Blog Posts

Build on Kyoto’s Strengths

The Kyoto Protocol is the first small step in industrialised countries taking the lead to fight climate change. While there have been some growing pains along the way and there is definitely room for improvement in some areas, the Kyoto Protocol forms a strong basis upon which to expand industrialised country commitments. ECO would like to take a moment to remind Parties what is good and what needs to be improved in Kyoto.

At its core, Kyoto is an internationally binding multilateral framework that requires that all play by the same rules: from how they account for their own emissions, which credits they can use towards their targets and what the consequences of non-compliance are. This cannot change. To ensure a level playing field, we must continue to compare apples with apples and not let Parties pick and choose their own rules domestically.

In other words, the legal nature of the obligation (quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives (QELROs)); the base year (1990); the gases and their global warming potentials (GWP); the sectors; the land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) rules; and the accounting (assigned amount units (AAUs)) or the concept by another name; and reporting, review and compliance must be the same for all industrialised country Parties. They must not be subject to any loopholes that their domestic laws may provide. When industrialised countries’ Parties finally step up to the plate and recognise their financial obligations to support action in developing countries, the financial reporting rules will also need to be the same.

There are many areas in which the Kyoto Protocol could be improved.  This is not surprising as Kyoto was a first foray into uncharted waters.  However improving is different from fundamentally changing the architecture. The most obvious section of Kyoto that needs to be improved in the next commitment period, but one that seems to be lost on most industrialised countries is the targets inscribed in Annex B and the aggregate in Article 3.1. ECO expects Parties to reach an agreement on a -40% below 1990 aggregate target for 2020 here in Bangkok as conclusion on this agenda item is well overdue. ECO also hopes to see development of the review and compliance regime of Kyoto.

Finally, let us not forget all of the good work the expert review teams have been doing behind the scenes to help Parties improve the quality of their inventories and national registries and systems, and resolve disputes related to data submissions. The international review process keeps Parties “on their toes” as they never know which issues might be raised. The power of expert review teams to adjust emissions data serves as a further incentive for Parties to produce high quality emissions data.

As the review of initial reports demonstrates, these adjustments are not insignificant amounts. A total of 124 potential problems were identified; 117 of these issues were resolved through a dialogue between the reviewers and the Party. This demonstrates the cooperative and problem-solving nature of the review process. The remaining problems related to two Parties where adjustments were made. While the work of the ERTs is largely facilitative, it does help to have “the stick” of referral to the Compliance Committee to ensure access to data and the full cooperation of Parties.   Adopting a peer review mechanism with no referral function or dispute resolution procedure would lose these crucial elements and undercut the effectiveness of the regime.

ECO finds it rather ironic that some Parties are now using Canada’s recalcitrance as an example for why Kyoto Protocol compliance has not worked. All this goes to show is that automatic early-warning triggers are required to bring Parties before the Committee (and not that the Committee itself does not work). ECO would be more than happy to refer recalcitrant Parties to the Compliance Committee, if Parties would only give us such an opportunity.

With only 10 negotiating days left until Copenhagen, let us focus on sewing up a deal that builds on Kyoto’s strengths rather than unravelling this multilateral structure in favour of domestic flexibilities.

[Article published in Climate Action Network's Eco Newspaper, Oct. 5, 2009 from Bangkok, Thailand UNFCCC negotiations - full PDF version here]

All Aboard?

The industrialised countries are pushing forward a model for a Copenhagen agreement based firmly around carbon markets coupled with weak targets. By and large, developing countries are not boarding any train headed to weak targets. Ever stopped to wonder why?

Industrialised countries talk about carbon markets and offset mechanisms in particular as if they are doing developing countries a favour, by providing financial flows from North to South. In fact, at least under the Clean Development Mechanism, it is more accurate to say that developing countries are the ones doing the favour – by giving Annex I countries a way of meeting their targets on the cheap.

The carbon markets question is emerging as one of the key fault lines in the negotiations. It cuts across discussions on Annex I targets, finance and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions. Until the discussion is reframed, it will be hard to make the progress we urgently need to see.

