Tag: GCF

CAN Intervention in the SB38/ADP2-2 Bonn Intersessional: Special Event with Co-Chairs on Finance, 8 June, 2013

Thank you for this opportunity. My name is Alix Mazounie and I’m speaking on behalf of Climate Action Network.

The importance of finance to both raising pre-2020 mitigation ambition and getting a successful deal in 2015 cannot be overstated.

But climate finance is currently in no man's land. After the end of the Fast Start Finance period last year, 2013 should mark the start of a new finance period.

Instead, we are almost half way through the year and we've seen no new commitments on finance beyond the small handful of pledges made in Doha.

 As CAN we think no developed country should be coming back to this process empty handed.

The various streams of work on finance this year, in particular the Long Term Finance work Programme and the Ministerial on finance at COP 19 (which crucially must involve finance ministers or ministers with mandate on finance), need to secure concrete decision options for consideration and agreement at COP 19:

(1) We need ALL developed countries to set out what climate finance they will provide over 2013-2015, and commit to a roadmap for scaling-up global public climate finance and reaching $100bn per year by 2020.

(2) We need agreement that a minimum of 50% of all public climate finance between now and 2020 will be spent on adaptation. Better than that, we need developed countries to make a collective pledge to save the Adaptation Fund and keep implementing ambitious projects on the ground.

(3) We need confidence that the Green Climate Fund is operational and ready to receive substantial pledges in 2014. A first round of pledges in Warsaw will send a strong political signal that the Green Climate Fund must not be left an empty shell for a fourth COP in a row.

With the LCA finance negotiations behind us, and ADP negotiations on pre-2020 ambition focused on mitigation, this year’s LTF WP is the main space for making progress on finance.

We need all countries to understand that forward steps on climate finance pre-2020 are key to ADP outcomes in both work-streams.

A new agreement applicable to all seems unlikely to emerge if developing countries have not seen existing promises of financial support being met.

So - in response to your question on our role in this process - we believe we would be fruitfully contributing to the ADP process if developed country parties agreed to our longstanding asks to scale up public finance. 

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CAN Speaking Notes from GCF Board Meeting, March 12 - 15

 

Resource Mobilization:

·      In our earlier interventions we emphasized that the GCF should narrowly focus on ambitious, paradigm shifting actions. That, of course, implies that resources will be made available at the scale and urgency that the task requires, in accordance with the commitments of Article 4.3 and 11.3 of the Convention. So these are, in large measure, two sides of same coin.

·      Developed countries should put forward initial pledges as a matter of urgency in 2013, that could be reported back to COP19, as indicator of progress taking place here, and to prepare the way for disbursements next year.

·      We’d support Derek and several other’s preference for option 2, step-wise approach, with a caveat.

·      As a matter of credibility and impact, rapid resourcing leading to disbursements as soon as possible is critical, in the context of adequate environmental, social and fiduciary standards. .

·      Resourcing need not await agreement on a burden sharing allocation. Neither should it prejudge the outcome of a future agreement on burden sharing arrangements for future replenishment processes.

·      The longer term framework must be designed to deliver adequate and predictable resources. To that end, the resource mobilisation framework should be designed to also allow the receipt of revenues from sources of additional public finance other than direct contributions from developed countries, such as from financial transaction taxes, the use of special drawing rights, carbon taxes, and aviation and maritime levies.

·      The scale of the GCF’s ambition should not be limited by the claim that there is a scarcity of public money. Certainly, enormous sums have been made rapidly available to pay for other actions governments have seen as urgent, wars and financial bailouts.

·      Multiple feasible proposals exist for generating large amounts of public money from innovative sources, such as carbon pricing, closing tax loopholes, and redirecting fossil fuel subsidies in developed countries, etc.  At the end of the day, its an issue of political scarcity, not economic scarcity.

·      Finally, regarding section 6.3 on earmarking. We wouldn’t want to see individual contributors circumvent Board decision-making through earmarking. Allocation of funds should be decided by the GCF board, reflecting developing country needs and in accordance with the GI’s requirement for a balanced allocation between mitigation and adaptation. In particular, we are concerned that adaptation will be given short shrift under an earmarking arrangement.

 

Addressing "to promote a paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways.":

·      Address first 2 guiding questions: what it means to “to promote a paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways”.

