CAN Position - Views on the CDM Appeals Procedure - Jun 2011
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Tag: South East Asia
Strengthening ASEAN
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Wanun Permpibul
Head, Energy and Climate Change Programme
Renewable Energy Institute of Thailand Foundation
Thailand
The second week in Bonn is over. So many things to share with CANSEA members, comprising colleagues from Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand, particularly on the issues related to ASEAN. For me, it would be progressive to see ASEAN’s common position on legal status of the climate agreement after 2012, mitigation efforts from key ASEAN countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, finance and technology for both mitigation and adaptation actions. Although, members in ASEAN have social and political differences, they do share some of the concerns on climate change.
They are vulnerable to the impacts of climate change especially in the coastal and marine sector, human settlement, water resources, etc. Because of these, they need long-term resources to help with adaptation. On the other hand, their level of emissions is not small and is increasing. They need to show to their people how they are going to reduce their emissions, especially from the energy sector. Different studies indicate a vast potential of renewable and alternative sources of energy that can meet increasing demands of energy while meeting sustainable development in the long run, including solar, wind, geothermal, biomass, biogas and particularly energy efficiency and savings. False solutions, particularly large hydro and nuclear, are not only unsustainable and are not the answer to the climate crisis, but they would also reduce and limit the adaptive capacity of communities and their citizens in maintaining their livelihoods under the changing climate. ASEAN must take climate issues as their priority and integrate it into the development policy and needs to take actions on climate change, both mitigation and adaptation.
What seems to be possible as the starting point is to use the existing platform of ASEAN Climate Change Initiative (ACCI) to engage all members and get them to agree on a common position and a clear agenda for negotiations, based on the common interests and concerns, leaving behind what is considered each national interest that cannot come to a common position. Strengthening ASEAN’s engagement in the climate change negotiation as a strong bloc is necessary. I think in CANSEA we will have to advocate more to influence the ASEAN position on climate change.
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CAN's Durban Expectations Summary - Russian
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CAN Intervention - LCA plenary - 17 June 2011
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Farewell Bonn, Hello… Who Knows?
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At the time ECO went to press, we’d heard all sorts of rumors about where the next intersessional might be: Panama, Bangkok, Mars? But despite this week’s lunar eclipse, our thoughts are firmly earthbound. ECO is confident that parties can see the sense in holding another intersessional, including workshops, technical negotiations, and the resumed sessions of the two AWGs. But, dear delegates, please leave behind the tedious haggling-over-the-agenda sessions. An additional meeting must be used productively so that Durban has a better chance of delivering the basis for a fair, ambitious and binding agreement.
First, developed countries must acknowledge there is no alternative to a Kyoto Protocol second commitment period. Period.
We deplore the current stance taken by Japan, Canada and Russia. The hypocrisy is staggering. Japan presided over the COP that produced the KP. Russia’s support for the KP brought the treaty into force. Canada deftly launched the negotiations for a second commitment period (CP2) in Montreal. Where are those climate ambitions now?
The rest of the pack – the EU, Australia, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland – used Bonn to elaborate their conditions for joining a KP CP2. We expect these countries to declare their full support for extending Kyoto’s commitments beyond 2012, and to come to Durban with pledges that top their current commitments. The world shouldn’t accept anything less!
The unvarnished truth, however, is that what is on the table now is not going to deliver a safe climate. Even the US has acknowledged that developed countries need to decarbonise their economies by 2050, based on low-carbon development strategies; as agreed in Cancún. These low carbon development strategies should contain a 2050 decarbonization goal, a plan to get there, and initial reduction targets of more than 40% by 2020, based on common accounting rules and
enhanced national communications and biennial reporting as essential ingredients.
A second piece of the puzzle should be tackled by developing countries.
As AOSIS noted in their workshop presentation, developing countries also have a role to play in closing the gigatonne gap. ECO looks to all developing countries who have not yet submitted pledges to the UNFCCC or have not elaborated their plans further, including Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, DRC, Nigeria, Iran, Venezuela, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, and Thailand. It’s not on their shoulders alone. But they need to make it clear how they can reach their ambitions through a mix of supported and unsupported actions.
The third major element of the Durban package is finance.
Finance negotiators have been hard at work on designing the Green Climate Fund and the Standing Committee. But all too many are missing the big picture: that the best-designed financial institutions in the world will be quite useless without substantial finance to govern. Concrete decisions must be made at COP17 to move us firmly onto a pathway to increase climate finance so as to reach $100bn per year by 2020, as committed by developed countries in Cancún.
Here in Bonn, the US has worked furiously to block much-needed discussions on all sources of finance, from budgetary contributions to supplementary innovative financing options such as bunkers, FTTs and SDRs. Discussion is also needed on common but differentiated responsibility for climate finance, no net incidence and compensation. We’re relieved to see some countries are asking for workshops to pave the way to a appropriately ramped-up 2013-2020 climate finance plan; all developed countries need to come to Durban prepared to put forward their mid-term financing commitments from 2013 onwards.
