Tag: CAN Positions

Doha Milestones and Action: Chinese Summary. October 2012

 

地球正在警告我们危险的气候变化会是什么样子——从 东非、美国和墨西哥史无前例的干旱,到巴西和中国的 灾难性的洪水,以及欧洲和其它地方的热浪。世界性的 粮食危机的阴影正在浮现。而那些缺乏减排雄心并引导 这个世界走向升温3.5到6度和失控的气候灾难的国家,还在漠视这些警示。

 

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CAN Submission - How to advance the work of the ADP in Doha and Beyond. 29 October 2012

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Practical ideas and suggestions on how the ADP can advance its work, both towards delivering an effective post-2020 agreement and bridging the ambition gap in the pre-2020 period

  • Produce a balanced package from every COP
  • Support ministerial round table
  • Ensure adequate negotiating time
  • Ensure that the ADP co-chairs and facilitators obtain clear mandates to begin work on text 
  • Embrace multi-stakeholder process

How best to advance the work of the ADP in Doha and beyond

  • Set milestones and detailed workplans for both ADP workstreams
  • Take work from other negotiating tracks into account
  • Ensure Civil Society Access to ADP
  • Involve ministerial level negotiators early in the process
  • Incorporate equity into Workstream 1 

Topics or questions that could be used to focus substantive discussions in Doha or in future sessions, building upon the roundtable discussions in Bangkok

  1. How to increase the pledged levels of ambition for Parties, including through enhanced support, to be in compliance with the ultimate objective of the Convention and the agreed 2ºC temperature increase limit
  2. How can we ensure that sufficient, predictable and public finance and other support is provided to meet urgent pre-2020 adaptation needs?
  3. How to ensure that predictable levels of financial, technological and capacity building support are made available to developing countries to implement the NAMAs they have already identified, and further support any additional NAMAs in the short term?

Equity questions:

  1. How should equity principles be applied in the new agreement?
  2. What indicators best specify those principles?
  3. How can we best ensure each Party is doing is its fair share of the global effort without compromising its sustainable development needs?
  4. How will we provide developing countries with the means to implement their commitments and how will we cooperatively ensure that the global emissions reach a rapid and sustainable peak, one consistent with an agreed temperature goal and cumulative emission reduction pathways that would allow the world to stay within that goal?

Practical Ideas and Suggestions on how the ADP can advance its work on bridging the ambition gap in the pre-2020 period

 

At Doha an ADP workplan to increase short term ambition must be agreed:

  • Informed by a technical paper assessing the gap in ambition and ways to close it and by the progress of the Review; increasing developed country economy wide targets  to close the gap between existing ambition and that needed to keep warming below 1.5oC; ensuring that any new market mechanisms add to overall ambition with stringent rules;  facilitating developing countries to reduce their emissions by rapidly scaling-up public climate finance, focusing on economy-wide or sector-wide actions that would rapidly and significantly lower emission trajectories and supporting initiatives that reduce costs and eliminate barriers and perceived risk, so that low and zero carbon technologies and approaches can quickly become competitive;  
  • To enable developing countries to increase their mitigation and adequately deal with adaptation public finance from 2013-15 must be at least double the amount of the Fast Start Finance, and there should be a process to reassess the adequacy of financial pledges in terms of overall scale required, thematic balance and geographical distribution starting in 2013.  A 2 year Doha Capacity Action Plan should be initiated.

 

Submission by the Climate Action Network (CAN) on cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions: emissions from international aviation and maritime transport

Background:

International aviation and maritime transport are major and fast‐growing sources of greenhouse gas emissions, while being under‐taxed from an environmental perspective.  Yet there is high potential to reduce those emissions globally, beyond the energy efficiency measures developed and considered under the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO).  Carbon pricing would be an effective means of addressing this situation and can be applied fairly and equitably. In addition, it could raise considerable funds to support climate action in developing countries, and in the maritime and aviation sectors.

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Briefing Paper for Developing Country NAMA workshop

 

Although this paper concerns developing country NAMAs, CAN stresses, at the outset, the need for developed 
countries to do much more in terms of mitigation and support obligations.
 
CAN recognizes that developing countries are already taking actions as evidenced by the inputs in previous 
workshops.  How these actions can be enhanced through international support needs to be addressed.  At the sametime, we need to look at ways in which we can address global environmental integrity through internationalizing these efforts and setting common rules for establishing baselines, dealing with underlying assumptions, and accountability, amongst others.
 
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CAN Position on the Carry Over of Surplus Kyoto Units - August 2012

Kyoto Protocol rules allow countries to carry over any unused (ie. surplus) Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) into the next commitment period. A number of countries, such as Russia, Ukraine and Poland, have very large surpluses of AAUs. By the end of 2012, up to 13 billion AAUs, could be carried over into the Kyoto Protocols second commitment period. This is almost three times the annual emissions of the European Union or more than twice those of the United States.

This surplus threatens the viability and effectiveness of international climate policy regimes. If no restrictions are placed on the surplus of Kyoto units, weak pledges together with the surplus will allow countries to have emissions that are as high as business-as-usual emissions are projected to be in 2020. This holds true even if the largest surplus, that of Russia, is excluded.  Allowing the full AAU surplus to be carried over could eliminate the chances of avoiding dangerous climate change by overshooting the +2˚C limit agreed by all Parties to the UNFCCC in Copenhagen in 2009.