·      Given the scale of the challenge and the unique mandate of the GCF, the objective of achieving a “paradigm shift” should be the central organizing principle of the GCF’s work.  How the GCF defines and prioritizes actions to spur a “paradigm shift” will be a key determinant of its impact and effectiveness on the climate crisis and in making a significant difference in the lives of affected people.

·      It is therefore critical for the Board to reach understanding on the “paradigm shift” the GCF will promote for mitigation and adaptation. This includes a discussion on how to apply it also to the PS facility. We believe the “paradigm shift” must include these three pillars: (1) ambition, (2) country-driven planning, and (3) multi-stakeholder, participatory and inclusive decision-making.

·      All 3 are critically important to us, but country led planning and participatory decision-making have other textual homes in the GI, so won’t address them further now. Ambition—what is suitably ambitious to merit GCF support? does not, so I’d like to spend the time discussing.

·      A couple introductory points:

·      Rough and ready understanding: When BAU for decisions by governments, investors and consumers, and civil society lead to the low carbon and climate resilient actions.

·      Consensus that GCF Funded initiatives should deliver sustainable development and resiliency benefits, including at the local level. Board should be clear about how those values be integrated in decision-making? 

·      GCF needs to be strategic and add value. For example, actions that would go forward without GCF support cannot, by definition, promote a paradigm shift.

·      Mitigation:

o   First, the GCF should focus on enabling a rapid shifting of emissions trajectories, taking into account environmental and social safeguards, and taking a gender-sensitive approach, ensuring social, economic and development co-benefits particularly for the poor.

o   Second, paradigm shifting actions should also include initiatives that may deliver smaller immediate reductions, but can contribute towards transforming markets and patterns of consumption and investment over the medium to long term.

o   In this regard, initiatives to support SME are critical. Many of the most transformational initiatives underway today are happening at the local level, scaling up these initiatives can be an extremely effective way to catalyze a paradigm shift at the scale and ambition that is required. Resist the idea that ambition and transformation are synomymous with big infrastructure.

o   In general, preference for supporting policy level shifts over one-off investments.

·      Adaptation:

o   Ambition in adaptation context is tougher to define. It means building resilience at different levels--national, regional and local—to the variety of climate induced stressors that need to be addressed comprehensively.

o   It must be understood in the context of developing country needs and the rights of those directly impacted, including critically, equitable resource access and the participation of affected communities in adaptation decision-making.

Thank you for the opportunity to come speak at this informal session, and we look forward to contributing to a rich discussion over the next 3 days. 

 

BMF Intervention Notes

·      URGENCY! When we next come together in June, it will be 3.5 years after announced in Copenhagen, 2.5 years after agreed in Cancun. still talking about vision of fund, not even yet about mobilizing resources at scale and urgency required, let alone supporting action on the ground! We know this not easy, but urge board to redouble efforts to find a way forward.

·      That said, We fully support the effort to clarify proposed areas of work, objectives, gaps and opportunities in existing architecture, and indicators of success, as a matter of priority and indeed urgency.

·      But, This work should be undertaken in the context of the overarching objective of promoting a paradigm shift and resiliency in context of sustainable development.—so within each area of work, and for each proposed objective, this effort should identify the approaches that are likely to be suitably ambitious and transformational in their impacts, and will also serve the interests of the poor. Need for the overarching objectives to be translated into specific, measurable criteria for evaluating and prioritizing proposals.

Section C

·      Also don’t find wholesale/retail illuminating.

·      Convergence on principle of direct access and country drivenness—further work will need to include analysis of options how the PSF can serve to further the country-driven approach, and the role of national designated authorities in that process AND modalities for subnational and non-governmental access. 

·      transparency and accountability, input from CSO and PSO, (c5)

·      On leveraging:

o   Emphasize the importance of policy shifts, which may often have the potential to leverage greater change than discrete investments. This is true, even if you think that leveraging the private secotr is a critical priority. so a critical question here is the extent to which the Fund will focus on supporting those shifts.

o   Leveraging finance not an objective in itself, need to relate back to overarching objectives of paradigm shift, and promoting sustainable development and resilience, esp for the poor.  narrow indicators of leverage may not be helpful in benchmarking impact.

·      Annex and CONSULTANCY

·      We recognize this is an enormously difficult undertaking, and that the Board needs to bring an extremely broad array of expertise to bear.

