. Even though we understand that climate change claims for actions in the developing world, particularly in emerging economies, we cannot accept this to be an excuse for developed countries not to act as needed.

When we hear United States, Australia, Japan, Canada, Switzerland, the European Union, New Zealand and others saying there is not supposed to be any negotiating text on adaptation issues and finance under the LCA, we fear this is leading to a dead-end. Of course, there is clearly a much needed link between, for instance, Adaptation Committee, Standing Committee and Green Climate Fund Board´s work. Why would developed countries fear this should be in an agreed text coming out of Doha?

There are no “political skills” necessary to understand that this might mean they are not truly committed to fund adaptation actions in our countries as needed (i.e. promptly and effectively). If this is true, it would certainly undermine any strong effort in the most afflicted countries, including LDCs, SIDs and Central American countries.

We surely expect that, in the road to Doha, these countries find the logical connection between “we are sinking” –in all of its meanings- and the need to complete the work in the LCA track. This means an agreed outcome is a MUST, including a clear agreement on international finance for adaptation actions to take effect now.

Related Campaign: 
Leadership Development Program

Finally, Finance?

ECO is heartened to have heard that a group of developed countries is considering putting concrete numbers on the table for long-term finance in Doha. In the last year of Fast Start Finance, and with few firm commitments for finance from 2013 onwards currently on the table, this is none too soon. Substantial new and additional climate finance commitments could really help to give a boost to the negotiations going into Qatar.

As ECO has long argued, such commitments would give developing countries some needed reassurance that climate finance is not about to fall off a cliff, but rather start the steady climb towards the US$100 billion per year promise made in Copenhagen and Cancun. Rhetorical reassurances during the negotiations are no match for concrete numbers committed on paper.

Let’s hope that more developed countries reach this enlightened conclusion before Doha. There will be nowhere for them to hide if a group of countries makes a pledge, while they turn up empty handed.

But ECO would also hope that developed countries have learned some lessons from the Fast Start Finance experience, and apply them as they consider their pledge. Don´t forget that ECO has a beady eye for creative accounting tricks that may artificially inflate finance pledges that are actually not new and additional. The potential for trust-building could be undermined if developed countries are seen to be counting spurious finance flows, especially from private finance.

One kind of pledge that is guaranteed to win plaudits from developing countries and ECO alike is a serious commitment to the capitalisation of the Green Climate Fund. No one wants to see a third COP in a row that leaves the GCF as an empty shell. Now is the time to give the political signal of financial support for the fund over the coming years.

After the delays in the Board’s first meeting, a round of pledges to the Fund would be like a shot in the arm to this nascent institution. It would spur efforts to get the Fund up and running and disbursing climate cash to those who need it most as soon as possible. At the end of Bonn, ECO insisted that a sum of $10-15 billion of public finance by 2015 is needed. What better way for developed countries to show they mean business in the negotiations over this period than to take our hint?

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Ace the AC

ECO congratulates the Adaptation Committee (AC) members for their selection and welcomes them to Bangkok, where the first AC meeting will take place. The AC has been mandated with the very important task of promoting the implementation of enhanced action on adaptation in a coherent manner, and supporting the COP in taking appropriate decisions on adaptation. ECO would like to encourage all members of the AC, both from developed and developing countries, to work as ONE TEAM and with a true spirit of collaboration and cooperation.

In its first meeting, the AC’s members will focus on developing its three year work plan and its modalities. ECO requests that the Adaptation Committee include the following priority issues. The AC should:

 - consider the linkages and stimulate coherence among the various adaptation institutions within the UNFCCC, including the Standing Committee and Green Climate Fund

 - develop an overview, identify gaps and establish/strengthen regional centres and networks to address those gaps

 - facilitate discussion among Parties to explore ways to effectively address regional, cross-border and common sub-regional adaptation issues through promoting ecosystem- and community-based approaches.

Other issues to  be to reflected upon include the guidelines and modalities for the National Adaptation Planning (NAP) process for non-LDC countries and national institutional arrangements for adaptation.

Outreach to the wider community and public is an important part of the AC’s job description. Organizing a biannual adaptation conference with diverse stakeholders to create a platform for sharing new knowledge, practices and experiences could be explored. Most importantly, the AC will have to elaborate its linkages with ongoing external processes, like the development of a new Disaster Risk Reduction Framework, SDGs and MDGs – all of which have an equal 3 year timeline and will be relevant to further elevate the adaptation agenda around the world.

Lastly, ECO offers its full support to the Adaptation Committee and wishes its members all the best for this exciting work!

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Fill the Fund in Qatar: $10-15 billion for the Green Climate Fund

 

In Qatar, developed countries need to put forward a climate finance package that includes:  

  • Commitments to total climate finance  (bilateral and multilateral, inside and outside the GCF) in 2013-2015 that are substantially above the levels of the Fast Start Finance period (2010-12); 
  • A pledge of at least $10-15 billion in new and additional public finance to be disbursed to the GCF over the years 2013-2015, with 50 percent of these initial resources for adaptation through direct access where possible and preferred  
  • A clear roadmap for scaling-up climate finance to meet  the $100 billion per year commitment by 2020; 
  • Decisions that advance the most promising alternative sources of public finance as part of this roadmap;
  • Decisions allowing the full operationalization of the Green Climate Fund.  

