Tag: 2013

Annex I Accounting – Not Just About Transparency

Since June, there has been much attention paid to the topic of Annex I accounting. This has been reiterated in the open session on mitigation.

There does seem to be some convergence on the need for transparency of assumptions underlying Annex I targets. This is absolutely critical and in line with the provisions of the Cancun Agreements. There is so much we don’t know about the pledges that have been put forward.  What are the rules for LULUCF underlying the pledges? What methodologies for offsets are being embraced? How is economy-wide being defined? What gases and sectors are included? How will double counting of emissions reductions be avoided?  Without information on these and other issues, it will be difficult, if not entirely impossible, to accurately assess the targets in the International Assessment and Review (IAR) process. This clarification process must be formalized beyond the workshops. A first step would be for the Secretariat to update their technical paper on Annex I targets, which came out in June this year. But furthermore, countries must be more forthcoming about their assumptions and this cannot be achieved without a more formal clarification process.

So what is the big deal around accounting? Can’t Annex I countries just report what they are doing and be done with it? Well, while transparency and clarification are vital they just are not good enough to ensure a robust international climate regime. Common accounting rules will be necessary if emissions reductions are to be assessed in a comparable way – a key objective of the Cancun Agreements. In addition, it will be very difficult to inform the periodic review if we do not have an accurate picture of emissions reductions. And last but not least, a lack of common accounting rules could lead to double counting of emissions reductions, confusion in the carbon market, incompleteness of coverage, and potential gaming. As the UNEP emissions gap report shows, accounting rules can directly affect the amount of emissions reductions achieved in the 2013-2020 period.

We need to make sure that the IAR process is not only about clarification – which is vitally important – but also about the development of accounting rules. The environmental integrityof the regime depends upon it.

Topics: 
Related Event: 

Scientific Integrity in the UNFCCC?!

ECO appreciates the critical role of the IPCC, which provides scientific input to the UNFCCC process and led to the Convention itself and its Kyoto Protocol. But how will this link continue in future?

Yesterday’s technical briefing by the IPCC was meant to explore how this link will continue in the future and how the 5th Assessment Report (AR5) will serve as a key input into the 2013-2015 Review.

ECO applauds the use of communication technology (Skype) at this technical briefing to cut down on emissions from air travel and foster lower-carbon meetings. The IPCC Chair Pachauri promised improved policy relevance of AR5 compared to any previous report, strengthening links between the IPCC Working Groups –especially on adaptation and mitigation- to address cross-cutting issues. So far, so good. But how about the actual input for the Review process? AOSIS (Granada) asked this key question at the very end of the briefing: How will we merge the IPCC timeline with the Review’s requirements? Will the IPCC Synthesis Report be published at least a month before the concluding COP20, allowing for preparation of a decision at COP21? Apparently, IPCC will ask this question at its next meeting in Uganda this November. For ECO there’s only one possible answer: it must.  

But ECO wonders if the Parties are clear on how the IPCC will input into the 2013-2015 Review. To ECO it seems that more opportunities for Parties to discuss the review with the IPCC are critical to help answer the many questions that remain unasked and unanswered on this key element of hope for our collective future. ECO appreciates the critical role of the IPCC, which provides scientific input to the UNFCCC process and led to the Convention itself and its Kyoto Protocol. But how will this link continue in future?

Yesterday’s technical briefing by the IPCC was meant to explore how this link will continue in the future and how the 5th Assessment Report (AR5) will serve as a key input into the 2013-2015 Review.

ECO applauds the use of communication technology (Skype) at this technical briefing to cut down on emissions from air travel and foster lower-carbon meetings. The IPCC Chair Pachauri promised improved policy relevance of AR5 compared to any previous report, strengthening links between the IPCC Working Groups –especially on adaptation and mitigation- to address cross-cutting issues. So far, so good. But how about the actual input for the Review process? AOSIS (Granada) asked this key question at the very end of the briefing: How will we merge the IPCC timeline with the Review’s requirements? Will the IPCC Synthesis Report be published at least a month before the concluding COP20, allowing for preparation of a decision at COP21? Apparently, IPCC will ask this question at its next meeting in Uganda this November. For ECO there’s only one possible answer: it must.  

But ECO wonders if the Parties are clear on how the IPCC will input into the 2013-2015 Review. To ECO it seems that more opportunities for Parties to discuss the review with the IPCC are critical to help answer the many questions that remain unasked and unanswered on this key element of hope for our collective future. 

Related Event: 

Reassessing priorities on long-term finance

Back in Bonn, Eco complained that the finance negotiations seemed more concerned with designing finance institutions than deciding where the long-term finance to fund them should come from. The result could be a Green Climate Fund that is an empty shell, and a Standing Committee that is left to stand still.

Paying a quick visit to yesterday’s finance informal, Eco was pleased to see a number of parties stress the need to readdress this balance. When Durban draws to a close, the world’s citizens will find it extraordinary if the African COP does not deliver the resources that poor and vulnerable people in Africa and elsewhere need to adapt to climate change and shift to a low-carbon development path.

A meaningful decision on long-term finance in Durban should cover at least three elements. First, a roadmap is needed for scaling-up climate finance from 2013 to 2020 to at least meet the $100 billion per year commitment by 2020. This should include a commitment from developed countries that there will be no gap after the end of the Fast Start Finance period. The roadmap should recognise that $100 billion is needed from public finance – mobilised first and foremost through assessed budgetary contributions of developed countries, and through supplementary sources of public finance, such as carbon pricing of international transport or financial transaction taxes.

Finally the roadmap should include a detailed workplan to drive towards the further decisions needed at COP-18, including technical workshops and submissions from parties, experts and observers.

But negotiators should not be satisfied with agreeing a roadmap alone. They must also get the finance car on the road and start driving down it.

The second key area to address in Durban is the initial capitalisation of the Green Climate Fund. Eco wants to be clear that an initial capitalisation should not merely cover the running costs of the Secretariat and Board of the new fund over the next year, but must extend commitment to a substantial first tranche of funding to enable the disbursement of climate finance to developing countries from 2013.

Finally, there should be a decision in Durban to move ahead with the most promising supplementary sources of public finance. Eco notes that the International Maritime Organisation is ready to get to work on designing an instrument to apply a universal carbon price to international shipping, which would both control high and rising emissions from the sector, and raise substantial new revenues. But the IMO process is waiting for guidance from the UNFCCC COP on how to do so while respecting CBDR.

There is no reason to delay giving that guidance to ensure the IMO gets down to work from March next year. A Durban decision should establish the principle that CBDR can be addressed by directing revenues as compensation to developing countries and to the Green Climate Fund. Further work will still be needed on the details of implementation, but better to start those discussions next year than wait another 12 months.

With progress on these elements in Panama, Eco is confident that Durban can yet deliver an balanced outcome on finance which helps both to operationalize the new finance institutions needed, and to mobilize the long-term revenues. The people watching the African COP will expect nothing less.

Topics: 
Related Event: 

Panama: Progress or Paralysis?

Durban is shaping up as a critical moment in the 20-year history of the climate regime.  The world can either build on what has been created in the Kyoto Protocol, raise the level of ambition as demanded by the science, and provide sufficient finance to meet developing countries’ needs for adaptation, mitigation, and REDD. Or it risks relegating the UNFCCC to a side show with little legitimacy to meaningfully address the climate crisis.

Let’s review what’s needed to avoid a train wreck in Durban:

Mitigation:In the Cancun Agreements, developed countries accepted that their aggregate level of ambition should be in the range of 25-40%.  Even while this range does not guarantee that global temperature rise will stay below 2 degrees Celsius, current developed country emission reduction pledges will result in reductions of only 12-18% going down to ~2% if currently existing and proposed loopholes are taken into account.  ECO suggests four critical elements in the Durban mitigation package for developed countries:: clarify what the net emissions would be based on current pledges and assumptions; close the loopholes;  move to the high end of current pledges; and agree on a process to increase ambition beyond 40%, for adoption at COP18/CMP8.

Panama can and must reach agreements on closing the loopholes.  The recent Review of proposals on forest management under LULUCF clarifies the size of the forestry loophole.  Now, Parties must adopt forest management reference levels that are comparable and that don’t significantly undermine Annex I Party targets. Overall, LULUCF rules should encourage Parties to achieve ambitious mitigation from land and forests.  On carry-forward of AAUs, Parties must eliminate the risk of “hot air” undermining the environmental integrity of future reduction commitments.