The issue has to be addressed by the end of 2012 when the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol ends, otherwise the existing rule that allows full carry-over will be applied by default.

By COP18 in Qatar a solution must be found to make a second commitment period under the Kyoto protocol viable and to avoid stifling progress on a new global climate deal called for by the Durban Platform. The Climate Action Network International (CAN-I) urges the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to fully address the issue of surplus AAUs and makes the following recommendations:

  • Almost all of the surplus must be eliminated, including surplus emissions credits from the CDM and JI e.g. solutions based on the proposals made by AOSIS and the African Group. Both proposals would eliminate approximately 95% of the Kyoto unit surplus.
  • The surplus must be eliminated permanently. Option that would not restrict the carry-over but limit the use of any carried-over surplus are insufficient because they do not resolve the question of what would happen to the surplus after the end of the second commitment period. The surplus could continue to exist decades from now.
  • To be eligible to use any surplus AAUs, CERs and/or ERUs at all, a Party must have a reduction target for the second commitment period that is lower than its 2008 emissions.
  • A new “hot air” AAU surplus must be avoided at all costs in the next commitment period. The current limited emission reduction targets of Russia, Ukraine and the EU risk generating a further AAU surplus within the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, on top of the existing surplus AAUs from the first commitment period. Any 2020 reduction target for any Annex I country must be substantively lower than current baseline emission estimates.
  • Annex I countries must significantly raise second commitment period emissions reduction targets and participation in the Kyoto Protocol. Higher targets would work most effectively if combined with a stringent limit on the use of the surplus. According to UNEP a combination of stronger reduction targets with stricter Kyoto rules (such as the reduction of the surplus) is needed to keep the global average temperature increase below +2˚C.
  • CAN-I calls on the G-77 to develop a joint proposal based on the proposals made by AOSIS and the African Group.
  • CAN-I calls on the EU to find an intra-European solution so it is able to take a clear position at the UNFCCC negotiations. If the EU wants to maintain its constructive and proactive role in the climate mitigation arena it needs to follow up with clear and strong positions on elements that could threaten the environmental integrity of a future global climate regime.
  • If the EU and the G77 put their diplomatic weight behind a joint position, it would greatly increase the chances of addressing the AAU surplus to strengthen the environmental integrity of a second commitment period and a new climate treaty to be agreed by 2015. 

 

 

Submission to SBI: For Implementation Concerning Views On Ways To Enhance TheEngagement Of Observer Organizations

The Climate Action Network makes this submission in response to the Subsidiary Body for Implementation’s invitation to submit “views on ways to enhance the engagement of observer organizations.”

Respectful, relevant and effective participation by observers plays a critical role in climate negotiations.  The SBI has recently “affirmed the value of the engagement of observer organizations … and acknowledged the important role of civil society representation in the intergovernmental process.”ii  As the Secretariat has explained, vibrant public participation...

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Tackling the Intellectual Property Elements of an Enabling Environment for Technology Transfer

 

 

 

 

 

 

Executive Summary

Climate Action Network International (CAN) concurs with the apparent consensus at the third Technology Executive Committee (TEC) meeting (held on the 28th and 29th of May in Bonn) that intellectual property rights (IPR) is an issue in the transfer of climate technologies that could be an incentive, a barrier, neither or both. Furthermore, the determination of which role it plays can only be made at the national/sectoral level on a case-by-case basis. There are cases where IPR has been and can be a barrier and some parties are concerned that it will be a barrier to the transfer of key climate technologies to help mitigate their emissions and enhance their adaptive capacities. On the other hand, technology developers are concerned with the intellectual property enforcement risk in developing economies and potential negative impacts on innovation. In the absence of some guidance on key issues related to IPR from the Technology Mechanism (TM), countries and providers would be left to deal with each IPR issue that arises from scratch, stalling and even derailing much-needed technology deployment. 

But the UNFCCC can play a critical role here to ensure that countries have the tools they need to find resolution in a case where IPR issues threaten to pose a barrier to the transfer of a key climate technology while ensuring that appropriate incentives for technology innovation are maintained.  By providing appropriate guidelines on the use of existing tools and a platform to facilitate various forms of information sharing on IPR solutions among other initiatives, the UNFCCC has the opportunity to proactively prevent IPR from becoming a widespread barrier while building confidence in the TM among both demanders and suppliers of climate technologies.  

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Fill the Fund in Qatar: $10-15 billion for the Green Climate Fund

 

In Qatar, developed countries need to put forward a climate finance package that includes:  

  • Commitments to total climate finance  (bilateral and multilateral, inside and outside the GCF) in 2013-2015 that are substantially above the levels of the Fast Start Finance period (2010-12); 
  • A pledge of at least $10-15 billion in new and additional public finance to be disbursed to the GCF over the years 2013-2015, with 50 percent of these initial resources for adaptation through direct access where possible and preferred  
  • A clear roadmap for scaling-up climate finance to meet  the $100 billion per year commitment by 2020; 
  • Decisions that advance the most promising alternative sources of public finance as part of this roadmap;
  • Decisions allowing the full operationalization of the Green Climate Fund.  

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