Part of the problem is that Annex I negotiators may be too busy to read the analysis by their own technical experts. Take the European Commission’s recent Communication on climate finance. Put aside for the moment the fact that the Commission’s model would give high probability of exceeding 2oC warming. The Commission says that developing countries will need around Euros 100 billion per year by 2020 for adaptation and mitigation. Carbon markets would provide around 40% of this total – and public finance from international sources would be some Euros 22-50 billion per year.

However, the Commission’s headline figures are based on an assumption that cumulative Annex I targets are 31% below 1990 levels by 2020. Has anyone seen that sort of ambition actually on the table here in Bangkok?

The EU has been less keen to draw attention to perhaps the most important line in the Communication. This concludes that if cumulative Annex I reductions end up at around 10% below 1990 levels, this “would require an increase in the transfer of international public finance to developing countries of around Euros 120 billion per year in 2020.”

Such “radical” voices as McKinsey, in its recent analysis for Project Catalyst, give the same simple message – weak targets require much, much higher levels of public finance from Annex I countries for mitigation in developing countries. There is no free lunch.

Unfortunately a lot of industrialised countries’ negotiators can’t get their heads round the simple maths, and are trying to have it both ways. ECO is clear – if markets are to play a role, enabling conditions must first be in place. Low Annex I targets do not enabling conditions make.

At Bonn III, developing countries called for a fundamental debate on the role of carbon markets in the Copenhagen agreement, and have strongly repeated the call here in Bangkok. An honest discussion of the conditions under which carbon markets could contribute to keeping warming well below 2oC is long overdue. Let’s strip out double, triple and quadruple counting and concentrate on what the atmosphere sees. And address the concern that the rich world is picking all of developing countries’ “low hanging fruit.”

The EU and other industrialised countries are sitting in the carbon market train wanting to discuss the colour of the seats, and wondering why developing countries won’t jump on board. The developing countries are on the platform waiting for the engine to turn up.

[Article published in Climate Action Network's Eco Newspaper, Oct. 5, 2009 from Bangkok, Thailand UNFCCC negotiations - full PDF version here]

The Week Ahead

Last week there was much talk of elephants in the room.

Today, ECO chooses to highlight members of the cat family. The UNFCCC process is crawling forward like a timid kitten but the pace must accelerate to cheetah-like speed at once if effective actions are to be taken in Copenhagen.

The first observation on last week’s sessions is that after many weeks of “negotiations” this process can move forward. But movement is not enough. We need speed, focus and intention. And needless to say, the texts are still way too long and the steps so far are way too small.

Second, we need to see the political commitment and ambition expressed by national leaders in New York last month flowing into the text, rather than marking time and holding off the necessary steps to consolidate, clarify and consolidate yet again. ECO urges delegates to keep in mind that each step sorting through the different options steers the process either towards a fair, ambitious and legally binding agreement, or towards a weak and empty deal which will get us nowhere. Every choice counts.

There is something else that needs to happen this week outside the UN Conference Centre. Heads of state and government should be clearing their calendars to attend the climate summit in Copenhagen. Their personal presence will signal that countries and leaders are willing to deliver the commitments required for a fair and effective global climate deal.

The current sad state of the discussions around finance and developed country mitigation action illustrate the very wide gap between low ambition of the offers on the table and the necessity of a high ambition outcome in Copenhagen.

This coming week is the time for negotiators to focus on accelerating their work significantly, sharpening the text and moving into full negotiations mode. To begin with, facilitators should be given latitude to consolidate text further. But there is one caution: shortening text by cutting out the ambitious options does not count as improvement at all.

Turning to the Long-term Cooperative Action (LCA) text in particular, ECO finds the following fresh footprints amidst the humdrum repetition of longstanding positions.

• Improvement and shortening of the technology text

• New clarity and progression in the adaptation text

• Commencement of shortening of

1(b)(ii) text

• Submission of the finance text for a round of consolidation after a positive political discussion

• Shortening and significant improvement of the REDD text

However, these are still the actions of a kitten’s hesitant forays into the bright new world. Delegates this week should start building up speed and sprinting like the cheetah with no delay.

[Article published in Climate Action Network's Eco Newspaper, Oct. 5, 2009 from Bangkok, Thailand UNFCCC negotiations - full PDF version here]

Not the Wakeup Call, the Final Call


As Parties took stock of the snail paced progress achieved during the first week at the Conference Centre, residents of Metro Manila were taking stock of lost lives, dwellings and personal belongings that came about due to tropical storm Ondoy.  An unprecedented flood, drenching the region with a month's worth of rain in 6 hours, seems clearly linked to climate change.

Following the dual plenaries on Friday afternoon, stretching into the evening, ECO wondered how many people would have to die and how much property would be destroyed before governments around the world take stock of their serious lack of ambition and wake up to the urgency of the moment.

As the representative from Mauritius pointed out, “This is not the wake up call, this is the final call.”

The KP and LCA plenaries seemed a flat ending to a fitfully productive week.  Was it the late hour, the profusion of repetitious rhetoric, or the inability of delegates to find new and transformational elements in the long discussions?

To be fair, negotiations have moved forward at a slow but measureable pace on adaptation, technology transfer and capacity building. But the keystone, emission reduction targets by developed countries, was sadly still cast in cotton. This is not at all good news.  Perhaps, as New Zealand said, enhancing the scale of actual aggregate and country by country proposals for emissions reductions is out of the hands of this process and must be taken up at the political level.

So that leaves the other essential task to be completed by next Friday in Bangkok: very substantial progress toward clean, non repetitive, negotiating text.  Parties should be in a position to step on the accelerator starting immediately.  This was the clear message from vulnerable country parties in the plenary.

The week-long discussions in the AWG-KP did not deliver the paradigm shift that would help keep global warming well below 2oC. Developing country parties raised the issue repeatedly in their interventions, pointing out among other things that for them this is a question of survival.

But a different and rather unfortunate emerging theme is the clear realization that the Kyoto Protocol is at risk of unraveling; indeed, as Mauritius said, a feeling that a deliberate attempt was being made to do so.  This is hardly the kind of  news the world is looking for while watching the evidence of our vulernability to natural disasters (whether or not climate related) in Metro Manila, Sydney, Samoa and Sumatra.

The lack of sufficient aggregate targets put on the table by developed countries, and only reluctant discussion on on finance and legal architecture, are holding other key parts of the discussions hostage. The lack of clarity on the future form and regulatory aspects of market and non- market based mechanisms is muddying the waters further.

The deliberate insertion of response measures into the adaptation text by some developing country parties is unhelpful and is verging on blocking progress in the contact group.  And the inability of both developed and developing countries to get their act to together on bunkers (especially on the issue of International Air Passenger Levy for Adaptation) is a looming failure in an increasingly climate constrained world.

Over the week in various contact groups it seemed that parties were resorting to their favorite activity – reiterating long memorized positions across the spectrum of issues so they can play the blame game later.  But blame aside, it is readily evident that the slow pace of negotiations only plays into the hands of those parties who don’t want a real deal at Copenhagen.

Despite the predictable recycling of rhetoric this past week, ECO doesn't mind repeating itself on this key reality: global emissions must peak within the next 5-year commitment period, and be reduced thereafter on the order of at least 80% below 1990 levels by 2050, in order to ensure the survival of the poorest and most vulnerable countries and communities.   These reductions must be pursued in the spirit of equity and justice, especially when it comes to the needs of the poor and vulnerable in developing countries.

Delegates should note that what was true in New York last week on the immensity of the climate challenge remains true here this week and next. Bangkok cannot be another lost opportunity for the international community to deliver on its obligations to the the environment, future generations and particularly the most vulnerable communities and countries.  The disaster zones we saw on our TV screens and laptops this week were a mere hint of the losses to come if dangerous climate change is not averted.

So ECO returns to the theme that closed our first review of the week.

Delegates here in Bangkok must realize that the best rhetoric in the world won’t by itself build a single wind turbine, save a single acre of rainforest, or help a single village respond to the impacts of climate change.  Actions speak louder than words.

[Article published in Climate Action Network's Eco Newspaper, Oct. 3, 2009 from Bangkok, Thailand UNFCCC negotiations - full PDF version here]

Fair Deal = Just Transition

Ambitious action is fundamental if we want to leave our children a sustainable world and a chance to achieve the social and development goals they deserve.