·      But obviously, the full range of necessary expertise is unlikely to reside in any one consultancy or think tank, and so it is critically important that this process be open to a broad range of inputs. A couple of specific recommendations:

o   Build on the enormous body of work already undertaken under the convention, country needs assessments, national communications, country plans, and the work of the transitional committee.

o   Consultancy or think tanks should include developing country perspectives, and expertise beyond the financial realm

o   The TOR should be put out for public comment.

o   The TOR should make clear that the work should be based on broad consultation and public input

o   The report should present options and alternatives, not just recommendations.

 On safeguards in Annex I (f) (1): includes analysis of best practices in the participatory decisionmaking and application of safeguards/standards in funding decisions and implementation of activities, including the PCF

 

Notes for intervention

Readiness, including needs assessments, organizational capacity building and the development of strategic plans from which funding proposals can be derived will be essential.

Show real value in two ways:

·      Readiness will expand the universe of countries who can come forward with the kind of high quality, transformational proposals that the Board will be looking for.

·      Improve the overall quality of proposals that will be put before the Board, as countries learn from each other and build on previous proposals.

We also believe that at least an initial strategy for supporting readiness could be fast tracked within the broader BMF conversation, and I would submit that this might provide a useful way forward on the sequencing issue that arose in the last session. The preparation of a fast tracked readiness strategy might unlock  opportunities for more rapid capitalization, in advance of resolving all of the outstanding BMF issues.

 

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Climate Action Network's Response to Questions related to the “Paradigm Shift” Posed in the Co-Chairs’ information note on the informal discussion on the business model framework of the Green Climate Fund

 

On behalf of the more than 700 member organizations in the Climate Action Network International, we appreciate the opportunity to provide our comments on Co-Chairs’ information note on the informal discussion on the business model framework of the Green Climate Fund.

This submission will address the “initial guiding questions” posed by the Co-Chairs in relation to the Operational Objectives of the Fund: 

1. What does it mean, in practice, to promote a paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways? 

2. What results will the GCF be supporting to contribute to this paradigm shift? For example, for mitigation, are we only interested in tCO2e, or do we want tCO2e plus some measure of transformational change (for example, some demonstration of fit of activity with national strategy/innovation/fiscal effort)? 

The GCF should promote a “paradigm shift” by scaling-up resource flows for ambitious and effective climate related policies and actions in accordance with country-led strategies. It should incentivize synergies between the GCF’s strategic objectives and the achievement of overall national development strategies and the production of development co-benefits. To achieve these objectives, civil society and other stakeholders must be full partners, both at the international and national level, in determining the way in which the GCF will finance climate action. 

Towards this end, the Board should adopt the following definition of “paradigm shift” as part of its strategic vision or business model for the GCF: 

A paradigm shift involves a strategic, long-term, and fundamental re-orientation towards low-emission, climate-friendly, climate-resilient, pro-poor, gender-equitable and country-driven development. Such a transformation must be undertaken on the basis of country-owned strategies, plans and programmes that are developed and implemented through participatory and inclusive processes and that are integrated into developing countries’ core development plans. 

This understanding of “paradigm shift” includes three essential elements: (1) ambition, (2) country-led planning, and (3) participatory and inclusive decision-making. 

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Fill the Fund in Qatar: $10-15 billion for the Green Climate Fund

 

In Qatar, developed countries need to put forward a climate finance package that includes:  

  • Commitments to total climate finance  (bilateral and multilateral, inside and outside the GCF) in 2013-2015 that are substantially above the levels of the Fast Start Finance period (2010-12); 
  • A pledge of at least $10-15 billion in new and additional public finance to be disbursed to the GCF over the years 2013-2015, with 50 percent of these initial resources for adaptation through direct access where possible and preferred  
  • A clear roadmap for scaling-up climate finance to meet  the $100 billion per year commitment by 2020; 
  • Decisions that advance the most promising alternative sources of public finance as part of this roadmap;
  • Decisions allowing the full operationalization of the Green Climate Fund.  

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Fill the Fund!

As the end of the Fast Start Finance period approaches, ECO lies awake at night thinking about what happens next. There is nothing on the table for 2013 and beyond, and a huge mid-term finance gap is looming. ECO is as worried as developing countries that developed countries have little interest in discussing a scaling-up roadmap of climate finance towards 2020, with clear milestones, and ensuring that the Green Climate Fund doesn’t remain an empty shell.

