Doha Milestones and Action: Chinese Summary. October 2012
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Download the file - which contains full details on:
Practical ideas and suggestions on how the ADP can advance its work, both towards delivering an effective post-2020 agreement and bridging the ambition gap in the pre-2020 period
How best to advance the work of the ADP in Doha and beyond
Topics or questions that could be used to focus substantive discussions in Doha or in future sessions, building upon the roundtable discussions in Bangkok
Equity questions:
Practical Ideas and Suggestions on how the ADP can advance its work on bridging the ambition gap in the pre-2020 period
At Doha an ADP workplan to increase short term ambition must be agreed:
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Background:
International aviation and maritime transport are major and fast‐growing sources of greenhouse gas emissions, while being under‐taxed from an environmental perspective. Yet there is high potential to reduce those emissions globally, beyond the energy efficiency measures developed and considered under the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Carbon pricing would be an effective means of addressing this situation and can be applied fairly and equitably. In addition, it could raise considerable funds to support climate action in developing countries, and in the maritime and aviation sectors.
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Kyoto Protocol rules allow countries to carry over any unused (ie. surplus) Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) into the next commitment period. A number of countries, such as Russia, Ukraine and Poland, have very large surpluses of AAUs. By the end of 2012, up to 13 billion AAUs, could be carried over into the Kyoto Protocols second commitment period. This is almost three times the annual emissions of the European Union or more than twice those of the United States.
This surplus threatens the viability and effectiveness of international climate policy regimes. If no restrictions are placed on the surplus of Kyoto units, weak pledges together with the surplus will allow countries to have emissions that are as high as business-as-usual emissions are projected to be in 2020. This holds true even if the largest surplus, that of Russia, is excluded. Allowing the full AAU surplus to be carried over could eliminate the chances of avoiding dangerous climate change by overshooting the +2˚C limit agreed by all Parties to the UNFCCC in Copenhagen in 2009.
The issue has to be addressed by the end of 2012 when the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol ends, otherwise the existing rule that allows full carry-over will be applied by default.
By COP18 in Qatar a solution must be found to make a second commitment period under the Kyoto protocol viable and to avoid stifling progress on a new global climate deal called for by the Durban Platform. The Climate Action Network International (CAN-I) urges the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to fully address the issue of surplus AAUs and makes the following recommendations:
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The Climate Action Network makes this submission in response to the Subsidiary Body for Implementation’s invitation to submit “views on ways to enhance the engagement of observer organizations.”
Respectful, relevant and effective participation by observers plays a critical role in climate negotiations. The SBI has recently “affirmed the value of the engagement of observer organizations … and acknowledged the important role of civil society representation in the intergovernmental process.”ii As the Secretariat has explained, vibrant public participation...
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Executive Summary
Climate Action Network International (CAN) concurs with the apparent consensus at the third Technology Executive Committee (TEC) meeting (held on the 28th and 29th of May in Bonn) that intellectual property rights (IPR) is an issue in the transfer of climate technologies that could be an incentive, a barrier, neither or both. Furthermore, the determination of which role it plays can only be made at the national/sectoral level on a case-by-case basis. There are cases where IPR has been and can be a barrier and some parties are concerned that it will be a barrier to the transfer of key climate technologies to help mitigate their emissions and enhance their adaptive capacities. On the other hand, technology developers are concerned with the intellectual property enforcement risk in developing economies and potential negative impacts on innovation. In the absence of some guidance on key issues related to IPR from the Technology Mechanism (TM), countries and providers would be left to deal with each IPR issue that arises from scratch, stalling and even derailing much-needed technology deployment.
But the UNFCCC can play a critical role here to ensure that countries have the tools they need to find resolution in a case where IPR issues threaten to pose a barrier to the transfer of a key climate technology while ensuring that appropriate incentives for technology innovation are maintained. By providing appropriate guidelines on the use of existing tools and a platform to facilitate various forms of information sharing on IPR solutions among other initiatives, the UNFCCC has the opportunity to proactively prevent IPR from becoming a widespread barrier while building confidence in the TM among both demanders and suppliers of climate technologies.
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In Qatar, developed countries need to put forward a climate finance package that includes: