Tag: 1.5

ECO is sure that negotiators noticed the irony when Australia noted that 104 developing countries have yet to submit NAMAs. If that was a plea for increasing ambition, then ECO couldn’t agree more. But, did it have to come from a country that is committed to a pathetic unconditional target that is nowhere near a pathway consistent with 1.5/2°C? ECO believes there is hope. Australia has also suggested for the gap to be recognized and ambition to be increased.

It remains to be seen if Australia applies this to its own pledge when it comes to finding out who will do what to close the 5-12 gigatonne gap. While that discussion will come soon enough, there are more areas where Australia and other developed countries can focus on for now. In Saturday’s informal group, the co-facilitator smartly suggested that discussions should focus on ideas for a work programme. Alas, the aim of such a work programme is quite easy to define, as the gigatonne gap that results from the lack of ambition to at least avoid the worst impacts of climate change is clearly visible.    

ECO had previously suggested that the first logical step would be to get clarity on developed countries’ net domestic emissions in 2020 resulting from current pledges – this would clarify what Annex I commitments really mean. ECO has noted that, on a related matter, the United States does not want to even discuss common accounting rules, and ECO speculates how that ties up with its continued attempts to dress-up its low pledge as comparable to the EU’s.

The next area to be covered in the work programme would be to once-and-for-all close off the loopholes, such as bogus LULUCF projections, or rules to keep hot air into the system. Thirdly, ECO would like to encourage (as often as needed) developed countries with conditional (upper end) pledges to clarify (i) what part of the conditions has been met so far; and (ii) what is needed to fulfill the remaining conditions. ECO believes everyone would find these talks much easier if such clarification would be made in a way that allows an objective assessment of these conditions, so that countries can indeed move to the upper end of their pledges. Finally climate-friendly readers will agree that a work programme that’s worth the work would result in (i) recognizing the size of the gap; and (ii) agreeing a process to close it.

The bright and shiny moments in yesterday’s workshop on mitigation targets of developed countries were noticeable, albeit sparse, and mostly rhetorical. It seems to ECO, the truth is still inconvenient!

We learned that reducing emissions is good for the economy. Many countries re- affirmed the need to increase the ambition level and were very aware of the gap between current pledges and the cuts needed to stay below 2 degrees of warming, let alone the needed 1.5°C limit. And nearly everyone – except the U.S. – acknowledged the need for common accounting standards to ensure the environmental integrity of this global climate cooperation.

But, to put it simply, knowing a thing and doing a thing isn’t the same thing...

On the difficult questions CAN posed; negotiators did not have such positive answers. For example, what will their true emissions be? Assumptions on forests and other land use accounting, the use of carbon offsets and hot air carry-over are all huge potential loopholes. While there was some conversation on this subject – with the U.S. promising to count both sources and sinks in its land-based accounting approach and challenging other countries’ approaches – there was no definitive account of those true emissions. Russia, Iceland and others didn’t take up the challenge, but you know, there’s those inconvenient ‘national circumstances’ to consider. The offsets question was kicked to the MRV discussion...so stay tuned.

CAN expected that developed countries with current pledges below the 25-40% range would explain how their low pledges are consistent with their fair share of the needed global mitigation efforts. We did not get answers. We just heard a lot about ‘conditions’ that must be met before they will tell us their real target.

CAN expected developed countries whose pledges are below their current Kyoto targets, and/or below business as usual under existing domestic legislation and targets, to explain how those pledges constitute progress. To ECO’s dismay, one candidate for this question, Canada, didn’t even sit for the exam. Another, the EU, wiggled free of the challenge by explaining that member states really want to achieve their long-agreed voluntary energy efficiency targets which is needed to cut their domestic emissions overall by 25%. ECO, along with the Philippines, would like to ask how that makes the EU a climate leader.

ECO also wanted to know how their 2020 pledges will allow them to achieve near-zero emissions by 2050.        Only Norway seemed to come even close to answering, but Germany did present indicative decadal targets for -80% by 2050, while the UK’s trajectory to -80% is enshrined in national law. The UK’s model is overall not a bad model for a low-emission development strategy. There was a potentially encouraging admission by Poland that it was too addicted to coal and was embracing energy efficiency. Now, if only Poland took that realisation to Brussels.

While additional details remain to be tabled, equally important work must begin to enable the leading industrialized countries of the world to ensure the environmental integrity of their emissions targets.