The labour movement started calling some time ago for a "just transition." This is a framework for ensuring social justice in the necessary transformation towards climate-resilient societies.  The idea is that transitioning to a low carbon economy is possible, and therefore climate action is a driver for sustainable economic growth and social progress.  Mitigation and adaptation policies can be part of a broader strategy, shaping the societies of the future in a way that is socially fair and environmentally sustainable.
But for this to happen, a process of social consultation, green investment and social protection has to be put in place.  The first steps are already being taken, as the concept is making its way through the UNFCCC process, and text calling for a just transition now appears in the Shared Vision.

The aim is to build the necessary consensus leading toward ambitious action, smoothing the shift towards a more sustainable society and providing hope for the capacity of a "green economy" to sustain decent jobs and livelihoods for all.  The steps beyond that will engage concrete policies and programs to turn this shared vision into a reality that provides sustainability to people's lives as well as nature itself.

[Article published in Climate Action Network's Eco Newspaper, Oct. 3, 2009 from Bangkok, Thailand UNFCCC negotiations - full PDF version here]

Auctioning Off?


It's a familiar theme: developments within Annex I countries are worrying ECO. In the recent European Commission proposal, auctioning seems not to have made the grade.  This doesn’t instill confidence in European leaders whilst they make up their minds on a financial package at the end of this month.  Whilst Europe procrastinates, we see developing countries focus their efforts (quite rightly) on pushing Annex I on scale, not sources.

And so we come to a standstill.

As a decent proposal withers away, no one is nurturing it.   “So what?” some Parties might add.   Well, there is real merit in auctioning: it’s automatic, supports compliance, doesn’t have to flow through national budgets, provides money that is new and additional to ODA commitments, and can raise substantial amounts to name but a few.

So what’s the problem?  ECO says: back to the drawing board, and keep working to fill out the sketch into a complete design. .

[Article published in Climate Action Network's Eco Newspaper, Oct. 3, 2009 from Bangkok, Thailand UNFCCC negotiations - full PDF version here]

The Elephant in the Room

Look carefully around you: there is an elephant walking the hallways in Bangkok (it’s not the local type). It’s an intangible but very sizable beast: 7.5 to 10 Gt CO2e worth of surplus assigned amount units (AAUs).

It’s important to understand the scale of the AAU elephant - almost a third of current, best-case Annex I pledges. If this gets off the track, it threatens to undermine real emissions reductions and collapse the price of carbon when carried over from Kyoto’s first commitment period to a post-2012 regime. This represents a serious threat to the goal of limiting warming to as far below 2oC as possible.

The collapse of economies in transition during the 1990s produced real social and economic hardship. Yet emissions fell dramatically, delaying the reduction of carbon space in the atmosphere.

However, this was by no means the result of climate policy, and rewarding this phenomenon as “early action” contravenes the principle that only targeted, policy-driven changes in greenhouse gas emissions should be accounted for. In addition, to no one’s surprise, surplus AAUs are currently the “grubby outcasts” of the carbon market (even worse than HFCs).

It wasn’t the best idea in Kyoto for Parties to allocate the surplus, but they can join together to correct this error in Copenhagen.

If countries with surpluses want to trade, that needs to be part of a credible, environmentally sound solution.

For example, countries holding extra AAU amounts could agree to a stringent discount (e.g., 60%) of the surplus, if carried over, and the remaining Annex I countries could increase their pledges by another 5%, insuring that overall Annex I aggregate emissions stay more than 40% below 1990 levels in 2020. If countries can’t agree to this kind of solution, carry-over should be forbidden under the Copenhagen agreement.

The EU Commission took a strong position on the AAU surplus issue. Options they have been considering should be rolled into the kind of compromise described above. AAUs cannot be used for compliance in the EU post-2012 climate and energy package. Now the EU can set the tone internationally, reaching a solution to absorb its surplus out of the global compliance system before Copenhagen.

Russia and Ukraine have set 2020 targets, but according to IIASA, those levels could actually be achieved by business-as-usual emissions growth from current levels, while still generating hundreds of megatons of credits annually. Talk about a free elephant ride!