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Fill the Fund!

As the end of the Fast Start Finance period approaches, ECO lies awake at night thinking about what happens next. There is nothing on the table for 2013 and beyond, and a huge mid-term finance gap is looming. ECO is as worried as developing countries that developed countries have little interest in discussing a scaling-up roadmap of climate finance towards 2020, with clear milestones, and ensuring that the Green Climate Fund doesn’t remain an empty shell.

Adaptation and mitigation needs have only grown larger since they were last assessed, and ECO believes that a finance gap is the last thing the climate, and these negotiations, needs. ECO worries that climate finance will be lower in 2013 than in the three years since Copenhagen.
ECO wonders if negotiations, including those on increasing mitigation ambition, will progress at all without a clear signal that developed countries will be living up to their commitment to provide new and additional climate finance, and start making progress towards meeting the US$100 billion per year by 2020. Yes, some developed countries have made reassurances that climate finance will not fall of a cliff after 2012, but in ECO’s view, general reassurances are one thing; individual commitments, though, are quite another.
So ECO strongly suggests that developed countries show that they mean business, and clarify what they intend climate finance to look like in the beginning of 2013 and over the years to 2020. As a clear down payment on trust, which has been our missing friend here in the Maritim, ECO believes developed countries should make a political commitment in Doha to initially pledge at least $10-15 billion to be disbursed to the Green Climate Fund over the years 2013-2015 as part of a broader climate finance commitment.

 The Green Climate Fund has some work ahead, and we urge all parties to get on with the institutional arrangements without delay. That should not stop parties from making their political commitments in Doha. Hesitating countries might be interested to know that, in fact, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria received pledges well before it was ready to receive funds.
Such a pledge would send a strong and positive signal and help fight the perceptions of the last two weeks that the means of implementation may not be forthcoming. Pledges in Doha could be complemented by future revenues from new alternative sources, such as from a fair bunkers mechanism or a financial transaction tax. Of course, initial pledges in Doha would be the first step on a longer pathway to scale-up the annual turnover of the Green Climate Fund by 2020, where the majority of the $100 billion commitment is channelled through the GCF itself.
ECO believes that all this is firmly within the remit of possibilities of developed countries, as the memories of the bank bailouts with hundreds of billions (or was it trillions) of dollars are still fresh on our mind. We suggest that when negotiators have arrived back home, they make urgent phone calls to their finance ministers to get them started on preparing for the Doha pledges. Civil society, to be sure, will be ringing them.

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Progress on the Path to $100 billion

This year’s long term finance work programme provides a critical opportunity for focused and constructive engagement on sources of climate finance and developing country financing needs. 2012 should be a pivotal year for climate finance, as Fast Start Finance comes to an end and developed countries start on the path to US$100 billion per year by 2020

Negotiations on long-term finance have faced significant headwinds in recent years, and analytical work has been limited to ad-hoc and one-off initiatives like the UN Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing, and fora with limited and exclusive memberships such as the G20. If rich countries want to show climate finance is not just another broken promise to poor countries, they must use this year’s work programme to help make significant progress on agreeing to a roadmap to scale up funding over the next eight years to $100 billion per year by 2020.

To help ensure this ambition is realised, ECO would like to highlight the following objectives for the work programme, for consideration by parties attending today’s UNFCCC consultation on its scope

It is vital the work programme contributes to decision(s) at COP18 that make concrete progress towards scaling up finance, including:

- Identifying and advancing promising sources of predictable and assured finance, especially public sources, such as providing guidance to the International Maritime Organisation and International Civil Aviation Organisation on generating financing from measures to address emissions from international shipping and aviation, as well as financial transaction taxes and public finance liberated in developed countries through the elimination of their fossil fuel subsidies

- Providing a roadmap for reaching agreement on a pathway to mobilising $100 billion by 2020, including maximisation of public sources channelled through the Green Climate Fund, an appropriate role for the private sector and a trajectory for developed countries to scale up

- Establishing a shared understanding of developing country financing needs, based on a review of recent literature on mitigation and adaptation financing requirements

- Clear commitments to provide scaled up finance from 2013 onwards, including for the capitalization of the Green Climate Fund

This work is all the more urgent given the link between raising and delivering climate finance and reaching the goal of staying below 1.5/2 degrees C of warming. Scaled up finance to support increased ambition in developing countries is critical to move them towards low carbon development pathways.

In addition to constructive engagement on these areas through the work programme, all parties must be afforded sufficient spin-off group time in Bonn, Bangkok and Doha to participate in defining vital decisions for agreement at COP 18. In this respect it is imperative the Work Programme is seen as a complement to, rather than a substitute for, negotiations involving all parties.

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