Tag: Europe

Developed country leadership on moving to a zero carbon economy is in short supply. The positions adopted by many Annex I parties give the impression that they are dragging their heels rather than picking up their pace and embracing a greener future.
So the call by the UK’s powerful Committee on Climate Change for the UK to cut its emissions by 60% by 2030 on 1990 levels – and with the use of offsets “only at the margin” – is indeed a ray of sunshine.
The Committee is a statutory body under the UK’s groundbreaking Climate Change Act to advise on targets and monitor progress towards them. The Act sets a legally binding target to cut emissions by at least 80% by 2050, spanned by binding five-year carbon budgets.
A reduction of 60% by 2030 (and at least 50% by 2025), the Committee says, is achievable and affordable, with costs to the UK economy of less than 1% of GDP. In fact, the UK stands to benefit from a major drive on energy efficiency and developing new green industries based firmly on renewable energy sources.
There are also some strong pointers on EU ambition for 2020 and beyond. The Committee wants the EU to move to its long-promised 30% target as soon as possible. But in the meantime, the UK should move ahead unilaterally, at least for those sectors not covered by the EU emissions trading scheme.
The EU is also considering targets for 2030 as part of a ‘road map’ exercise due to report in the spring of 2011. The Committee also sets the bar here, calling for the EU to set a goal of around 55% below 1990 levels by 2030.
Here in Cancun, Parties are considering text which would require developed countries to implement Zero Carbon Action Plans – clear long-term frameworks to guide the transition to a green economy and avoid lock-in to high-carbon infrastructure.
Another key benefit will be to build trust that at least some Annex I Parties are taking concrete steps to deliver on their short and long-term targets. On this showing, the UK Climate Change Act is proving to be a pretty good model to follow.
Of course, the UK government now needs to act on the Committee’s advice. When he came to power in May, Prime Minister David Cameron pledged that his government will be the ‘greenest ever’.
What better way to prove it than by deciding a strong, early acceptance of the Committee’s recommendations? After all, in the runup to the election he committed to implementing them.  
With new, strong policies to meet these targets, the UK would fully embark on the path to a green economy and reduce reliance on fossil fuel imports. This will also give a clear and powerful signal to other developed nations that a zero carbon economy is nothing to be afraid of, and every bit an enormous 
opportunity for the future.
 

Over in snowy Brussels, the European Commission has set an agenda for 2011 in which the year 2050 looms large.  During the course of next year the Commission plans to publish a Roadmap towards a low carbon economy for the EU by 2050, including milestones for the structural and technological changes needed by 2030.  This feeds into a vision of an overall ‘resource-efficient’ economy, and will be followed by another Roadmap of 
possible development paths for the EU energy system to 2050.
An early prelude to this work is the European Climate Foundation’s Roadmap 2050 report which was presented in a side event yesterday.  This major project, conducted and backed by numerous experts and stakeholders, analyses four scenarios for achieving at least an 80% decarbonisation of the EU economy by 2050.  It puts a strong focus on energy efficiency and demand reduction, and priority is given to decarbonisation of the power sector, electrification of transport and heat and an integrated European approach to grid interconnection.  
The four scenarios cover renewable energy levels ranging from 40% to 100%, with the remainder addressed by nuclear and CCS (you can guess which scenario ECO prefers).  All four scenarios are found to be technologically feasible, secure, affordable, and even cheaper than business as usual, assuming a modest carbon price.  
But the most important finding is that none of the scenarios will be realised automatically.  A great deal of policy intervention will be needed in accordance with a structured, long-term plan.  If we rely solely on the price of carbon, market mechanisms and near-term emissions targets, the risk of lock-in to a high intensity carbon system is high.  At the same time, the upfront investment costs for major new grid, power generation and demand management infrastructure are substantial and planning ahead is a necessity.
What the EU needs – and indeed every country – is a Low or Zero Carbon Action Plan (alternatively known as a Low Emission Development Strategy or a Low Carbon and Climate Resilient Development Strategy).  
The UK’s Climate Change Act, with its legally binding national targets for 2020 and 2050, has precipitated just such a conclusion from the Independent Committee on Climate Change.  By looking out to 2050, the Committee came to the sharp realisation that the country’s power sector needs to be decarbonised by 2030.  Clearly the only way this can happen is by means of major policy intervention over and above what the carbon market will deliver, starting now.  
There is hope that focusing on 2050 will deliver an EU-wide strategy, complete with milestones and measures.  And there should be immediate recognition that a target of 20% emission reductions by 2020 is far from the least cost pathway.  
It is time to accept the necessity of long-term strategies to bring us safely to 2050.  That needs to be firmly embodied in an international agreement.  Not only would zero carbon plans for developed countries avoid nasty surprises down the line, they will provide tangible benefits in terms of innovation, job creation and quality of life.  And they would greatly improve MRV and trust in developed country actions matching intentions – something currently very hard to find.