Finally, Durban must launch negotiations on a complementary legally binding agreement to Kyoto.
This agreement should address the major elements of the Bali Accord: comparable mitigation commitments by the United States, expanded financial commitments by developed countries, and developing country action. Virtually every country says they support a legally binding agreement; in Durban, they must rise above their well-known differences on the exact form of such an agreement and commit to turning those words into action.
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CAN position - HFC-23 abatement projects - Jun 2011
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Following the request by the Conference of the Parties (COP)1 the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), will discuss options to address the implications of the establishment of new HCFC-22 facilities seeking to obtain Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) for the destruction of HFC-23. CAN strongly urges delegates to adopt option 1) Making new HCFC-22 facilities ineligible under the CDM.
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Changing how the system works
Submitted by MBrockley on
Wanun Permpibul
Head, Energy and Climate Change Programme
Renewable Energy Institute of Thailand Foundation
Thailand
I have been doing research with the Sustainability Watch Thailand, a local think tank focusing on the promotion of alternative and renewable sources of energy, and enhancement of action research on community based vulnerability assessment and adaptation aiming at influencing climate policy in Thailand.
Power and transport are the two largest sectors contributing to increasing GHGs in Thailand. High potential sources of alternative and renewable energy are available but they need clear policy framework and supports to utilise these resources effectively. In these areas we have been working through the Power Development Plan, which is the plan directing power generation for Thailand. Together with other civil society organisations, we have prepared the alternative plan where renewable sources of energy as well as energy efficiency and savings are the focus, which also reflect the potentials for Thailand’s mitigation measure on this sector. Additionally, the role and performance in ensuring good governance and promoting renewable sources of energy in the power sector is also investigated and recommendations will be proposed to the government.
With regards to climate impacts, vulnerability and adaptation, we have attempted to combine scientific modeling and forecasts with local observations in order to engage people’s participation in addressing impacts, assessing vulnerability and sectors of vulnerability, and identifying areas where adaptive capacity needs to be strengthened or provided that could lead to long term adaptation. We have applied the livelihood vulnerability index and participatory techniques with communities. Through this, we hope to integrate climate change and adaptation into the local plan and subsequently national policy.
Participating in the climate negotiations would enable and broaden my understanding on the link of climate, both mitigation and adaptation, and sustainable development issues. I do appreciate the South Capacity Building programme of CAN International, enabling me to understand better on the negotiation process, overall picture of climate politics and deepened my knowledge on the adaptation. This would strengthen my capacity to better communicate with the Thai government to get a clear national position towards climate negotiations. Furthermore, the SCB programme has enabled me to better understand how NGOs as a network work effectively and in a powerful manner to influence climate politics, which I could apply to the network in the country.
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LULUCF Briefing - Bioenergy
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Under international accounting rules significant emissions from bioenergy are not being accounted for, meaning that bioenergy is not fulfilling its potential as a climate mitigation tool and in some cases emits more carbon than fossil fuels. This briefing explores the reasons for this accounting failure and what must be done to resolve this issue.
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CAN Talking Points - Mitigation - June 2011
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Overview
A. Clarify assumptions behind pledges:Developed countries must clarify their assumptions on domestic efforts and the use of carbon offsets, LULUCF accounting and AAU carry-over. Developing countries should provide information on key factors underlying BAU projections, e.g. energy use or economic development. They should also clarify what emissions savings they plan to achieve independently and what additional savings could be achieved with support.
B. Close loopholes and agree common rules:Parties should seek to minimise or close off loopholes, such as bogus LULUCF accounting rules, AAU carry-over or new hot air from weak 2020 pledges in certain developed countries. This must lead to agreement on improved common accountingand reporting rules showing the true emissions of each country.
C. Clarify conditions and move to the high end of pledges:By Durban at the latest, developed countries must move to the high end of their pledged ranges. Developed countries with conditional (upper end of) pledges must clarify these conditions, identify which conditions been met and indicate what is needed to meet the remaining conditions.
- Increase overall effort to get the world on a 1.5°C/2°C pathway:By Durban at the latest, Parties must begin negotiations to increase overall ambition, beyond the high end of current pledges[1]. This must lead to developed countries moving towards more than 40% reductions by 2020, but also developing countries increasing their overall effort, supported through international climate finance.
- Make progress on Low Emission Development Strategies:Between now and Durban, Parties should, through additional workshops, develop common templates and guidelines and review procedures for the Low Emission Development Strategies.
[1]Even in the best of all cases (countries implementing the high end of their pledges using strict accounting rules) global emissions are likely to be between 5 (UNEP) and 10 (Climate Action Tracker) GtCO2eq above what they should be for a 1.5°C/2°C emissions pathway.
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CAN Talking Points - MRV - Bonn June 2011
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Bonn is a key moment to make progress on MRV issues. While there are a great many political issues at play, work on some technical issues needs to begin now.
Parties should agree on the structure, timing, and content of the workshops that are needed to discuss new or enhanced elements of MRV in the coming months. These workshops should be informed by existing submissions of Parties and observers, and should involve calling for further submissions.
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