Adaptation and mitigation needs have only grown larger since they were last assessed, and ECO believes that a finance gap is the last thing the climate, and these negotiations, needs. ECO worries that climate finance will be lower in 2013 than in the three years since Copenhagen.
ECO wonders if negotiations, including those on increasing mitigation ambition, will progress at all without a clear signal that developed countries will be living up to their commitment to provide new and additional climate finance, and start making progress towards meeting the US$100 billion per year by 2020. Yes, some developed countries have made reassurances that climate finance will not fall of a cliff after 2012, but in ECO’s view, general reassurances are one thing; individual commitments, though, are quite another.
So ECO strongly suggests that developed countries show that they mean business, and clarify what they intend climate finance to look like in the beginning of 2013 and over the years to 2020. As a clear down payment on trust, which has been our missing friend here in the Maritim, ECO believes developed countries should make a political commitment in Doha to initially pledge at least $10-15 billion to be disbursed to the Green Climate Fund over the years 2013-2015 as part of a broader climate finance commitment.

 The Green Climate Fund has some work ahead, and we urge all parties to get on with the institutional arrangements without delay. That should not stop parties from making their political commitments in Doha. Hesitating countries might be interested to know that, in fact, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria received pledges well before it was ready to receive funds.
Such a pledge would send a strong and positive signal and help fight the perceptions of the last two weeks that the means of implementation may not be forthcoming. Pledges in Doha could be complemented by future revenues from new alternative sources, such as from a fair bunkers mechanism or a financial transaction tax. Of course, initial pledges in Doha would be the first step on a longer pathway to scale-up the annual turnover of the Green Climate Fund by 2020, where the majority of the $100 billion commitment is channelled through the GCF itself.
ECO believes that all this is firmly within the remit of possibilities of developed countries, as the memories of the bank bailouts with hundreds of billions (or was it trillions) of dollars are still fresh on our mind. We suggest that when negotiators have arrived back home, they make urgent phone calls to their finance ministers to get them started on preparing for the Doha pledges. Civil society, to be sure, will be ringing them.

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Progress on the Path to $100 billion

This year’s long term finance work programme provides a critical opportunity for focused and constructive engagement on sources of climate finance and developing country financing needs. 2012 should be a pivotal year for climate finance, as Fast Start Finance comes to an end and developed countries start on the path to US$100 billion per year by 2020

Negotiations on long-term finance have faced significant headwinds in recent years, and analytical work has been limited to ad-hoc and one-off initiatives like the UN Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing, and fora with limited and exclusive memberships such as the G20. If rich countries want to show climate finance is not just another broken promise to poor countries, they must use this year’s work programme to help make significant progress on agreeing to a roadmap to scale up funding over the next eight years to $100 billion per year by 2020.

To help ensure this ambition is realised, ECO would like to highlight the following objectives for the work programme, for consideration by parties attending today’s UNFCCC consultation on its scope

It is vital the work programme contributes to decision(s) at COP18 that make concrete progress towards scaling up finance, including:

- Identifying and advancing promising sources of predictable and assured finance, especially public sources, such as providing guidance to the International Maritime Organisation and International Civil Aviation Organisation on generating financing from measures to address emissions from international shipping and aviation, as well as financial transaction taxes and public finance liberated in developed countries through the elimination of their fossil fuel subsidies

- Providing a roadmap for reaching agreement on a pathway to mobilising $100 billion by 2020, including maximisation of public sources channelled through the Green Climate Fund, an appropriate role for the private sector and a trajectory for developed countries to scale up

- Establishing a shared understanding of developing country financing needs, based on a review of recent literature on mitigation and adaptation financing requirements

- Clear commitments to provide scaled up finance from 2013 onwards, including for the capitalization of the Green Climate Fund

This work is all the more urgent given the link between raising and delivering climate finance and reaching the goal of staying below 1.5/2 degrees C of warming. Scaled up finance to support increased ambition in developing countries is critical to move them towards low carbon development pathways.

In addition to constructive engagement on these areas through the work programme, all parties must be afforded sufficient spin-off group time in Bonn, Bangkok and Doha to participate in defining vital decisions for agreement at COP 18. In this respect it is imperative the Work Programme is seen as a complement to, rather than a substitute for, negotiations involving all parties.

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Civil Society Organizations Submission: Observer participation in the proceedings of the Board of the Green Climate Fund

 

Preliminary responses for initial consultation

Our initial response to the questionnaire from the interim secretariat is based on the understanding that arrangements will be made by the GCF Board, including developing and operating accreditation processes in accordance with paragraph 16, section 7, "Observers", Chapter C "Rules of Procedure of the Board", of the GCF Governing Instrument.