This could divert huge financing flows away from mitigation in developing countries.

Russia and Ukraine should set more ambitious targets, well below BAU, and address the current surplus. While their emissions collapse slowed the growth of GHG stocks, this would be reversed if the Kyoto surplus was used to achieve targets, and especially so if future weak targets generate yet more questionable credits. From ECO’s viewpoint, that would be about as absurd as watching a magician pull an elephant out of a hat.

Restoring EU Leadership

Rewind 10 months to December 2008: in Poznan, negotiators prepare for another day of working group discussions. Meanwhile the rest of the continent is intently watching Brussels, where European leaders make the big political decisions on the EU’s 2020 climate package.

Now fast-forward one year to December 2009: it’s mid-session in the climate talks in Copenhagen and European leaders are again meeting in Brussels. What sort of leadership can we expect?

Europe still talks a good game on climate change and headlines their place at the head of the Annex I pack. But the cracks in confidence in the EU’s leadership have turned into chasms of concern as ambition has weakened.

At a moment when the vast majority of countries want a strong agreement but the negotiations remain mired in distrust and distraction, ECO suggests that European delegates consider these steps toward restoring EU climate leadership.

Step one is to communicate a compelling vision of what success looks like at Copenhagen: a vision based on staying as far as possible below 2oC through a global transition to low carbon economies and sustainable development for all.


Step two is to demonstrate that actions lead to success. That means moving onto new ground with mitigation and finance proposals that reflect scientific necessity rather than political expediency, and not simply waiting to see what the others will do first.

Step three is to shift the dynamic of the negotiations from ‘after you’  to ‘follow me’ – to build an “ambition coalition” of countries willing to take round after round of stronger action as others take steps for action and support. Together, ambition and action will lead to success.

The EU showed real leadership when it first tabled its 20%-30% target for emissions reductions below 1990 levels by 2020 - the first major emitter to make a unilateral agreement of this kind. It is ahead of most Annex I parties in its willingness to negotiate seriously on climate finance. But there are some problems.

• Rather than preparing for success by setting out a plan to move to 30%, many European countries seem to be quietly hoping that they can stick to 20% and avoid another battle with carbon polluting industries.

• Rather than sending a strong signal that Europe is serious about building a low carbon economy at home, it has proposed achieving much of its target through land use loopholes and cheap international offsets.

• Rather than recognising the need for additional, innovative and sustained public financing flows to help ambitious developing countries transform their economies and adapt to climate change in the coming decades, it is busy lowering expectations of Europe’s “fair share” of the bill.

It’s still not too late to turn this around. The economic crisis has created an opportunity.

Europe’s emissions have fallen to a point where achieving a 30% reduction is no more difficult or costly than 20% was expected to be when leaders signed on the dotted line. In fact, by adopting more ambitious targets, Europe can ensure that the economic recovery is built on low carbon investment rather than a return to business as usual.

Furthermore, if the EU really wants to reaffirm its role as a climate change leader, it will move toward a 40% reduction target. Not only is it the right economic pathway for Europe, it is also the most credible political strategy for success at Copenhagen.

[Article published in Climate Action Network's Eco Newspaper, Oct. 2, 2009 from Bangkok, Thailand UNFCCC negotiations - full PDF version here]

Comparability of Effort and Chances of Survival

Parties should welcome the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the nations of Kazakhstan, Turkey and Zimbabwe. Their action affirms Kyoto’s continued value and demonstrates a commitment to sparing humanity from catastrophic climate change.

A Copenhagen agreement that does not aim for a high probability of ensuring the survival and sustainable development of all nations, and the welfare of the most vulnerable, is not acceptable. The targets currently tabled by developed countries fall well short of guaranteeing these core objectives. Those targets put us on a trajectory to wipe sovereign nations off the map, add to development challenges and increase human suffering.

There is a very narrow envelope of possible emissions pathways to 2050 that have an acceptably high probability of avoiding the worst impacts of dangerous climate change. These pathways require peaking global emissions within the next 5-year commitment period and achieving reductions of at least 80% below 1990 levels by 2050.

