Durban Expectations - Russian Summary
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Mamady Kobele Keita
Climate change team leader
Guinee Ecologie
Guinea
During the June session in Bonn, I have been working on Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) and it’s amazing to see how most of the participants consider this issue. You are likely to hear “Hoo wow, LULUCF?”, “this is not our concern”, “no it’s for Annex 1 countries only”, “I have a limited knowledge on the issue”, “ if you know more about it, please help me to understand”, “it’s definitely too complicated for me”, “ I have no idea about it”. This “staying far from LULUCF” does allow parties to understand the issue and accordingly take responsibility for their parts.
Why is CAN-International paying close attention to LULUCF and why should non-Annex 1 parties be interested in the LULUCF issue? Because under the current provisions of the Kyoto Protocol, Annex 1 parties can hide their emissions from forest management, thus earning more credits while emitting at least 400 Mt of CO2 annually. Just like in other sectors, all emissions should be accounted for and all related consequences addressed.
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is clear on the issue in the following provisions:
Article 3, paragraph 1: “The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.”
Article 4, paragraph (a): …Parties shall (a) Develop, periodically update, publish and make available to the Conference of the Parties, in accordance with Article 12, national inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, using comparable methodologies to be agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties”
Although inviting Annex 1 parties to reduce their overall emissions of greenhouse gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012, the Kyoto protocol limits direct human-induced land-use change and forestry activities to afforestation, reforestation and deforestation, excluding in the same time activities related to forest management.
The LULUCF working group within CAN-International has summarized the issue:
• LULUCF is a set of rules determining how Annex I Parties account for emissions from their land and forests.
• Currently it is mandatory to account for afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation, while it is voluntary to account for forest management, grazing land management, cropland management, and revegetation.
• In the first commitment period, the voluntary nature of accounting is being exploited by Annex I Parties to obtain credits without accounting for debits. In the second commitment period, Annex I Parties are trying to change the rules to avoid accounting for increased emissions. Either way, LULUCF is being used to falsely exaggerate emission reductions.
• Reports and analysis by the European Commission, the Stockholm Institute, the Postdam Institute, UNEP and CAN’s own analysis have all highlighted that LULUCF rules are playing a significant role in undermining Annex 1 mitigation efforts and contributing to the “Gigatonne Gap” between ambition in this process and what the science requires for addressing climate change.
• LULUCF could, however, be a source of real mitigation action.
As you can see, it’s really important for all parties, especially non-Annex 1 parties to fully consider this issue and keep following it. During the last Bonn session, our group wanted parties to consider the introduction of a paragraph on review process in future agreed documents. We really expect for Durban to see LULUCF rules that increase accountability and strengthen the level of ambition of developed countries so that forestry and land use sectors deliver emissions reductions. This will only be possible when non-Annex 1 parties take their responsibility on the issue and act in the way that allows a review in the LULUCF accounting rules. Otherwise, the second commitment period, starting in 2013 and called by these non-Annex 1 parties, will not deliver as expected.
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At the time ECO went to press, we’d heard all sorts of rumors about where the next intersessional might be: Panama, Bangkok, Mars? But despite this week’s lunar eclipse, our thoughts are firmly earthbound. ECO is confident that parties can see the sense in holding another intersessional, including workshops, technical negotiations, and the resumed sessions of the two AWGs. But, dear delegates, please leave behind the tedious haggling-over-the-agenda sessions. An additional meeting must be used productively so that Durban has a better chance of delivering the basis for a fair, ambitious and binding agreement.
First, developed countries must acknowledge there is no alternative to a Kyoto Protocol second commitment period. Period.
We deplore the current stance taken by Japan, Canada and Russia. The hypocrisy is staggering. Japan presided over the COP that produced the KP. Russia’s support for the KP brought the treaty into force. Canada deftly launched the negotiations for a second commitment period (CP2) in Montreal. Where are those climate ambitions now?
The rest of the pack – the EU, Australia, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland – used Bonn to elaborate their conditions for joining a KP CP2. We expect these countries to declare their full support for extending Kyoto’s commitments beyond 2012, and to come to Durban with pledges that top their current commitments. The world shouldn’t accept anything less!