We believe that the GCF will benefit from civil society participation/input in a number of ways including increasing transparency, effectiveness and credibility. Thus we invite the Board of the GCF, at its first meeting, to view these recommendations as the initial step in an inclusive, in-depth process for broad consultation and engagement on observer issues and we look forward to further opportunities in the near future to share additional and further developed views with the Board on these important issues.

Active observers according to the GCF Governing Instrument

·       Active CSO board observers (1 North, 1 South)

·       Active private sector board observers (1 North, 1 South)

Proposed structures for observers

 

·       Alternate CSO board observers (1 North, 1 South)

·       Alternate private sector board observers (1 North, 1 South)

·       Advisory Committee (helps vet selections for CSO and private sector seats, and helps advise observers once they are nominated, including preparing pre-board meeting materials and consultations; 1 North, 1 South from each of the UNFCCC 9 constituencies = 18 people total)

·       Third party facilitator for selection process

·       Civil society liaison staff person in the GCF interim secretariat (supports observers)

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10 Points of Action

Ministers – thank goodness you are here. Your delegations may have been burning some midnight oil in the last few days – but they have left the hard decisions for you! Here’s what your agenda for the next 4 days looks like:

1.  Don’t just “Mind the Gap” – do something! Ministers, at Durban you must show that you live on the same planet as the rest of us and acknowledge that the current mitigation pathway puts us on track for over 4° C warming. You must explicitly acknowledge the 6 to 11 Gigatonne gap, agree to a 2012 work plan to close the gap by increasing developed country targets to at least 40% by 2020, and provide guidelines and timeframes for NAMAs to be registered and supported where required. The ambition work plan must include clear markers through 2012, including submissions, technical papers and a dedicated intersessional meeting, to ensure we don’t have another year of wishy washy workshops with outcomes.

2. Commit for the long term. Negotiators have made no progress at all in setting a peak year and a long term global goal for emissions. Ministers now should explicitly agree that each country contribute their fair share to the globally needed mitigation effort, leading to a peak by 2015 and a reduction of global emissions of at least 80% below 1990 by 2050.

3. Stop spinning wheels in the Review. Ministers need to ensure that the Review will be effective, and limiting the scope will help it get off the ground as an effective instrument. We must focus on the important things: reviewing the long-term goal and the overall progress towards achieving it. Leave the biannual reports under MRV to cover the inputs like the means of implementation.

4. High Time for legally binding. A 5 year long second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol is an absolute necessity as it contains important architectural elements which are crucial to ensure that mitigation commitments are legally binding and have environmental integrity. Nobody believes that a temperature rise of 4° C might be OK. So now is the moment to act decisively. An LCA mandate to agree a comprehensive legally binding instrument can build on the KP. Parties need to go beyond their long stated positions and immediately kick off negotiations toward a comprehensive, fair, ambitious and binding agreement to be agreed no later than 2015.

6. KP is essential – but it must have integrity. When added together, loopholes in the KP could wipe out Annex I ambition for the second commitment period.

In LULUCF, hidden and unaccounted emissions could significantly undermine Annex I targets, and cause us to doubt your commitment. Ministers must therefore ensure emissions from forests and land use are accurately accounted and reject the options on the table with the lowest environmental integrity.

All of the parties to this relationship know that the hot air / carried over AAUs is a bad joke that threatens to sour our relationship.  To keep it pure we need you to retire your surplus AAUs, or at least reduce them to 1%. Flexible mechanisms need clear rules and governance structures to avoid double counting of both emissions and finance, strengthen additionality testing and ensuring the standardization frenzy does not leave us with a highway for free-riders. Let’s start by keeping CCS and nuclear out of the CDM and let’s exclude coal power projects. Last but not least, we do indeed need stakeholder involvement in the CDM. Don’t back down, we are counting on you!

PS: CDM’s little brother JI has been up to a bunch of no-good stuff: hot air gussied up in new clothes (ERUs) is still hot air.