Developed nation commitments must be based on a science-driven approach. A weak, bottom-up approach to reduction targets combined with loopholes and offsets creates a race to the bottom and a crash course on the harsh reality of catastrophic climate change.

Carbon markets should play a role in a post-2012 agreement only if the currently tabled developed country reduction targets are increased dramatically. In addition, the hazard of surplus AAUs must be addressed. The rules on LULUCF, offsetting and AAU banking must be consistent with keeping temperatures well below 2oC.

There is no avoiding the fact that deep and real emissions reductions are needed now. There simply is no atmospheric space for evasion of responsibility. For this reason, agreements in the KP track must be consistent with agreements in the LCA track in order to avoid double-counting, promote consistency, avoid loopholes and ensure the environmental integrity and fairness of the overall Copenhagen agreement.

The Kyoto Protocol provides a clear framework for industrialized country action. Rapidly evolving scientific evidence on the growing impacts of global warming does not allow for any more time to be wasted in renegotiating its architecture. Copenhagen must deliver robust, quantifiable, legally binding emissions reduction targets for all developed countries consistent with our world’s shrinking carbon budget.

The existing monitoring, reporting and verification systems are essential to help ensure environmental integrity. The compliance system must be strengthened and expanded to include an early warning system to correct projected shortfalls as well as stronger consequences for non-compliance if early warning does not lead to a remedy. The system of 5-year commitment periods is vital to allow for reviews based on new science, particularly the 5th IPCC assessment report due in 2014.

Developed countries are deliberately blurring discussions by taking different rather than common approaches to negotiating their targets. Agreement must be reached here in Bangkok on a more than 40% aggregate reduction target by 2020 compared to 1990 levels, 5-year commitment periods, and an agreement on supplementarity. Only when these elements are fixed can fair, effective national targets be negotiated and the “comparability of effort” be evaluated, and our chances of survival be elevated.

[Article published in Climate Action Network's Eco Newspaper, Oct. 2, 2009 from Bangkok, Thailand UNFCCC negotiations - full PDF version here]

Time for a Course Correction

The Bali Action Plan (BAP) provides a clear timetable and outline for negotiations aimed toward a fair and effective deal in Copenhagen. That outline differentiates between the mitigation commitments of developed countries and the MRV actions undertaken by developing countries.

The BAP did not, however, provide space for the crucial overarching discussion on architecture. That includes a discussion about the relationship between an enhanced Kyoto Protocol (or a successor Protocol) and the legal outcome of negotiations under the LCA. This architectural debate goes to the heart of the Copenhagen outcome.

Such a discussion will have to include consideration of the comparability of the efforts of those rich countries that have avoided doing so under Kyoto -- especially the United States -- and those who have inscribed their commitments in Annex B.  It should fully consider all architectural proposals that aim to flesh out all the requisite responsibilities, as the climate regime evolves and builds on the solid foundation the Convention provides.

ECO has been a bit surprised by the confusion the US was able to create with its call for a discussion of the “common” elements of the BAP.  Indeed, it is the US that is on review until it is ready to commit to doing its fair share, both in reducing its own emissions and taking on a concrete financial obligation. The clock is ticking on the US Senate turning the good intentions of President Obama into legislative action. Today, the main bill from Senate leadership is being released: game on.  The countdown to Copenhagen continues.

As for the developing countries, based on what they have been tabling recently, like China last week, they have nothing to fear.

Developing countries need not be defensive, and they should welcome a broader debate on architecture.
ECO calls on all delegations to enter into this debate with an open mind, without dwelling too much on the motivations of the US. We welcome political statements if they are used as a means to clarify country positions, rather than as detours slowing down progress towards an equitable and ambitious deal that has real environmental integrity.

These refinements to the course of the debate would help shorten the negotiating text to its bare essence, by articulating areas of convergence and divergence in legal terms and conducting actual negotiations, rather than further process discussions. Yet for all the diplomatic niceties: this is a fight worth having.

[Article published in Climate Action Network's Eco Newspaper, Sep. 30, 2009 from Bangkok, Thailand UNFCCC negotiations - full PDF version here]

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