The unvarnished truth, however, is that what is on the table now is not going to deliver a safe climate. Even the US has acknowledged that developed countries need to decarbonise their economies by 2050, based on low-carbon development strategies; as agreed in Cancún. These low carbon development strategies should contain a 2050 decarbonization goal, a plan to get there, and initial reduction targets of more than 40% by 2020, based on common accounting rules and
enhanced national communications and biennial reporting as essential ingredients.
A second piece of the puzzle should be tackled by developing countries.
As AOSIS noted in their workshop presentation, developing countries also have a role to play in closing the gigatonne gap. ECO looks to all developing countries who have not yet submitted pledges to the UNFCCC or have not elaborated their plans further, including Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, DRC, Nigeria, Iran, Venezuela, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, and Thailand. It’s not on their shoulders alone. But they need to make it clear how they can reach their ambitions through a mix of supported and unsupported actions.
The third major element of the Durban package is finance.
Finance negotiators have been hard at work on designing the Green Climate Fund and the Standing Committee. But all too many are missing the big picture: that the best-designed financial institutions in the world will be quite useless without substantial finance to govern. Concrete decisions must be made at COP17 to move us firmly onto a pathway to increase climate finance so as to reach $100bn per year by 2020, as committed by developed countries in Cancún.
Here in Bonn, the US has worked furiously to block much-needed discussions on all sources of finance, from budgetary contributions to supplementary innovative financing options such as bunkers, FTTs and SDRs. Discussion is also needed on common but differentiated responsibility for climate finance, no net incidence and compensation. We’re relieved to see some countries are asking for workshops to pave the way to a appropriately ramped-up 2013-2020 climate finance plan; all developed countries need to come to Durban prepared to put forward their mid-term financing commitments from 2013 onwards.
Finally, Durban must launch negotiations on a complementary legally binding agreement to Kyoto.
This agreement should address the major elements of the Bali Accord: comparable mitigation commitments by the United States, expanded financial commitments by developed countries, and developing country action. Virtually every country says they support a legally binding agreement; in Durban, they must rise above their well-known differences on the exact form of such an agreement and commit to turning those words into action.
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Mamady Kobele Keita
Climate change team leader
Guinee Ecologie
Guinea
As a CAN International Southern Capacity Building Fellow, I am attending the UNFCCC June session in Bonn. Interestingly, if you want to be efficient during the climate change sessions, your best means is the email. I couldn’t imagine how useful can this tool be in negotiations. Let’s be clear.
In CAN-International, communication plays a crucial role during sessions. For this one week period, the number of emails I have received is increasingly high; more than 1000 climate change related emails if I include the emails from all the listserves I am on… For sessions, side events, workshops and informal meetings, Internet has been my best friend. It has really been useful for me for learning on issues, contacting NGOs and parties representatives, reading further development and updates on issues, following last minute changes to meetings, lobbying and campaigning, and most importantly, for building shared strategies with other CAN members.
As my first expectations, this first week really improved my understanding of the climate change negotiation atmosphere and politics, developed my contacts and network of very dedicated and passionate people. And again Communication, which 90% seems to be on email, plays a crucial role in this process.
My second goal is to take the necessary contacts and other technical resources for Guinean and other West African NGOs in order to improve their participation in the UNFCCC process, including the coming Durban COP 17 meeting where CAN has many expectations.
With regards to CAN, I think it’s for me, one of most structured and dedicated organizations I’ve never met in the climate negotiations; I personally have seen the hard work its working groups and bodies are doing behind the process. More importantly, I really appreciate the different positions taken by CAN to screen negotiations and help developing countries understanding their rights. This should be rewarded and supported.
Coming to the SCB program, I think it is a wonderful opportunity for developing countries NGOs to bring their brick to the climate building. I only hope CAN will have sufficient resources to involve more people.
Back home, my first activity will be to transfer this experience to local NGOs and maybe to think about setting up a national CAN network. I will also try to improve my participation in CAN activities by influencing decision makers at local and national levels.
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Following the request by the Conference of the Parties (COP)1 the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), will discuss options to address the implications of the establishment of new HCFC-22 facilities seeking to obtain Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) for the destruction of HFC-23. CAN strongly urges delegates to adopt option 1) Making new HCFC-22 facilities ineligible under the CDM.
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Under international accounting rules significant emissions from bioenergy are not being accounted for, meaning that bioenergy is not fulfilling its potential as a climate mitigation tool and in some cases emits more carbon than fossil fuels. This briefing explores the reasons for this accounting failure and what must be done to resolve this issue.