7. Fill the Fund. Operationalising the GCF in Durban is essential but not nearly enough – an empty fund is no good to anyone. We need initial capitalization of the GCF from developed country Parties in Durban. Reaching $100 billion per year by 2020 will require a commitment to scaled up finance from 2013 onward and clear progress on innovative approaches to generate finance. In Durban, parties should move forward on the establishment of mechanisms in the shipping and aviation sectors in a way that reduces emissions, generates finance, and ensures no burdens and costs on developing countries. Countries must also agree to a detailed one year work programme under the UNFCCC to consider a full range of innovative sources of public finance and report back to COP 18 with a proposal for action.

8. Gear Up and Deliver Technology. Technology is heading in the right direction, but speed is needed! Don’t be held back by other laggards. The Tech Mechanism could be operational by the end of COP 18.

9. Feel the Love for Transparency and Stakeholders. Your negotiators excised stakeholders’ right to participate from the IAR text and subject to heavy bracketing in ICA. But we know, Ministers, that you recognize the worth of engaging stakeholders to create a better process – rather than having us only campaign from the outside. Current text also falls short on common accounting rules for Annex I countries and clarification of pledges for all countries. Surely we’ve learned from the financial crisis! Robust reporting, such as Biennial Reviews and Biennial Update Report guidelines, including tables for reporting actions, and a common reporting format for finance must be agreed in Durban, so countries can complete their biennial reports in time for the first review. And where would this relationship between us and the planet, be without compliance for our commitments!

10.  An ambitious adaptation package at the African COP. Good agreements on Loss and Damage and the Nairobi Work Programme have already been reached. Wrapping up the package will require agreement on a strong Adaptation Committee including active civil society observers and direct reporting to the COP (as well to the SBs when COP does not meet). Furthermore, guidelines for National Adaptation Plans for Least Developed Countries must be adopted, plus modalities on how other developing countries can take these up. The prioritisation for LDCs must of course not be undermined.

A strong role for local, affected communities and civil society in national planning processes, building on the principles agreed in the Cancun Adaptation Framework, is essential. Finally, Parties must ensure that the Adaptation Fund does not dry up because of decreasing CER prices and lack of new pledges to the Fund from developed countries.

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Take Good NAPs

As Parties start to feel the effects of lack of sleep here at the COP, they might want an afternoon nap.  But ECO knows Parties won’t want to fall asleep on the job when it comes to crafting a decision on the National Adaptation Plans (NAPs).  Durban needs to deliver a decision that formalizes and elaborates this process and outlines the guidelines and modalities for LDCs and other developing countries to benefit from the process, clearly articulating the role, responsibility, and functions that the UNFCCC will offer, support, and facilitate.  The process should entail such efforts as workshops, forums and expert meetings to facilitate south-south learning.

The specific form and format of national adaptation plans and strategies should be decided by each country, including whether to create a stand-alone plan or to incorporate adaptation needs and actions into existing strategic climate change or poverty alleviation and development plans. The global process should be non-prescriptive and enable country-driven, flexible, and iterative national-level planning and implementation. There are, however, a number of elements which are important when developing guidelines in order for NAPs to deliver on essential needs.

A decision on the National Adaptation Plans should include an elaboration of the guiding principles included in paragraph 12 of 1/CP.16 in order to support a country-driven, gender-sensitive, participatory and fully transparent approach that takes into account vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems.  These principles help ensure that the NAPs process and implementation will deliver assistance for the most vulnerable, for example through comprehensive vulnerability assessments to identify and prioritise the most vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems. The process should also include robust consultations and participatory approaches to meaningfully capture the needs and concerns of most vulnerable communities.  NAPs should integrate and reflect gender considerations, integrate and address ecosystems and their services, and facilitate synergies with other multilateral frameworks, such as the CBD, UNCCD and the Hyogo Framework for Action.

With regard to modalities, ECO believes a NAPs decision should enhance synergies and linkages among the different bodies involved, in particular the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, the Adaptation Committee and the Nairobi Work Programme, to enable the dissemination of knowledge, information and good practices.  Modalities should include opportunities to build national, local and civil society
capacity. 

It is important to get the technical modalities right, and it is vital not to hold this up. However, ECO would also like to remind developed country Parties that vulnerable countries and communities cannot adapt to the impacts of climate change (which they did not cause) empty-handed. They need to be able to trust in the will of developed countries to deliver funds for preparation and implementation of the NAPs.  Potential channels for funding NAPs already exist through the LDCF (for planning and projects in LDCs), the Adaptation Fund (for projects) and potentially the Green Climate Fund - they just need to be filled up.

And a well-crafted NAPs decision will be rewarded with plenty of time for catching up on sleep.

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