Kyoto Protocol: As acknowledged by both Executive Secretary Figueres and incoming COP President Nkoana-Mashabane, the future of the Kyoto Protocol will be decided at Durban.  While some developed country Parties would prefer to overlook the KP or at best, make a second commitment period conditional on what happens in the LCA over the next four years, it is  essential that in Durban, we cement a second commitment period of the KP.  The alternative – a pledge and review world – just won’t cut it.

Convention mandate: Given the urgency of the climate catastrophe unfolding daily before our eyes, nothing less than the greatest level of commitment is needed from all parties.  Therefore, in addition to preserving the Kyoto Protocol, Durban must agree that by 2015 at the latest, the commitments and actions of all Parties should be inscribed in legally binding instrument[s], whilst fully respecting the principles of the Convention.

Finance:The last session on finance in Bonn was dominated by discussions on the Standing Committee.  Negotiations need to also focus on the critical issue of where the money is going to come from.  Urgent attention on scaling up sources of climate finance from 2013 to 2020 is needed.  In addition to expanding direct finance from national treasuries, Parties should commit to raise significant revenue for the Green Climate Fund from innovative sources, implemented in a way that has no net incidence for poor countries.  Progress on a mechanism to levy bunker fuels would be an especially noteworthy achievement here in Panama, which licenses so much of the world’s shipping.

Technology: CAN urges Parties to decide here in Panama on the criteria for the Climate Technology Center host, so that the Center and Network can be operationalized in 2012 as envisioned in the Cancun Agreement.

Adaptation: Parties aren’t far away from a good decision text on the Adaptation Committee.  Here in Panama, they should agree on the composition of the Committee with equitable representation, direct reporting to the COP, and linkages to other institutions, particularly on finance and technology.

Capacity Building: Parties should work with the Facilitator's notes and his new and highly comprehensive background paper to begin drafting text for a Durban decision. This paper should focus on the vital question of how to design effective and comprehensive co-ordination of new, additional and scaled-up capacity-building within the emerging new architectures for finance, technology, adaptation, MRV and mechanisms.

MRV: Parties should build on the MRV architecture agreed in Cancun by moving forward on common accounting rules for emission reduction targets and an enhanced common reporting format on finance. Parties should also adopt guidelines on the content, timing and structure of biennial reports, and agree procedures for strong International Assessment and Review (IAR) for developed countries and International Consultation and Analysis (ICA) for developing countries.  

On all these fronts, Parties need to agree here in Panama what text they will work from – and begin to constructively work on that text.  It’s time for all Parties to show they are serious about the UNFCCC, and serious about their commitment to prevent catastrophic climate change; small steps won’t cut it.

Related Event: 

CAN Intervention - Bonn June Closing LCA Plenary - June17, 2011

My name is Manjeet Dhakal and I am from Nepal.
 
Climate change is already melting glaciers and putting my community at risk.  
The following urgent action is needed to close the ambition gap and keep
warming at a level that my country can adapt to – no more than 1.5 degrees.  
 
Firstly developed countries must move to the top end of their pledged ranges.   
Secondly, at your next meeting, identify a pathway for developed countries to
increase ambition to more than 40% by 2020 and make this target a
milestone in low carbon development strategies. Show us how you will
decarbonise your economies!
 
Developing countries can also contribute to global ambition, by more clearly
identifying assumptions, and beginning a process to agree guidelines for
business as usual baselines.  Developing countries should then articulate
how much their mitigation effort could increase with financial and
technological support. Clearly, further technical work is necessary on the
NAMA registry before Durban, to understand how developing country
mitigation effort will be recorded and supported.
 
If negotiations continue on their current path there is a danger we will create a
Green Climate Fund without any funds!  The current commitments for climate
finance in 2013 are zero.  Parties should provide submissions, and hold
workshops before Durban, on mid and long term sources of funding –
including supplementary innovative sources, such as bunker levies, financial
transaction taxes and special drawing rights.  Including a discussion on
CBDR, no net incidence and compensation.  We do not want to fall off the cliff
of fast start finance, only to see the mountain of long term finance in front of
us.

Related Event: 
Subscribe to Tag: 2013