The future of Annex I forests and their role in climate change mitigation is about to be decided here in Cancun.
ECO has long highlighted how inappropriate and possibly fraudulent LULUCF accounting rules could be used by Annex I Parties to avoid accounting for their forestry emissions. This week a group of NGOs assessed the scale of these impacts, in particular, the magnitude of proposed forest management baselines relative to the ambition of Parties’ pledges. Astonishingly, the emission reduction efforts of some Parties could be reduced by up to 66% as a consequence of unaccounted emissions from logging their forests.
There is still more than one proposal on the table, and it is clear that the impact of forest management accounting on countries’ pledges will differ depending on the approach agreed upon.
A review process was proposed by developing countries earlier this year to evaluate the robustness of favoured baseline proposals by Annex I countries. The new KP Chair’s text calls on Parties to provide the required information by February 2011 and for expert reviewers to conclude their review by May.
But let’s be clear.  The impact of the proposed reference levels is unacceptable and a review won’t fix that. However, broadening the review to include an objective analysis of all accounting options could help Parties make an informed decision about which approach should be used in the second commitment period. To do this, Parties would need to provide information about each of the potential options on the table and how it will impact their pledges.
This analysis is urgently required for a meaningful discussion on numbers. That will achieve two crucial things: the discussion of ‘numbers’ will go forward with consideration of all potential options, and decisions will be made based on the likely real impacts on the climate.

Notes: Figures are percentages of country-specific base years.  Pledged emission reductions for 2020 (rel 1990) from FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/INF.2/Rev.1.  Unaccounted logging emissions equals the difference between Party’s proposed reference levels and average of historical net emissions.  The estimate of average historical net emissions from Annex I forest management calculated using data from 1990-2008 (forest land remaining forest land) from Parties’ 2010 
inventory submissions.  Any adjustments were made on consultation with Parties and technical experts.  Japan has not yet indicated whether its pledges include accounting for forest management.

Cancun should deliver a substantial package of decisions that provides a clear framework for climate action. Such a package will move forward toward a legally binding agreement and put positive pressure on countries to go beyond their current quite inadequate pledg­es and commitments. The Cancun package must progress both the KP and LCA tracks and secure agreements on all building blocks, namely mitigation/MRV, finance, adaptation, REDD, technology, the legal form, the sci­ence review, and a road map for South Africa and beyond.

This means all countries must do their fair share to secure success in Cancun. And so ECO would like to take the liberty of identi­fying some opening moves that key countries should make so that Cancun starts on a con­structive note, open negotiating space for the coming two weeks, and deliver outcomes that will set us on the pathway towards the ambi­tious, global treaty we need.

ECO supports the United States objective of increasing the transparency of mitigation actions by developing countries, but it must be part of a broader framework that includes greater transparency of developed country actions on both mitigation and finance. And so instead of pressurizing others, the US should announce its willingness to increase the transparency of its own actions. The draft decision text being circulated by the EU call­ing for more detailed information in Annex 1 national communications would be a very good way to start. Making it clear that sup­porting enhanced transparency for everybody includes the US itself will make adoption of a balanced package of decisions here in Can­cun much more likely. Just say yes!

ECO expects the European Union to speak out much more clearly in favour of a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, so that a constructive dialogue between de­veloped and developing countries leading to a legally binding agreement from both tracks can be achieved. To provide further support for the Kyoto Protocol the EU should also help close the loopholes in its own position on AAU surplus and LULUCF. Those helpful moves on the Kyoto track can be bolstered by the EU championing the establishment of the UNFCCC climate fund.

China should take a more progressive role in the international negotiations instead of just continually reacting to provocations from others. That way, China can building strongly on its domestic momentum for low carbon and clean energy development. For Cancun, this means China should now put forth its own views on the form international consultation and analysis should take, as well as challenge the US to clearly commit itself to proper MRV, along with other developed countries.

Japan must show more flexibility about the second commitment period of the Kyo­to Protocol. Upfront rejection will create an unconstructive atmosphere for the entire negotiations. Kyoto was the product of hard negotiations, not only for the specific targets, but also for a top-down approach so that ag­gregate emission reductions are driven by the science. ECO hopes that Japan still remem­bers the sleepless nights in Kyoto and knows that while the Protocol is not perfect, there is still a lot to be proud of. More openness on Kyoto will signal that it acknowledges that the Kyoto architecture is important to a vast majority of Parties and opens the way forward for securing a stronger global architecture.

India should help broker a solution to the dilemma of international consultation and analysis by tabling its own ICA proposal, un­equivocally stating that it will work towards creating a rule-based system of multilateral governance within the UNFCCC and ensur­ing transparency and accountability. Another constructive move will be to support efforts to identify substantial and innovative sources of public finance for the new global climate fund.

Brazil could come forward as a champion for the creation of a fair climate fund in Can­cun, supported through innovative sources of public funding, which fully funds not only mitigation but equally so adaptation. Brazil also should come forward as a leading coun­try fighting for responsible and transparent LULUCF accounting rules to help reduce and close the Gigatonne Gap.

It’s time for Mexico to play a more crea­tive role in its welcome efforts toward trust-building in the COP 16 presidency. Mexico is well positioned to spur Parties to tackle the issues that could otherwise drive the negotia­tions into deadlock: legal form, the road map on crunch issues post-Cancun, the Gigatonne Gap, the science review and more.

Russia has an AAU surplus of 6 billion tonnes of CO2 that is creating grave uncer­tainty for the negotiations, carbon markets and the environmental integrity of the Kyoto Protocol. It’s time for clear statements from Russia that it will not sell its AAU surplus from the 1st commitment period. That kind of good political will can go a long way to ensuring progress can be made in Cancun on dealing with AAU surplus, and give a big boost to closing the Gigatonne Gap.

ECO hopes this list of substantial but manageable first moves will help clarify the middle game on the Cancun chess­board and lead to a solution that makes everyone a winner.